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Thesis Summary
This thesis examines the relationship between self-esteem and psychological 
health. In Chapter 1 ,1 define self-esteem and psychological health, illustrate the 
prominence of these two psychological constructs, and review the literature on the 
relation between self-esteem and psychological health. As we will see, self-esteem can 
be defined as one’s overall evaluation as a person, and psychological health can be 
defined as the absence of depression, anxiety, and negative affect together with the 
presence of life satisfaction and positive affect. Further, we will see that self-esteem 
and psychological health are among the most frequently researched psychological 
constructs. Thus, the corpus of research on the relationship between self-esteem and 
psychological health is massive. Nonetheless, the nature and dynamics of this 
relationship are complex and far from being fully understood. The empirical research 
presented in this thesis helps to better understand this relationship.
To this end, I have conducted three empirical lines of research. The three lines 
of research approach the same overarching goal from three very different angles. In the 
first empirical chapter (Chapter 2), I report a line of research in which my collaborators 
and I studied the impact of one facet of psychological health -  i.e., chronic mood -  on 
self-esteem when recalling positive and negative past selves. In four studies, we found 
that chronically happy people assimilated towards a recalled positive self and 
contrasted away from a recalled negative self, which in both cases lead to a relative 
increase in self-esteem. Chronically sad people, on the other hand, assimilated towards 
a recalled negative self and contrasted away from a recalled positive self, which in both 
cases lead to a relative decrease in self-esteem. Thus, this research shows that
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psychological health in the form of chronic mood can impact self-esteem via the 
medium of recalling past selves.
The research reported in the second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) was 
motivated by the conviction that a full understanding of the relationship between self­
esteem and psychological health can be obtained only by placing this relationship in a 
larger context involving other psychological variables. Past research suggests that 
belongingness is the one psychological construct that is particularly relevant in this 
respect. Thus, Chapter 3 reports a line of research studying the relations between 
belongingness, self-esteem, and psychological health. In three studies, we developed 
and validated a novel two-dimensional measure of people’s perceptions of the 
belongingness they experience from other people. The measure assesses the amount of 
belongingness experienced and the degree to which people perceive this belongingness 
as being unconditional or conditional on their achievements and contributions. We 
extended past social psychological research by demonstrating that the unconditionality 
of belongingness explains variance in psychological health independent of the amount 
of belongingness. More importantly, the data showed that self-esteem plays a central 
role in these relationships. Specifically, the amount of self-esteem (e.g., global self­
esteem) mediated the relationship between the amount of belongingness and 
psychological health, whereas the conditionality of self-esteem (i.e., global contingent 
self-esteem) mediates the relationship between the unconditionality of belongingness 
and psychological health.
In the final empirical chapter (Chapter 4), we wanted to elucidate why past 
empirical research failed to find a relationship between implicit measures of self-esteem 
and self-reported psychological health when controlling for explicit measures of self­
esteem. One reason for this puzzling but consistent null result may be that existent
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implicit measures of self-esteem assess domain-specific self-esteem, but not global self­
esteem. Thus, Chapter 4 reports a line of research studying the relation between 
psychological health and a novel implicit measure of global self-esteem. Six studies 
developed and validated this new implicit measure, finding that our newly developed 
measure predicts higher psychological health even when controlling for explicitly 
measured self-esteem.
Finally, Chapter 5 reviews the contribution of the research presented in this 
thesis to our understanding of the relationship between self-esteem and psychological 
health. Overall, the research emphasises the complexity of the multi-faceted processes 
that underlie this relationship. Directions for future research are discussed.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Chapter Overview
The primary purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. There have been various 
sceptical reactions to this aim from friends and colleagues. Some wondered, “Isn’t 
your contribution negligible given that you focus on one in a billion relationships that 
occur in psychology?” Others asked, “Isn’t it a bit pathetic to devote three years of your 
life to examining a single correlation between two variables?” Some people have been 
bemused: “And it took you really three years to figure this relationship out?” I am 
hopeful that this chapter clarifies these issues.
The scope of the chapter is threefold. First, I examine definitions of self-esteem 
and psychological health and show that these two constructs are among the most 
frequently researched constructs in psychology. Thus, we are not dealing with merely 
one randomly picked relationship out of a billion possible relationships.
Second, I will review the literature on the relationship between self-esteem and 
psychological health. This review will show that this relationship is among the most 
robust and most frequently demonstrated relationships in the social sciences. At the 
same time, I will show that the nature and dynamics of this relationship are 
multifaceted, complicated, and far from being fully understood. Thus, it is extremely 
worthwhile to build a dissertation on the multi-facetted questions around the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. In fact, one could spend an 
entire lifetime examining the same issue, but even a life-long research program would 
not be able to solve the complete puzzle around this relationship.
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The third aim of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the research that my 
collaborators and I have conducted in order to better understand the relationship 
between self-esteem and psychological health. This research demonstrates that (1) 
psychological health in the form of chronic mood can affect self-esteem when recalling 
positive and negative past selves (Chapter 2), (2) quantitative and qualitative 
differences in belongingness play a major role in the understanding of the relationship 
between self-esteem and psychological health (Chapter 3), and (3) implicit measures of 
self-esteem can predict psychological health over and above explicit measures of self­
esteem (Chapter 4).
1.2 Self-Esteem and Psychological Health
This section will define self-esteem and illustrate its psychological relevance, 
and then define psychological health and illustrate its psychological relevance. I will 
then briefly review the literature on the causal role of self-esteem in the relationship 
between self-esteem and psychological health. This review reveals that high self­
esteem is neither the cause of virtually every positive intrapersonal and interpersonal 
outcome nor is low self-esteem the cause of virtually every negative intrapersonal and 
interpersonal outcome, as has been assumed at large (see also Baumeister, Campbell, 
Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; Crocker & Park, 2004; Marsh & Craven, 2006; Scheff & 
Fearon, 2004). In fact, this review shows that one of the few strong and reliable 
outcomes of higher self-esteem is better psychological health, which illustrates the 
importance of understanding the processes underlying the relationship between self­
esteem and psychological health. On the other hand, the literature review also reveals a 
lack of research on the causal effect of psychological health on self-esteem. Together 
then, the literature review points toward several exciting and timely topics of research
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regarding the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. Three of these 
topics will be addressed in this thesis’s three empirical chapters.
1.2.1 Self-Esteem
Global, personal self-esteem (hereafter simply ‘self-esteem’) is defined as one’s 
overall sense of worthiness as a person (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Rosenberg, 1979; 
Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Self-esteem has been frequently labelled as one of the most 
important psychological constructs (Baumeister, 1998; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; 
Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). In fact, self-esteem is the most 
frequently researched trait in psychology (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002), and it 
has been argued that high self-esteem is one of the most fundamental psychological 
needs (Fiske, 2002; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Some 
empirical evidence even indicates that high self-esteem is the single most important 
psychological need (Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001).
In addition, self-esteem lies at the heart of many of the most prominent theories 
in social psychology. For example, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner; 1979; see 
also Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002), Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 
2004), Sociometer Theory (Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Cox, 
2007; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), the SCENT model (Sedikides & Gregg, 
2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997), Self-Affirmation Theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; 
Steele, 1988), the Self-Evaluation Maintenance Model (Tesser, 1988, 2000), and 
Temporal Self-Appraisal Theory (Ross & Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2001) are all 
based on the assumption that people strive for self-esteem.
1.2.2 Psychological Health
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There is no universally accepted definition of psychological health (World 
Health Report, 2001). There is disagreement among researchers about which 
psychological variables qualify as indicators of psychological health (cf. Ryff & Singer, 
1998). However, the field broadly agrees upon several core elements of psychological 
health: the absence of depression and anxiety, low chronically negative affect, and the 
presence of life satisfaction and chronically positive affect (e.g., Beck, 1972; Diener, 
1984; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004; Spielberger, 1966; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Some researchers also regard psychological health 
as subsuming various additional variables, including the absence of loneliness 
(Sedikides et al., 2004) the absence of neuroticism (Neiss, Stevenson, Sedikides, 
Kumashiro, Finkel, & Rusbult, 2005; Watson, Suls, & Haigh, 2002), and secure 
attachment (Simpson, 1990). In this thesis, I operationalize psychological health via 
different indicators of psychological health taken from the list of core indicators above.
The significance of psychological health in psychology has been labelled 
“unparalleled” (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Some have even argued that the justification of 
psychology as a discipline is that it promises to contribute to better psychological health 
(Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997). Finding ways to improve psychological health is an 
urgent endeavour given that depression, a major component of psychological health, is 
the most frequent illness in Western societies, among both men and women. In fact, it 
has been estimated that the productivity loss due to depression in the US economy costs 
employers about $44 billion a year (Stewart, Ricci, Chee, Hahn, & Morganstein, 2003) 
and that the total cost of depression in Europe is about €118 billion per year (Sobocki, 
Jonsson, Angst, & Rehnberg, 2006). In fact, the motivation to be psychologically 
healthy is considered so fundamental that it is seldom regarded as a mere motive or
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need, but rather as an underlying ‘principle’ (cf. pleasure principle; Freud, 1920; see 
also Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008).
1.2.3 The Relation between Self-Esteem and Psychological Health
Abundant research has explored potential effects of self-esteem and 
psychological health on numerous aspects of psychological functioning. A lot of this 
research is relevant to understanding the relation between self-esteem and 
psychological health. In this sub-section, I will consider the potential effects of each 
variable on the other.
Self-Esteem as a Causal Variable
Given the aforementioned prominence of self-esteem in psychological theory 
and research, it is not surprising that researchers, practitioners, and laypersons alike 
have seen self-esteem as “the panacea of modem life” (Brown & Dutton, 1995). Hence, 
it is intuitively appealing that self-esteem should cause a plethora of positive outcomes. 
As such, high self-esteem has been thought of as an “antidote to poverty, drug use, and 
under-achievement and lauded as the royal road to financial success, health, and 
personal fulfilment” (Brown & Dutton, 1995, p. 712). This glorification of self-esteem 
led to the so-called self-esteem movement, with a large number of offspring such as the 
California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility 
(1989). The conviction that, with the construct of self-esteem, psychology has 
discovered a “modern-day Holy Grail” (Swann et al., 2007) was so strong that leading 
figures of the self-esteem movement wholeheartedly believed that “self-esteem has 
profound consequences for every aspect of our existence” (Branden, 1994, p. 5 [italics 
added]) and that “virtually every social problem can be traced to people’s lack of self- 
love” (Davis, 1988, p. 10 [italics added]).
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The realization that self-esteem is neither a modern-day Holy Grail nor the 
panacea of modem life came only recently via empirical data, and this discovery was a 
shock to the many who were in love with self-love. Specifically, in a landmark paper, 
Baumeister and colleagues (2003) comprehensively reviewed the literature on the 
effects of self-esteem and came to a rather devastating conclusion: “most of the effects 
[of self-esteem] are weak to modest. Self-esteem is thus not a major predictor or cause 
of almost anything” and further, “we have not found evidence that boosting self-esteem 
(by therapeutic interventions or school programs) causes benefits. Our findings do not 
support continued widespread efforts to boost self-esteem in the hope that it will by 
itself foster improved outcomes.” (Baumeister et al., 2003, ps. 37 and 1 [italics added]; 
for similar conclusions see Crocker & Park, 2004; Marsh & Craven, 2006; Scheff & 
Fearon, 2004).
As a reaction to Baumeister and colleagues’ conclusions, researchers grew busy 
trying to restore the self-esteem’s crippled image (Swann et al., 2007, Swann, Chang- 
Schneider, & McClarty, 2008). That is, many attempts have been undertaken to show 
that self-esteem does exert positive effects on major intrapersonal and interpersonal 
constructs. As a result, three longitudinal studies found that self-esteem predicts 
delinquency, antisocial behaviour, and aggressive behaviour, respectively (Donnellan, 
Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005). In addition, an 11-year longitudinal 
study showed that self-esteem significantly predicts tobacco dependence, criminal 
convictions, school dropout, and money and work problems (Trzesniewski, Donnellan, 
Moffitt, Robins, Poulton, & Caspi, 2006). Further, other longitudinal studies showed 
that self-esteem improved standardized test scores, reduced school disciplinary reports, 
and reduced use of drugs and alcohol (DuBois & Flay, 2004; Haney & Durlak, 1998). 
Finally, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
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concluded on the basis of their longitudinal work that self-concept and related 
constructs are “closely tied to students’ economic success and long-term health and 
wellbeing” (OECD, 2003, p. 9). In all these studies, the effects of self-esteem held even 
after controlling for several potential confounding variables. Thus, these more recent 
findings shed a more positive light on the effects of self-esteem than the findings that 
were available at the time of Baumeister and colleagues’ review. Nonetheless, the 
effects of self-esteem are considerably more moderate than initially assumed by 
researchers and practitioners in the self-esteem movement.
There is one notable exception to this rule: self-esteem is strongly related to 
psychological health. This conclusion was supported by Baumeister and colleagues’ 
(2003) review:
“People with high self-esteem are significantly, substantially happier than other 
people. They are also less likely to be depressed, either in general or specifically 
in response to stressful, traumatic events. Many studies have confirmed this 
link.” (p. 28)
In support of this claim, self-esteem is typically related more strongly to more chronic 
positive affect (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Brown & Dutton, 1995; Halamandaris & 
Power, 1997; Hamid & Cheng, 1996; Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996; Tarlow & Haaga, 
1996), higher life satisfaction (Diener & Diener, 1995; Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996; 
Sedikides et al., 2004; Diener, 1984; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999), less chronic 
negative affect, (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Brown & Dutton, 1995; Halamandaris & 
Power, 1997; Hamid & Cheng, 1996; Lucas et al.„ 1996; Tarlow & Haaga, 1996), 
lower levels of depression (Lewinsohn, Hoberman, & Rosenbaum, 1988; Butler, 
Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994; Hankin, Lakdawalla, Carter, Abela, & Adams, 2007; Joiner, 
1995; Joiner, Katz, & Lew, 1999; Kemis, Grannemann, & Mathis, 1991; Kemis et al.,
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1998; Roberts & Gamble, 2001; Roberts & Monroe, 1992; Whisman & Kwon, 1993), 
and less anxiety (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, Rosenblatt, Burlin, Lyon, Pinel, & 
Simon, 1992; Joiner, 1995; Ralph & Mineka, 1998; Watson et al., 2002).
In addition, numerous longitudinal studies have shown that self-esteem predicts 
psychological health. For example, self-esteem has exhibited longitudinal effects on 
depression (e.g., Abela, Webb, Wagner, Ho, & Adams, 2006; Fernandez, Mutran, & 
Reitzes, 1998; Lewinsohn et al., 1988 [reanalyzing data reported in Lewinsohn, 
Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981]; Trzesniewski et al., 2006; Orth, Robins, & 
Roberts, 2008), anxiety (DuBois, Burk-Braxton, Swenson, Tevendale, Lockerd, Moran, 
2002; Neiss et al., 2005), and sadness (Ciarrochi, Heaven, & Davies, 2007). 
Psychological Health as a Causal Variable
Given the centrality of psychological health for people’s lives, it is not 
surprising that psychological health is related to a plethora of other variables, such as 
wealth (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002; Diener & Oishi, 20020), family satisfaction 
(Diener & Diener, 1995), extraversion (Mayers & Diener, 1995), religiosity (Smith, 
McCullough, & Poll, 2003), low educational qualification and a history of 
unemployment (Clark, Georgellis, Lucas, & Diener, 2004), social support (Stroebe & 
Stroebe, 1997), loneliness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), fear of death (Wagner & 
Lorion, 2006), optimism (Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998), and somatic 
health problems (Stordal, Bjelland, Dahl, & Mykletun, 2003). However, the 
consistently strongest correlate of psychological health is self-esteem (e.g., Diener & 
Diener, 1995; Joiner et al., 1999; Judge et al., 2002; Watson et al., 2002; Sheldon et al., 
2001).
Nonetheless, the causal role of psychological health in its relationship to self­
esteem is vastly under-explored. Specifically, there is a large imbalance between
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research and theory on the effects of self-esteem on psychological health and the effects 
of psychological health on self-esteem. This imbalance reflects the underlying 
assumption in social psychology that self-esteem plays a stronger causal role in the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health than does psychological 
health. Despite a total of over 10,000 studies on the relationship between self-esteem 
and psychological health, Baumeister et al.’s (2003) review of the effects of self-esteem 
indicated that not even a single study tested the causal effect of psychological health on 
self-esteem. At the same time, Baumeister et al. (2003) noted that it is possible that 
“happiness, in the sense of a temperament or disposition to feel good, causes high self­
esteem” (p. 28).
Since Baumeister et al.’s review, the situation has not changed much. A couple 
of relevant longitudinal studies have emerged, but the findings are somewhat 
contradictory. Specifically, Shahar and Davidson (2003) found a significant effect of 
depression on self-esteem in a longitudinal design over four months. However, Ormel, 
Oldehinkel, and Vollebergh (2004) and Orth et al. (2008) failed to replicate this finding 
using longer time-intervals and larger sample-sizes in their longitudinal studies.
Further, the processes that underlie possible effects of psychological health on self­
esteem are not clear. Thus, research elucidating possible effects of psychological health 
on self-esteem is badly needed.
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) in this thesis demonstrates causal effects 
of psychological health (here: chronic mood) on self-esteem in a specific domain: when 
recalling positive and negative personal traits and episodes. This line of research 
particularly emphasizes the process that underlies an effect of chronic mood on self­
esteem when it comes to recalling valenced selves.
Self-Esteem and Psychological Health as One Variable
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A third possibility that may explain the correlation between self-esteem and 
psychological health is that the two constructs are actually the same variable or at least 
are indicators of the same higher order concept. In fact, some empirical research 
supports this latter position. Specifically, three empirical papers have provided 
evidence that self-esteem and various markers of psychological health share the same 
underlying core. First, Judge et al. (2002) found that self-esteem, neuroticism, locus of 
control, and generalized self-efficacy are all highly correlated, load on a single higher 
order factor, display relatively poor discriminant validity, and account for little 
incremental variance in predicting external criteria relative to the higher order 
construct. Second, Watson et al. (2002) found correlations between self-esteem and the 
depression facet of neuroticism being as high as r  = -.86. These authors suggested 
conceptualizing high self-esteem as representing the absence of depression. Finally, 
Neiss, Stevenson, Legrand, Iacono, and Sedikides (in press) tested the structure and 
magnitude of genetic and environmental influences on the overlap among self-esteem, 
negative emotionality, and major depression symptoms. Neiss et al. found that self­
esteem, depression, and neuroticism represent aspects of a common temperamental 
core.
Given these findings, one may question the worth of treating self-esteem and 
psychological health as two separate constructs. And in fact, if one would base her 
judgment concerning this issue solely on the three aforementioned sets of data it may 
be sensible to conclude that treating self-esteem and psychological health as two 
separate constructs is unwarranted. However, on theoretical grounds, there is good 
reason to distinguish self-esteem and psychological health conceptually (see definitions 
above; see also Diener & Diener, 1995). In line with these theoretical considerations, 
there is a much larger corpus of empirical research than the aforementioned one that
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fails to find exceedingly high correlations between self-esteem and psychological 
health—including neuroticism, depression, and locus of control (e.g., Diener & Diener, 
1995; Sedikides et al., 2004; Segerstrom et al., 1998). Moreover, longitudinal research 
on the relationship between self-esteem and depression also supports the position that 
the two constructs are not redundant (e.g., Orth et al., 2008). Overall then, it is 
important to point toward the possibility of a common core underlying self-esteem and 
psychological health and future research is needed to better explore this possibility. 
However, as it currently stands, there is no reason to dismiss research that treats self­
esteem and psychological health as two related but distinct constructs. In fact, many of 
the results of the empirical chapters presented in this thesis provide additional support 
that self-esteem and psychological health are functionally not equivalent (see Chapter 
2, 3, and 4).
1.2.4 Why does High Self-Esteem lead to Better Psychological Health?
The more recent research revealing positive effects of self-esteem on 
psychological health has not investigated the mechanism underlying these effects. 
Despite Baumeister and colleagues’ (2003) suggestion that researchers should 
thoroughly examine why high self-esteem leads to better psychological health, research 
examining this question remains sparse. As a result, the processes through which self­
esteem exerts the positive effects on psychological health are not fully understood.
Nonetheless, recent theories and evidence have provided promising beginnings. 
A few theories provide compelling descriptions of the process through which high self­
esteem leads to better psychological health (e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000; 
Pyszczynski et al., 2004). Perhaps the broadest and most actively discussed theory in 
this respect is Sociometer Theory (Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary &
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Cox, 2007; Leary et al., 1995). According to Sociometer Theory, self-esteem functions 
as a meter of a person’s belongingness status. That is, Sociometer Theory assumes that 
high self-esteem is the affective manifestation of a sufficient degree of social bonds. As 
such, the effects that self-esteem asserts on psychological health are spuriously caused 
by the benefits of an optimal level of belongingness (i.e., sufficient social bonds, 
availability of social support, lack of loneliness). In other words, self-esteem is an 
epiphenomenon that has no causal effects itself, but reflects a person’s belongingness 
status (Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Cox, 2007; Leary et al.,
1995). Leary and colleagues argued for the evolutionary adaptiveness of self-esteem as 
a meter of belongingness, by pointing towards the survival value of belongingness in 
the prehistoric history of humankind (for a review, see Baumeister & Leary, 1995). 
Sufficient social bonds were vital for the survival of our species in ancient history.
Thus, there would be high evolutionary value in having a sensitive system that monitors 
one’s belongingness status and motivates people to seek more belongingness when 
one’s belongingness status is critically low (Leary & Baumeister, 2000).
Several empirical studies support the sociometer hypothesis (Antony, Holmes,
& Wood, 2007; Buckley, Winkel, & Leary, 2004; Leary, Cottrell, & Phillips, 2001; 
Leary, Gallagher, Fors, Buttermore, Baldwin, Lane, & Mills, 2003; Leary, Koch, & 
Hechenbleikner, 2001; for a review see Leary & Cox, 2007). In addition, ample 
research has shown that sufficient social bonds, availability of social support, and lack 
of loneliness are all related to better psychological health (e.g., Argyle 1987, DeNeve, 
1999; Lee & Ishii-Kuntz 1987; Myers 1999) and that this relationship is mediated by 
self-esteem (e.g., DuBois et al., 2002; Grills & Ollendick, 2002; Simoni, Huang, 
Goodry, Montoya, 2005; Symister & Friend, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004). In sum, the
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evidence indicates that self-esteem predicts psychological health, and this may be due 
to self-esteem being an indicator of a person’s belongingness status.
Although this conclusion may represent a significant step forward, it may also 
be a bit overly optimistic. The reason is that self-esteem varies not only in its amount 
(i.e., quantity), but also in its nature (i.e., quality). Recent studies have shown that, 
irrespective of the amount of self-esteem, people differ in the degree to which self­
esteem is contingent on their achievements and contributions. For some people, self­
esteem is relatively non-contingent on their achievements and contributions (i.e., 
contingent self-esteem; Kemis, 2003), and this high, non-contingent self-esteem has 
been called secure (Deci & Ryan, 1995) or optimal (Kemis, 2003) self-esteem.
This distinction between the amount of self-esteem and its perceived 
contingency has important consequences because of evidence that people with more 
contingency in their self-esteem show greater fluctuations in self-esteem over time 
(Kemis, 2008). More crucially here, contingent self-esteem is related to psychological 
health over and above amount of self-esteem (Kemis, 2008; Kemis, Lakey, & Heppner, 
2005; as cited in Kemis & Goldman, 2006). Thus, the effect of self-esteem on 
psychological health cannot be fully understood unless research is able to link 
qualitative differences in self-esteem (e.g., stability and contingency of self-esteem) to 
the belongingness framework of self-esteem.
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) in this thesis demonstrates that 
belongingness research can be reconciled with the latest research showing that self­
esteem does not only differ in its amount, but also in its contingency. Specifically, we 
introduce a novel dimension of belongingness: the degree to which belongingness is 
experienced as conditional on one’s achievements and contributions versus the degree 
to which belongingness is experienced as unconditional. Whereas amount of self­
Gebaucr 2008 13
Chapter 1 Introduction
esteem is strongly linked to amount of belongingness, contingent self-esteem is 
strongly linked to unconditionality of belongingness. This pattern of results is central 
for the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health, because amount and 
unconditionality of belongingness showed independent effects on psychological health, 
with amount of self-esteem mediating the effect of amount of self-esteem on 
psychological health and contingent self-esteem mediating the effect of 
unconditionality of belongingness on psychological health.
1.2.5 Is the Relationship between Self-Esteem and Psychological Health Due to 
Common Method Variance and Social Desirability?
The very consistent evidence of a relationship between self-esteem and 
psychological health exclusively capitalizes on explicit (i.e., self-report) measures of 
self-esteem. When assessing self-esteem via implicit (i.e., indirect) measures, the 
picture concerning this relationship looks quite different. Previous studies found that 
implicit measures of self-esteem relate only inconsistently to psychological health (e.g., 
Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Schimmack & Diener, 2003; Shimizu & Pelham, 
2004). Furthermore, in the infrequent cases where a significant relationship between 
implicitly measured self-esteem and psychological health did occur, this relationship 
was rendered non-existent when controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem (e.g., 
Bosson et al., 2000).
This finding is puzzling and muddles the otherwise clear evidence that self­
esteem relates to psychological health (Bosson et al., 2000; Schimmack & Diener, 
2003). Two separate lines of thought about self-esteem are perturbed by this null 
relation. First, advocates of the dual-attitude view o f self-esteem argue that people 
possess two distinct types of self-esteem, namely, implicit and explicit self-esteem
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(e.g., Koole, Dijsterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001; Spalding & Hardin, 1999; Wilson, 
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). According to dual-attitude theorists, implicit self-esteem is 
assessed via implicit measures, whereas explicit self-esteem is assessed via explicit 
measures. Dual-attitude theorists expect a positive relationship between implicit self­
esteem and self-reported psychological health because one’s spontaneous, non- 
conscious self-evaluations (i.e., implicit self-esteem) should manifest themselves in 
behavioural outcomes (e.g., Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), which should 
have direct effects on one’s affective experiences (Bosson et al., 2000). Furthermore, 
Baumeister et al. (2003, p. 25) made the point that “there is not even any meaningful or 
realistic way to assert that someone can be mistaken about his or her happiness.” By 
definition, happiness is a conscious experience and, thus, the most valid way to assess it 
is via self-reports (see Walker & Schimmack, 2008). As such, if implicit self-esteem 
was unrelated to self-reported happiness, the psychological relevance and function of 
implicit self-esteem would need to be questioned seriously (Sheldon et al., 2001). In 
sum, advocates of the dual-attitude view of self-esteem expect at least a small but 
reliable relationship between implicit self-esteem and self-reported psychological 
health, and the absence of this relationship is puzzling.
The absence of the relationship between implicitly measured self-esteem and 
psychological health is even more troubling for advocates of the single-attitude view o f 
self-esteem (Dijksterhuis, Albers, & Bongers, 2008; Famham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 
1999; Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007; Tafarodi & Ho, 2006). Single-attitude theorists 
assume that implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem assess the same construct, 
namely, self-esteem, while also assuming that the two different measurement methods 
(i.e., implicit vs. explicit) are divergently associated with different types of 
measurement error. According to single-attitude theorists, the divergent association
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with measurement error explains the low correlation between implicit and explicit 
measures of self-esteem. Single-attitude theorists of self-esteem dismiss the viability of 
assessing self-esteem via self-report measures, because these measures are biased by 
social desirability (for a review see Famham et al., 1999) and require the respondent to 
possess conscious knowledge about his or her true self-esteem (Greenwald & Famham, 
2000). In Famham et al.’s (1999) words, “self-report measures of self-esteem have 
questionable discriminant, convergent, and predictive validity. ... In order to measure 
genuine self-esteem, self-presentation must be avoided altogether through indirect 
measures of self-esteem.” (p. 235). Single-attitude theorists therefore believe that 
explicit measures of self-esteem do not assess “genuine self-esteem” (Dijksterhuis et 
al., 2008).
This conclusion resonates with earlier assumptions that explicit measures of 
self-esteem tap the motive to outwardly present a positive attitude toward the self 
(Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Tice, 1991) and that people who claim to view 
themselves positively may be boasting to compensate for insecurity and low self­
esteem (Homey, 1937). Given the argument that self-report measures of affect and 
happiness are valid due to the conscious nature of these constructs (Baumeister et al., 
2003), the logical conclusion of single-attitude theorists of self-esteem is to question 
that genuine self-esteem really relates to psychological health, because implicit 
measures of self-esteem failed to find strong and reliable relationships with measures of 
psychological health in the past (Bosson et al., 2000; Schimmack & Diener, 2003, 
Shimuzu & Pelham, 2004).
Irrespective of whether the single-attitude view or the dual-attitude view 
matches reality better, both render it interesting to explain why past research failed to 
find a reliable relationship between implicitly measured self-esteem and psychological
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health. The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) in this thesis demonstrates that the 
failure to find a reliable relationship between implicitly measured self-esteem and 
psychological health occurred because existing implicit measures of self-esteem assess 
only domain-specific rather than global self-esteem. My collaborators and I developed 
an implicit measure of global self-esteem and showed that this measure reliably related 
to psychological health. Together then, Baumeister et al.’s (2003) conclusion that there 
is a strong relationship between self-esteem and psychological health is consistent with 
longstanding empirical findings involving explicit measures of self-esteem as well as 
our findings using the new implicit measure of self-esteem.
1.3 Overview of the Current Research
Together, the previous sections of this chapter presented evidence that the 
popularity of self-esteem and psychological health in psychology as well as for 
laypersons is justified and not at all surprising. At the same time, the relationship 
between these two variables is one of the most frequently demonstrated and most robust 
relationships between two psychological variables. Nonetheless, more research is 
needed to assess how these constructs are related, and this thesis attempts to address 
this issue in three different ways.
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) provides evidence in line with the 
hypothesis that psychological health (in the form of chronic mood) has an effect on 
self-esteem in the context of recalling positive and negative past selves. This line of 
research focuses on the process that underlies the effect of chronic mood on self-esteem 
when recalling valenced selves. In particular, my collaborators and I have devised a 
Mood Congruence Model (MCM) of Temporal Comparison (see also Gebauer, 
Broemer, Haddock, & von Hecker, 2008a). The MCM assumes that chronically happy
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people assimilate towards recalled positive selves and contrast away from recalled 
negative selves. On the contrary, the MCM assumes that chronically sad people 
assimilate towards recalled negative selves and contrast away from recalled positive 
selves.
The provocative implication of the hypothesized pattern of assimilation and 
contrast is that recalling either a positive or a negative past self increases self-esteem 
for chronically happy people, but decreases self-esteem for chronically sad people. In 
four studies, my collaborators and I have provided empirical data that is in line with the 
MCM. These data focus on the reason why the expected patterns of assimilation and 
contrast occur. In brief, the data is in line with the hypothesis that mood congruence 
between the recalled self and the current self (i.e., positive recalled self for chronically 
happy people and negative recalled self for chronically sad people) causes feelings of 
temporal recency, which, in turn, foster assimilation effects of the recalled self on 
current self-esteem (cf. Schwarz & Bless, 1992, 2007; Schwarz & Strack, 1999). At the 
same time, our data is in line with the MCM’s hypothesis that mood incongruence 
between the recalled self and the current self (i.e., negative recalled self for chronically 
happy people and positive recalled self for chronically sad people) causes feelings of 
temporal recency, which, in turn, foster contrast effects of the recalled self on current 
self-esteem (cf. Schwarz & Bless, 1992, 2007; Schwarz & Strack, 1999). As such, 
recalling valenced selves is one domain of life that contributes to the strong relationship 
between self-esteem and psychological health, while speaking for a causal role of 
psychological health in this relationship.
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) is an attempt to integrate contingent 
self-esteem into the belongingness framework of self-esteem. This endeavour may line 
out a way for Sociometer Theory (Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary &
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Cox, 2007; Leary et al., 1995) to understand not only the effect of amount of self­
esteem on psychological health, but also the effect of contingent self-esteem on 
psychological health (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kemis, 2000, 2003; Kemis & Goldman, 
2003, 2006; Kemis & Paradise, 2002). To this end, my collaborators and I have 
conducted three empirical studies in which we have developed a self-report scale of 
belongingness. The belongingness scale possesses two independent dimensions 
(subscales): amount of belongingness and unconditionality of belongingness. Both 
subscales proved to be reliable and valid. Further, both subscales predicted 
psychological health independently from each other.
More relevant for this thesis, the amount of self-esteem mediated the 
relationship between the amount of belongingness and psychological health, whereas 
contingent self-esteem mediated the relationship between unconditionality of 
belongingness and psychological health. As such, this line of research promises to 
integrate contingent self-esteem into the sociometer perspective on self-esteem. This 
endeavour may help to update Sociometer Theory in a manner that enables it to explain 
the effect of amount of self-esteem on psychological health and the effect of contingent 
self-esteem on psychological health.
Finally, in order to confidently maintain the position that self-esteem relates to 
psychological health, it is timely to explain why past research failed to show that 
implicit measures of self-esteem do not consistently relate to psychological health (as 
discussed above). The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) provides an explanation for 
the null-result concerning the relationship between implicit measures of self-esteem and 
psychological health. Specifically, past research has revealed that implicit measures of 
self-esteem assess domain-specific rather than global self-esteem (Banaji, 1999; Bosson 
et al., 2000; Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kemis, 2007; Sakellaropoulo &
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Baldwin, 2007; Wentura, Kulfanek, & Greve; 2005). My collaborators and I (see also 
Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, & Maio, 2008b) have argued that the domain-specificity of 
existent implicit measures of self-esteem may explain why these measures are unrelated 
to psychological health. It follows that an implicit measure of global self-esteem needs 
to be developed, validated, and tested concerning its propensity to predict psychological 
health.
Chapter 4 contains six studies that perform this test. As expected, these studies 
show a reasonably high relationship between implicitly measured self-esteem and 
psychological health. Furthermore, this relationship even holds when controlling for 
explicitly measured self-esteem. In all, this research demonstrates that there is no need 
to dismiss the validity and reliability of the relationship between self-esteem and 
psychological health on grounds of implicit measures of self-esteem: a suitable implicit 
measure can yield this relationship.
Together, the research presented in this thesis has a single goal: Elucidating the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. As argued above my 
collaborators and I hold the conviction that one comprehensive way to examining the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health is to approach this task from 
very different angles at the same time. This endeavour resulted in three freestanding 
papers, including two that have been published (Gebauer et al., 2008a, 2008b). The 
diversity of the three lines of research makes it necessary to provide an extended 
introduction to each of these lines of research at the beginning of each empirical 
chapter. In the General Discussion chapter (Chapter 5), I will present and integrate the 
divergent lessons learned from the three empirical chapters. I believe that this 
integration contributes towards the goal to achieve a parsimonious and integrative view 
of the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health.
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Chapter 2
The Mood Congruence Model of Temporal Comparison
In collaboration with: 
Philip Broemer (University of Vienna) 
Geoffrey Haddock (Cardiff University) 
Ulrich von Hecker (Cardiff University)
2.1 Chapter Overview
The research described in this chapter demonstrates that chronically happy 
people show a relative increase in self-esteem by recalling either a positive or a 
negative self. Chronically sad people, however, show a relative decrease in self-esteem 
by recalling either a positive or a negative self. These effects are due to divergent 
perceptions of mood congruence between the recalled self and the current self. 
Specifically, happy people perceive high mood congruence between a recalled positive 
self and the current self, but low mood congruence between a recalled negative self and 
the current self. In contrast, sad people perceive high mood congruence between a 
recalled negative self and the current self, but low mood congruence between a recalled 
positive self and the current self. Independent of chronic mood, mood congruence leads 
to perceptions of temporal recency, whereas mood incongruence leads to perceptions of 
temporal distance. In line with the inclusion-exclusion model of social judgment, 
perceived temporal recency elicits assimilation effects on self-esteem, whereas 
perceived temporal distance elicits contrast effects on self-esteem. Together then, this 
research is in line with the hypothesis that psychological health -  in the form of chronic
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mood -  exerts effects on self-esteem via the medium of recalling valenced selves. As 
such, this research is among the first to provide evidence in line with the assumption 
that psychological health can have an impact on self-esteem, while putting a 
particularly strong focus on the processes that underlie this effect.
2.2 Introduction
Lay theories hold that thinking about personal glories increases self-esteem and 
subjective well-being, whereas thinking about personal failures decreases self-esteem 
and subjective well-being. Several psychological research-findings are congruent with 
this view. For example, Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, and Routledge (2006) showed 
that nostalgia (i.e., the recall of predominantly positively valenced episodes from one’s 
personal past) is a means for self-esteem boost (see also Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & 
Wildschut, 2008; Sedikides et al., 2004). In the clinical realm, reminiscence therapy 
(Haight, 1988) seeks to increase subjective well-being by asking elderly clients to recall 
happy times from their past. Furthermore, recalling extremely positive episodes from 
one’s personal past is frequently used to induce happy mood (e.g., see Martin, 1990; 
Sedikides, 1992). These findings all support the implicit notion that the current self is 
inevitably assimilated toward the recalled self. That is, remembering positive 
information from one’s personal past is assumed to be included in one’s current self- 
concept, resulting in higher self-esteem and/or subjective well-being. Put simply, 
thinking about our glorious past is assumed to make us feel like heroes in the present.
However, my collaborators and I believe that certain personality characteristics 
may prevent some people from assimilating towards recalled positive selves. In fact, we 
believe that some personality characteristics even render it likely that certain people 
contrast their current self away from recalled positive selves. In this chapter, I report
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four experiments providing evidence that for some people, recalling positive 
information operates as a standard of comparison against which the current self is 
judged (cf. Blanton, 2001; Schwarz & Bless, 1992, 2007). Relative to this positive 
comparison standard, the current self should appear negative, lowering self-esteem 
and/or subjective well-being. In other words, thinking about one’s glorious past makes 
some people feel like losers in the present.
Who are the people who feel like heroes and who are the people who feel like 
losers after thinking about glorious past selves? The overarching hypothesis in this 
research is that recalling a positive past self leads to a relative increase in self-esteem 
for chronically happy people but to a relative decrease in self-esteem for chronically 
sad people. Thus, we hypothesize that, after recalling glorious past selves, chronically 
happy people feel like heroes, whereas chronically sad people feel like losers. Together 
then, this research demonstrates that psychological health, in the form of chronic mood, 
has an impact on people’s self-esteem, within the context of recalling valenced selves. 
The rationale for this hypothesis is outlined below and illustrated in Figure 2.1, in what 
my collaborators and I refer to as the Mood Congruence Model (MCM) of Temporal 
Comparison.
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Figure 1. The Mood Congruence Model (MCM) of Temporal Comparison.
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According to the MCM, chronically happy people should perceive mood 
congruence between a recalled positive self and their current self. Past research on ease 
of retrieval effects (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 
1991), vividness of recall effects (Brown, Ripps, & Shevell, 1985; Hishitani, 1985), and 
feature overlap effects (Brown Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992; Schwarz & Bless, 
2007) all suggest that perceptions of mood congruence should foster the feeling that the 
recalled positive self is temporally recent (i.e., “it feels like yesterday”). Further, past 
research (Broemer, Grabowski, Gebauer, Ermel, & Diehl, 2008; Strack, Schwarz, & 
Gschneidinger, 1985; for a review see Schwarz & Strack, 1999) has shown that 
perceiving a recalled self as temporally recent fosters the impression that this recalled 
self is still a valid part of the current self. Therefore, the recalled self serves as an 
exemplar for the current self, resulting in the inclusion of the recalled self in the current 
self (i.e., assimilation; see Markman & McMullen, 2003; Mussweiler, 2003; Schwarz & 
Bless, 1992, 2007; Stapel & Koomen, 2000; for a general review see Stapel & Suls, 
2007). In short, when recalling a positive past self, chronically happy people (Figure
2.1, column 1, row 1) should perceive mood congruence between the recalled positive 
self and the current self (Figure 2.1, column 1, row 2). The perception of mood 
congruence should foster feelings of temporal recency between the past and the current 
self (Figure 2.1, column 1, row 3). The perception of temporal recency should elicit the 
feeling that the recalled positive self is a part of the current self (Figure 2.1, column 1, 
row 4). Hence, chronically happy people should show a relative increase in self-esteem 
(Figure 2.1, column 1, row 5).
Exactly the opposite should be the case for chronically sad people. According to 
the MCM, chronically sad people should perceive mood incongruence between a 
recalled positive self and their current self. As suggested by past research (see above),
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perceptions of mood incongruence should foster the feeling that the recalled positive 
self is temporally distant (i.e., “it feels like centuries ago”). Further, past research has 
shown that perceiving a recalled self as temporally distant fosters the impression that 
this recalled self is no longer a valid part of the current self. In this case, the recalled 
self serves as a standard of comparison against which the current self is judged, 
resulting in the exclusion of the recalled self from the current self (i.e., contrast). In 
short, when recalling a positive past self, chronically sad people (Figure 2.1, column 2, 
row 1) should perceive mood incongruence between the recalled positive self and the 
current self (Figure 2.1, column 2, row 2). The perception of mood incongruence 
should foster feelings of temporal distance between the past and the current self (Figure
2.1, column 2, row 3), and the perception of temporal distance should elicit the feeling 
that the recalled positive self is no longer a part of the current self. Hence, the current 
self should be compared to the positive past self (Figure 2.1, column 2, row 4), making 
the current self look inferior in comparison. As such, chronically sad people should 
show a relative decrease in self-esteem (Figure 2.1, column 2, row 5).
So far, I have outlined the implications of the MCM of recalling a positive past 
self. Of course, the recall of past selves is not restricted to remembering past glories. 
The MCM also forms predictions concerning the implications of recalling a negative 
past self. Specifically, the MCM suggests that chronically happy people (Figure 2.1, 
column 3, row 1) should perceive mood incongruence between a recalled negative self 
and their current self (Figure 2.1, column 3, row 2). Perceptions of mood incongruence 
should foster the feeling that the recalled positive self is temporally distant (Figure 2.1, 
column 3, row 3), giving the impression that this recalled self is no longer a valid part 
of the current self. Therefore, the recalled self serves as a standard of comparison 
against which the current self is judged, resulting in the exclusion of the recalled self
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from the current self (i.e., contrast) (Figure 2.1, column 3, row 4). Thus, chronically 
happy people should show a relative increase in self-esteem (Figure 2.1, column 3, row 
5).
Exactly the opposite should be the case for chronically sad people. The MCM 
suggests that chronically sad people (Figure 2.1, column 4, row 1) should perceive 
mood congruence between a recalled negative self and their current self (Figure 2.1, 
column 4, row 2). Perceptions of mood congruence should foster the feeling that the 
recalled positive self is temporally recent (Figure 2.1, column 4, row 3), giving the 
impression that this recalled self is still a valid part of the current self. Therefore, the 
recalled self serves as an exemplar for the current self, resulting in the inclusion of the 
recalled self in the current self (i.e., assimilation) (Figure 2.1, column 4, row 4). Thus, 
chronically sad people should show a relative decrease in self-esteem (Figure 2.1, 
column 4, row 5).
The provocative implication of the MCM is that chronically happy people 
should show a relative increase in self-esteem when recalling either a positive or a 
negative past self, whereas chronically sad people should show a relative decrease in 
self-esteem when recalling either a negative or a positive past self. In other words, the 
MCM predicts that chronically happy people show a relative increase in self-esteem 
whatever valenced self they recall, whereas chronically sad people show a relative 
decrease in self-esteem whatever valenced self they recall. As such, the MCM points 
towards a causal effect of psychological health, in the form of chronic mood, on self­
esteem, when it comes to recalling valenced selves.
As outlined in Chapter 1, research testing the effect of psychological health on 
self-esteem is sparse (see also Baumeister et al., 2003). Further, this research does not 
reveal the processes that explain why better psychological health fosters higher self­
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esteem. One of the main strengths of the MCM is that it describes the precise processes 
that underlie the effect of psychological health on self-esteem when recalling valenced 
selves. A detailed description of these processes follows in the next section.
2.2.1 Processes Underlying the MCM
The processes that underlie the MCM have partly been suggested and supported 
by other research. First, the Inclusion/Exclusion Model of Social Judgment (Schwarz & 
Bless, 1992, 2007) forms the basis for predicting that perceived temporal recency 
between a recalled and the current self evokes assimilation effects and that perceived 
temporal distance evokes contrast effects (see link between rows 3, 4, and 5 in Figure 
2.1),. In the present context, perceiving temporal recency between a recalled self and 
the current self leads the recalled self to be included in the representation of the current 
self, eliciting assimilation. However, perceiving temporal distance between a recalled 
self and the current self leads the recalled self to be excluded from the representation of 
the current self, eliciting contrast.
Moreover, the core of MCM -  that perceived mood congruence between a 
recalled self and the current self leads to feelings of temporal recency (see link between 
rows 2 and 3 in Figure 1) -  is in line with research investigating effects of ease of 
retrieval (Schwarz et al., 1991), vividness of recall (Brown et al., 1985), and feature 
overlap (Schwarz & Bless, 2007; Stapel, 2007). Interestingly, although these lines of 
research all suggest that mood congruence between a recalled self and the current self 
should lead to feelings of temporal recency, they differ in the suggested process 
underlying this link. Research investigating the effects of ease of retrieval and vividness 
of recall suggests that mood congruence increases the ease and the vividness with
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which information is recalled (cf. mood-state-dependent retrieval effect; Blaney, 1986; 
Bower, 1981; Kenealy, 1997). At the same time, research has shown that ease of 
retrieval and vividness of recall are used as heuristics to judge temporal distance, with 
easily retrieved and vividly recalled memories feeling temporally more recent than 
memories that are difficult to retrieve or feel vague and fuzzy (e.g., Brown et al., 1985; 
Herzog, Hansen, & Wanke, 2007; Sanna & Schwarz, 2003, 2004). Together then, 
research investigating effects of ease of retrieval and vividness of recall suggests that 
ease of retrieval and vividness of recall mediate the effect of mood congruence on 
perceived temporal distance.
On the other hand, research investigating the effects of feature overlap (Schwarz 
& Bless, 2007; Stapel, 2007) may also explain the effect of mood congruence on 
perceived temporal distance. Specifically, affect should be an important feature when it 
comes to valenced selves. This assumption is in line with the central role of the hedonic 
principle in people’s lives (Kahneman et al., 1999; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). When 
recalling valenced selves, mood should be an especially relevant feature and hence 
mood congruence should be an important type of feature overlap. Of importance, 
overlap between a recalled self and the current self has been assumed to foster feelings 
of personality continuity, which have been tied to the perception of temporal recency 
(cf. Beike & Niedenthal, 1998; Broemer et al., 2008). Together then, research 
investigating effects of feature overlap suggests that mood congruence is a particularly 
relevant type of feature overlap when recalling valenced selves and hence mood 
congruence should have an effect on perceived temporal distance.
Both possible explanations for our assumption that mood congruence affects 
perceived temporal distance are theoretically sound and not mutually exclusive. We 
will test which of these explanations applies to our model.
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2.2.2 The Temporal Distance Bias
While the primary aim of the research described in this chapter is to show that 
psychological health, in the form of chronic mood, exerts effects on self-esteem, the 
research also examines the mechanisms underlying the temporal distance bias. The 
temporal distance bias describes the phenomenon that people perceive positive past 
selves as temporally more recent than negative past selves. Prior research has suggested 
that the temporal distance bias is due to the motivation to self-enhance (Ross & Wilson, 
2002). According to temporal self-appraisal theory (Ross & Wilson, 2000; Wilson & 
Ross, 2001), the general finding that a positive past self is perceived as more recent 
than a negative past self reflects people's attempts to wilfully associate the current self 
with positive past selves and to dissociate it from negative past selves (cf. Ross & 
Conway, 1986; Ross & Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2001, 2003). Ross and Wilson 
(2002) argued that this motivational explanation for the temporal distance bias is 
supported by their finding that this bias is stronger for people with high self-esteem (cf. 
Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005; McFarland & Alvaro, 2000). According to Ross and 
Wilson (2002), self-esteem moderates the temporal distance bias, because high self­
esteem people engage more strongly in self-enhancement (Baumeister, 1998; Sedikides 
& Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Complementing this research, the MCM 
suggests that the strength of the temporal distance bias is partly determined by cognitive 
factors. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the MCM predicts that chronically happy people 
perceive a recalled positive self as more recent than a recalled negative self because 
they perceive similarities in chronic and recalled affective states. Following the same
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logic, the MCM predicts that chronically sad people perceive a recalled negative self as 
more recent than a recalled positive self.
2.2.3 Overview
Overall, the research described in this chapter pursues three goals. The first goal 
is to use the MCM to show that psychological health, in the form of chronic mood, 
exerts effects on self-esteem when it comes to recalling valenced selves. The second 
goal automatically results from the first goal. Particularly, the second goal is to 
challenge the common belief that people generally assimilate toward a recalled positive 
self and contrast themselves away from a recalled negative self. The final goal is to 
shed more light on the mechanisms underlying the temporal distance bias.
Four studies were conducted in order to achieve these goals. Study 1 shows that 
chronic mood affects the direction of the temporal distance bias and that perceived 
mood congruence mediates this effect. Study 2 replicates the findings of Study 1 using 
a different operationalization. More importantly, Study 2 rules out the possibility that 
the moderating effect of chronic mood on the temporal distance bias is spuriously 
caused by trait self-esteem. Study 3 replicates and extends the findings of Studies 1 and 
2 by demonstrating that perceiving a recalled self as recent leads to an assimilation 
effect on self-esteem, whereas perceiving a recalled self as distant leads to a contrast 
effect on self-esteem. Finally, Study 4 replicates the results of the prior studies and 
shows that an experimental manipulation of perceived temporal distance successfully 
undermines the naturally occurring differences in the temporal distance bias between 
happy and sad people. This last finding is important because it shows that interventions
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can be designed in order to prevent chronically sad people from decreasing their self­
esteem by recalling past selves.
2.3 Study 1
In Study 1, we tested whether chronically happy people perceive a recalled 
positive self as temporally more recent than a recalled negative self and whether 
chronically sad people perceive a recalled negative self as temporally more recent than 
a recalled positive self. Further, we tested whether this effect is due to differences 
between happy and sad people in the perceived mood congruence between the recalled 
self and the current self.
2.3.1 Method
Participants
95 participants (73 women, 20 men, and 2 did not respond) completed this 
online-study (www.online-studies.org). The study was advertised on John Krantz’s web 
portal for online-studies (http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html). The 
language of the study was English. The mean age of the participants was 27.08 years 
(SD = 10.61). The majority of the participants were from North America (77%). One 
additional participant was identified as an outlier and was excluded from the analyses. 
The reaction time of one additional participant indicated that she took a long break 
from the study between the completion of the manipulation and the dependent 
measures; thus, she was also excluded from the analyses.
Materials and Procedure
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After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, we assessed participants’ chronic mood followed by the recall of either 
positive or negative personal episodes that took place three to five years ago. As a 
manipulation check, participants rated the valence of the recalled episodes. Finally, 
participants completed the dependent measures, which were perceived mood 
congruence and perceived temporal distance between the recalled self and the current 
self. At the end of the study, participants read a feedback page and were thanked for 
their participation.
Chronic mood. The PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) consists of a 10-item Positive 
Affect subscale and a 10-item Negative Affect subscale. Example items for the Positive 
Affect subscale are “enthusiastic” and “active”. Example items for the Negative Affect 
subscale are “upset” and “ashamed”. Participants indicated whether or not “I generally 
feel this way...”, using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 
(extremely). As in previous research (e.g., Schimmack & Diener, 2003), positive and 
negative (reverse-scored) affect were combined to form one chronic mood score1 (a = 
.89).
1 By averaging across both subscales, chronic mood was treated as a one-dimensional 
construct. Some prior research has found that positive and negative affect do not 
constitute the endpoints of a single dimension, but constitute two independent 
dimensions (e.g., Watson et al., 1988). However, this perspective was challenged by 
Diener, Larsen, Levine, and Emmons (1985), who have argued that the one­
dimensional nature of chronic mood was obscured by the failure to distinguish between 
the intensity and the frequency of affect. In order to test whether positive and negative 
(reverse-scored) affect have different moderating effects on the temporal distance bias, 
all analyses were conducted for positive affect and negative affect separately for all
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Past self recall. In the positive (negative) past self condition participants read: 
“We would like you now to think about the successes (failures^ you had 3 to 5 
years ago. That is, please close your eyes and visualize as many of vour own personal 
successes (failures! as possible that took place 3 to 5 years ago. IN OTHER WORDS, 
THINK ABOUT ALL PERSONAL SUCCESSES (FAILURES) YOU 
EXPERIENCED 3 TO 5 YEARS AGO. Think solely about your own personal 
successes (failures) and disregard any personal failures (successes).
After visualizing as many successes (failures) as possible we would like you to 
write down the three most positive (negative! personal successes (failures! you had 3 to 
5 years ago. Please describe one success (failure) in each of the three textboxes below.” 
Manipulation check. Participants received a list of the three episodes they listed 
as a part of the manipulation (a = .86). Participants rated the valence of each episode on 
a 9-point rating scale ranging from -4 (extreme failure) to +4 (extreme success).
Perceived mood congruence. For each episode, perceived mood congruence was 
assessed with a semantic differential ranging from “My current mood is very different 
from the mood I was in at the time of episode X” to “My current mood is very similar 
to the mood I was in at the time of episode X”. Participants responded by ticking on a 
420 pixels long line. This line actually consisted of 60 squares. Thus, scores ranged 
from 1 to 60 (a = .79).
Perceived temporal distance. For each episode, perceived temporal distance was 
assessed with two semantic differentials. Participants used the same response format as
four studies. The results using positive affect and negative affect independently 
mirrored each other and were also virtually identical to the results obtained by treating 
chronic mood as a one-dimensional construct. Therefore, for the sake of brevity only 
the results obtained by the total chronic mood scale are reported.
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used to assess perceived mood congruence. The first semantic differential ranged from 
“Episode X feels very close” to “Episode X feels very distant”. The second semantic 
differential scale ranged from “Episode X feels very near” to “Episode X feels very far 
away” (a = .82). This measure was virtually identical to that used by Ross and Wilson 
(2002; Study 1).
In order to compute the internal consistencies for the perceived mood 
congruence and the perceived temporal distance measures, the three episodes for each 
participant were re-ordered so that episode 1 was always the episode with the highest 
perceived mood congruence/temporal distance score and episode 3 was always the 
episode with the lowest perceived mood congruence/temporal distance score. This 
procedure is necessary in order to compute Cronbach’s Alpha, because the order of the 
mood congruence items (i.e., the episodes) was determined by the participants 
themselves. Note that reordering the items does not affect the mean perceived mood 
congruence and perceived temporal distance scores.
2.3.2 Results and Summary
To check whether participants in the positive recall condition recalled a more 
positive self than people in the negative recall condition, we conducted a one-way 
ANOVA with the valence manipulation as the sole factor and the self-rated valence of 
the recalled self as the dependent variable. This analysis revealed that people in the 
positive recall condition indeed recalled a more positive self than people in the negative 
recall condition (see Table 2.1).
To test the hypothesis that chronic mood moderates the effect of recalling a 
valenced self on perceived temporal distance, we conducted a multiple regression
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analysis with valence of the recalled self (dummy coded) as a dichotomous predictor, 
chronic mood (centred) as a continuous predictor, and the cross-product of valence of 
the recalled self and chronic mood as a third predictor, with perceived temporal 
distance as the criterion (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). As illustrated in Figure 2.2 and Table
2.2, the results of this analysis support our hypothesis.2
2 An alternative hypothesis that may explain this result is that happy (sad) people 
recall episodes that are more (less) positive in the positive recall condition and episodes 
that are less (more) negative in the negative recall condition. In order to test this 
hypothesis, the same analysis was conducted again while controlling for perceived 
positivity of the recalled episodes. The results of this analysis were virtually identical to 
the results when perceived positivity of the recalled episodes was not controlled. 
Further, this alternative hypothesis was tested in all subsequent studies and it 
consistently failed to explain the hypothesized effects. Thus, these results render this 
alternative hypothesis extremely unlikely.
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Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics and Significance Tests to Check the Effectiveness o f the Valenced 
Recall Manipulation
Study M SD ANOVA
positive
recall
negative
recall
positive
recall
negative
recall F P
1 2.51 -1.55 1.10 1.59 197.47 .001
2 2.38 -2.06 1.72 1.83 160.98 .001
3 2.71 -1.55 1.22 2.03 253.29 .001
4 2.52 -2.11 1.79 1.83 446.07 .001
Note. DV: Perceived Valence of the Recalled Self
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Figure 2.2. The effect of valence of the recalled self (positive vs. negative) x chronic 
mood (happy vs. sad) on the perceived temporal distance between the recalled 
and the current self. The significance tests for contrasts A to D are presented in 
Table 2.2.
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Note. Sad and happy mood equal 1 SD below and above the mean of chronic mood, 
respectively. The graph illustrates the mean temporal distance perceptions for happy vs. 
sad mood people in the positive vs. negative recall condition across Studies 1 to 4.
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Table 2.2
Valence o f Recall x Chronic Mood/Trait Self-Esteem as Predictor o f Perceived 
Temporal Distance
Valence of Recall Self x Chronic Mood
Study Interaction Contrast A Contrast B Contrast C Contrast D
f i P f i P f i P f i P f i P
1 -.46 .006 .17 .24 -.23 .10 -.42 .006 .38 .03
2 -.53 .001 .18 .16 -.38 .008 -.65 .001 .45 .001
3 -.57 .001 .08 .44 -.52 .001 -.66 .001 .22 .05
4 (control) -.68 .001 .41 .009 -.34 .006 -.38 .008 .48 .01
Valence of Recall x Trait Self-Esteem
Study Interaction Contrast A Contrast B Contrast C Contrast D
f i P f i P f i P P P f i P
2 -.42 .002 .07 .58 -.26 .06 -.53 .001 .35 .009
3 -.43 .001 -.03 .79 -.50 .001 -.57 .001 .05 .70
4 (control) -.44 .01 .28 .06 -.08 .59 -.27 .09 .49 .005
Note. DV: Perceived Temporal Distance; Contrast A to D Correspond to the Contrasts 
as Indicated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
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Next, this interaction was decomposed in order to test the statistical significance 
of the four simple contrasts (Aiken & West, 1991). First, we tested the relation between 
chronic mood and perceived temporal distance for participants in the positive recall and 
the negative recall conditions separately. As can be seen in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2, 
chronically happy people perceived a recalled negative past self as temporally more 
distant than chronically sad people (contrast D), whereas chronically happy people 
perceived a recalled positive self as marginally more recent than chronically sad people 
(contrast B). Second, to test the hypotheses that chronically happy (sad) people 
perceived a recalled positive (negative) self as temporally more recent than a recalled 
negative (positive) self, we tested the relation between valence of the past self and 
perceived temporal distance at values one standard deviation below and above the mean 
of chronic mood. As can be seen in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2, chronically happy people 
perceived the recalled positive self as temporally more recent than the recalled negative 
self (contrast C), whereas chronically sad people showed a tendency to perceive the 
recalled negative self as temporally more recent than the recalled positive self (contrast 
A), although this effect was not significant.
To test whether perceived mood congruence mediated the valence of the 
recalled self x chronic mood effect on perceived temporal distance, we followed the 
recommendations by Baron and Kenny (1986). Specifically, in step 1 it has to be shown 
that the independent variable (i.e., the interaction between valence of the recalled self 
and chronic mood) predicts the dependent variable (i.e., perceived temporal distance). 
As shown above, this criterion was met. In step 2 it has to be shown that the 
independent variable (i.e., the interaction between valence of the recalled self and 
chronic mood) predicts the mediator (i.e., perceived mood congruence). A regression 
analysis revealed that this criterion was also met (see Table 2.3). Finally, in step 3 it has
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to be shown that the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is 
reduced when the mediator is controlled for. A regression analysis showed that the 
former highly significant effect of the interaction between valence of the recalled self 
and chronic mood on perceived temporal distance (see step 1) was no longer significant 
after perceived mood congruence was controlled. Further, a Sobel test (1982) revealed 
that the path from the valence of the recalled self x chronic mood interaction over 
perceived mood congruence to perceived temporal distance was significant, z = 2.33, p  
= .02. Thus, these analyses support our hypothesis that the valence of the recalled self x 
chronic mood interaction affects perceived temporal distance through its effect on 
perceived mood congruence. The results of the mediation analysis are summarized in 
Table 2.3.3
Another alternative hypothesis that may explain the findings is that happy people 
strategically choose to recall positive episodes that actually occurred relatively recently 
within the instructed time-frame (e.g., 3 years ago), whereas they choose to recall 
negative episodes that actually occurred relatively long ago within the instructed time­
frame (e.g., 5 years ago). Past research (Ross & Wilson, 2002) suggests that happy 
people may be motivated to make such strategic choices concerning the episodes they 
recall in order to associate themselves with positive episodes (by recalling more recent 
ones) and to dissociate themselves with negative episodes (by recalling more distant 
ones). Therefore, Study 1 assessed the actual temporal distance for each episode 
(“Episode 1/2/3 took place in [month], [year]”; a = .75). This enabled testing whether 
valence of the recalled self x chronic mood predicted actual temporal distance.
Speaking against this alternative explanation, the results of a multiple regression 
analysis with valence of the recalled self (dummy coded), chronic mood (centred), and 
the cross-product of valence of the recalled self and chronic mood as the predictors, and
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To summarize the results of Study 1, the perception of temporal distance in 
relation to positive and negative past selves was dependent on chronic mood. 
Chronically happy people perceived a recalled negative self as temporally more distant 
than chronically sad people, whereas chronically happy people perceived a recalled 
positive self as temporally more recent than chronically sad people. Further, chronically 
happy people perceived a recalled positive self as temporally more recent than a 
recalled negative self, whereas chronically sad people showed a tendency to perceive a 
recalled negative self as temporally more recent than a recalled positive self, although 
this last effect was not significant. Crucially, these differences in perceived temporal 
distance occurred although actual temporal distance between the recalled positive and 
negative selves to the current self was held constant. Moreover, we provided evidence 
that the determinant for this temporal distance bias was the perceived mood congruence 
between the recalled self and the current self. This finding supports our hypothesis that 
the temporal distance bias is not solely due to the motivation to self-enhance (Ross & 
Wilson, 2002) but that cognitive factors (i.e., perceived mood congruence) can also 
determine this bias.
actual temporal distance as the criterion revealed no significant interaction effect. Thus, 
there was no evidence that happy (sad) people recalled positive (negative) selves that 
actually took place more recently than sad (happy) people did. Further evidence against 
this alternative explanation is that controlling for actual temporal distance did not 
change the results of our valence of recall x chronic mood effect on perceived temporal 
distance.
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Table 2.3
Perceived Mood Congruence as a Mediator o f the Valence o f Recalled Self x  Chronic 
Mood /Trait Self-Esteem Effect on Perceived Temporal Distance.
Valence of Recall x Chronic Mood -> Perc. Mood Congr. -> Perc. Temp. Dist.
Study Step 1
P P
Baron & Kenny (1986) 
Step 2 Step 3
P P P P
Sobel (1982) 
z  p
1 -.46 .006 .48 .003 -.27 .10 2.33 .02
2 -.53 .001 .48 .001 -.34 .004 2.95 .003
3 -.57 .001 .63 .001 -.23 .03 4.57 .001
4 (control) -.68 .001 .66 .001 -.39 .04 2.81 .005
Valence of Recall x Trait Self-Esteem -> Perc. Mood Congr. - )  Perc. Temp. Dist.
Study Step 1
Baron & Kenny (1986) 
Step 2 Step 3 Sobel (1982)
P P P P P P z P
2 -.42 .002 .55 .001 -.18 .18 16.56 .001
3 -.43 .001 .46 .001 -.18 .09 3.50 .001
4 (control) -.44 .01 .35 .03 -.25 .11 2.00 .05
Note. Step 1 = effect of valence of recalled self x chronic mood/trait self-esteem on 
perceived temporal distance; Step 2 = effect of valence of recalled self x chronic 
mood/trait self-esteem on perceived mood congruence; Step 3 = identical to step 1, 
while controlling for perceived mood congruence.
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2.4 Study 2
Study 2 further tested the hypothesis that the temporal distance bias does not 
solely reflect self-enhancement motivation. Ross and Wilson (2002) argued that the 
temporal distance bias is due to the motivation to self-enhance, based on their finding 
that high self-esteem people are more prone than low self-esteem people to perceive a 
positive past self as temporally recent, and a negative past self as temporally distant. 
Because self-esteem and chronic mood are highly correlated with each other (Diener & 
Diener, 1995; Myers & Diener, 1995), the moderating effect of chronic mood obtained 
in Study 1 may be spuriously caused by the moderating effect of self-esteem. Thus, 
Study 2 was designed to replicate Study 1, while additionally testing whether the 
effects of chronic mood are spuriously caused by trait self-esteem. Given our finding 
that perceived mood congruence mediated the interaction effect of valence of the 
recalled self and chronic mood on perceived temporal distance, it is implausible that the 
effect of chronic mood is a completely spurious one.
Another goal of Study 2 was to use different methods than those used in Study 
1. Specifically, we used different measures of perceived mood congruence and 
perceived temporal distance. Most importantly, we asked participants to recall past 
traits, rather than past episodes. The literature on past selves almost exclusively focuses 
on the recall of past episodes. We posit that a person’s positive and negative traits 
constitute a more adequate operationalization of a person’s valenced self than personal 
positive and negative episodes. In line with this argument, the Twenty Statements Task 
(Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) asks participants to provide 20 self-descriptions as a 
measure of the self-concept. In this open-ended task, participants frequently report traits 
and personal attributes but very rarely report personal episodes. Moreover, with
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increasing temporal distance, past episodes have been found to be recalled in more 
dispositional terms (e.g., Semin & Smith, 1999; Trope & Liberman, 2003). Thus, 
asking people to recall traits associated with a past self denotes a comprehensive and 
representative way to operationalize past selves. Therefore, successful replication of 
Study 1 with this different methodology would provide strong support for the 
generalizability of our findings to different types of recall.
2.4.1 Method
Participants
103 participants (81 women, 22 men) completed this study. Again, the study 
was advertised on Krantz’s web portal. The mean age of the participants was 24.07 
years (SD = 9.10). The majority of the participants were from North America (83%). 11 
additional participants failed to complete the task and were excluded from the analyses. 
Materials and Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items, measures of chronic mood and trait self-esteem (in randomized order), and then a 
task asking them to recall either their positive or negative self. As a manipulation 
check, participants rated the valence of the recalled attributes. Finally, participants 
completed the dependent measures, which were perceived mood congruence and 
perceived temporal distance between the past self and the current self. The order of the 
items assessing the dependent variables was randomized and placed among several 
filler items. At the end of the study, participants read a feedback page and were thanked 
for their participation. The measure of chronic mood was identical to that used in Study
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1 (a = .91), whereas the manipulation and all other measures used were different from 
those used in Study 1.
Trait self-esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965; a = .91) 
consists of 10 items such as “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself’ and “At times, I 
think I am no good at all” (reverse-scored). Participants responded to each item using a 
7-point rating scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies completely).
Past self recall. In the positive (negative) past self condition participants read:
“We would like you now to think about positive (negative) attributes you had 5 
years ago. That is, please close your eyes and visualize the person you were 5 years ago 
by thinking about solely positive (negative) attributes and disregarding any negative 
(positive) attributes.
After visualizing your former self we would like you to write down the 5 most 
positive (negative) attributes you had 5 years ago. Please write one attribute (in one 
word) in each of the five textboxes below.”
Manipulation check. Participants received a list of the five attributes they noted 
down as a part of the manipulation (a = .95). Participants rated the valence of each 
attribute on a 9-point rating scale ranging from -4 (very negative) to +4 (very positive).
Perceived mood congruence. Perceived mood congruence was assessed with 
two items: “My current mood is very different from the mood at the time of my recalled 
self’ (reverse scored) and “My general mood at the recalled time was similar to my 
mood nowadays”, r = .28, p = .005. As in Study 1, participants completed these items 
by ticking on a 420 pixels long line ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 60 (applies 
completely).
Perceived temporal distance. The measure of perceived temporal distance was 
closely modelled after the measure used by Broemer et al. (2008). In particular,
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perceived temporal distance was assessed with two items: “The recalled self felt very 
far away” (reverse scored) and “The recalled self felt very recent”, r = .40, p  = .001. 
Participants completed these items using the same response format as used to assess 
perceived mood congruence.
2.4.2 Results and Summary
Employing the same procedure as in Study 1, we initially sought to replicate our 
previous findings. This replication was obtained for all of the key findings. First, as 
shown in Table 2.1, our manipulation was successful. Second, as shown in Figure 2.2 
and Table 2.2, chronic mood moderated the effect of recalling a valenced self on 
perceived temporal distance. Also, simple comparisons revealed that all contrasts in the 
interaction were significant in the expected direction except for Contrast A, which 
(similar to Study 1) showed a trend in the expected direction (see Table 2.2). Finally, as 
shown in Table 2.3, the effect of recalling a valenced self on perceived temporal 
distance was mediated by perceived mood congruence. Thus, the pattern of findings 
mirrored those obtained in Study 1.
Next, we tested the unique hypotheses of Study 2. To replicate Ross and 
Wilson’s (2002) finding that trait self-esteem determines the perception of temporal 
distance in respect to recalled positive and negative selves, we repeated the moderation 
analyses described in Study 1, while using trait self-esteem instead of chronic mood as 
the continuous predictor. As expected, the interaction between valence of the recalled 
self x trait self-esteem was significant. The interaction is illustrated in Figure 2.3 (see 
also Table 2.2).
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Furthermore, as shown in Table 2.3, the obtained interaction was mediated by 
perceived mood congruence. The finding that perceived mood congruence mediated the 
effect of valence of recalled self x trait self-esteem on perceived temporal distance 
provides initial support for our hypothesis that, over and above self-enhancement, 
cognitive factors account for the temporal distance bias. To further test this hypothesis, 
we conducted a multiple regression analysis with valence of the recalled self (dummy 
coded), chronic mood (centred), trait self-esteem (centred), the cross-product of valence 
of the recalled self and chronic mood, and the cross-product of valence of the recalled 
self and trait self-esteem as simultaneous predictors of perceived temporal distance.
The results of this analysis can be found in Table 2.4.
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Figure 2.3. The effect of valence of the recalled self (positive vs. negative) x trait self­
esteem (high vs. low) on the perceived temporal distance between the recalled and the 
current self. The significance tests for contrasts A to D are presented in Table 2.2.
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Note. Low and high self-esteem equal 1 SD below and above the mean of trait self­
esteem, respectively. The graph illustrates the mean temporal distance perceptions for 
low vs. high self-esteem people in the positive vs. negative recall condition across 
Studies 2 to 4.
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Table 2.4
Direct Comparison between the Effects o f Chronic Mood and Trait Self-Esteem on the 
Temporal Distance Bias
Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 (control)
P P f i P P P
Valence of Recall -.24 .01 -.30 .001 .05 .60
Chronic Mood .51 .01 .24 .05 .25 .25
Trait Self-Esteem -.08 .71 -.07 .61 .37 .06
Valence of Recall 
x Chronic Mood -.59 .003 -.45 .001 -.65 .005
Valence of Recall .08 .70 -.20 .11 -.04 .83x Trait Self-Esteem
Note. DV: Perceived Temporal Distance
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As can be seen, trait self-esteem did not account for the moderating effect of chronic 
mood on perceived temporal distance. Even after controlling for trait self-esteem, the 
moderating effect of chronic mood on the temporal distance bias remained highly 
significant (p < .01). If anything, our results suggest that chronic mood accounts for the 
moderating effect of trait self-esteem on the temporal distance bias. After controlling 
for chronic mood, the moderating effect of trait self-esteem on the temporal distance 
bias was no longer significant.
Despite using a different methodology, Study 2 replicated all results obtained in 
Study 1. Further, we extended the findings of Study 1 by providing evidence that our 
effect cannot be explained by self-enhancement. Taken together, there is strong support 
for our hypothesis that the temporal distance bias is not solely due to the motivation to 
self-enhance. Instead, our results suggest that the temporal distance bias is at least 
partially determined by cognitive factors: mood congruent past selves are perceived as 
temporally closer than mood incongruent past selves.
2.5 Study 3
As outlined in the introduction, perceived temporal distance has been found to 
be a crucial determinant of assimilation and contrast effects concerning past selves (for 
a review see Schwarz & Strack, 1999). Thus, Study 3 tested whether perceived 
temporal distance indeed determines assimilation and contrast effects on self-esteem, 
while attempting to replicate our earlier findings. Consistent with the MCM, we 
expected that perceiving a positive past self as temporally recent (as chronically happy 
people do) should lead to an assimilation effect of this positive past self and thus should 
relatively increase self-esteem. Similarly, perceiving a negative past self as temporally
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recent (as chronically sad people do) should lead to an assimilation effect of this 
negative past self and thus should relatively decrease self-esteem. On the contrary, 
perceiving a negative past self as temporally distant (as chronically happy people do) 
should lead to a contrast effect concerning this negative past self and thus should 
relatively increase self-esteem. Similarly, perceiving a positive past self as temporally 
distant (as chronically sad people do) should lead to a contrast effect concerning this 
positive past self and thus should relatively decrease self-esteem. Together then, 
chronically happy people should show a relative increase in self-esteem after recalling 
either a positive or a negative past self. Chronically sad people, on the other hand, 
should show a relative decrease in self-esteem after recalling either a positive or a 
negative past self. Findings in support of this hypothesis would provide direct evidence 
that psychological health, in the form of chronic mood, exerts effects on self-esteem, 
when it comes to recalling valenced selves.
2.5.7 Method
Participants
153 participants (114 women, 37 men, and 2 did not respond) completed this 
study. Again, the study was advertised on Krantz’s web portal. The mean age of the 
participants was 22.73 years (SD = 7.52). The majority of participants were from North 
America (86%). 13 additional participants failed to complete the task and were 
excluded from the analyses.
Materials and Procedure
The study was identical to Study 2 except that (a) participants completed a 
measure of trait self-esteem directly after completing the demographic questions (i.e.,
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pre-manipulation self-esteem) and (b) participants completed the same self-esteem 
measure again at the very end of the study (i.e., post-manipulation self-esteem). 
Therefore, only the self-esteem measure is described below. Internal consistencies of 
the chronic mood measure (a -  .90), the valence of the recalled self measure (a = .95), 
the measure of perceived mood congruence, r = .53, p  = .001, and perceived temporal 
distance, r  = .51, p  = .001, were good.
Trait self-esteem. The Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale (Robins, Hendin, & 
Trzesniewski, 2001) consists of the item “I have high self-esteem.” We chose this scale 
because Ross and Wilson (2002) used the same measure to provide evidence that the 
temporal distance bias is moderated by trait self-esteem. Participants responded to this 
measure using the same response format used to assess perceived mood congruence.
2.5.2 Results and Summary
Employing the same procedure as in Studies 1 and 2, the initial analyses tested 
whether Study 3 replicated the previous findings. Again, all of the key findings were 
replicated. First, Table 2.1 shows that our manipulation was successful. Second, Figure
2.2 and Table 2.2 show that chronic mood moderated the effect of recalling a valenced 
self on perceived temporal distance. Also, all of the contrasts showed the same effects 
as in Studies 1 and 2. Third, Table 2.3 shows that the effect of recalling a valenced self 
on perceived temporal distance was mediated by perceived mood congruence. Fourth, 
the moderating effect of chronic mood on the temporal distance bias was not spuriously 
caused by trait self-esteem. Figure 2.3 and Table 2.2 show that trait self-esteem 
moderated the temporal distance bias, while Table 2.3 shows that the effect of valence 
of recall x trait self-esteem was mediated by perceived mood congruence. Finally,
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Table 2.4 shows that the moderating effect of chronic mood on the temporal distance 
bias remained significant even after controlling for the moderating effect of trait self­
esteem. Taken together, the findings of Study 3 completely replicated the findings of 
Studies 1 and 2.
Next, the analyses tested the unique hypotheses of Study 3. We first tested 
whether perceived temporal distance actually determined the occurrence of assimilation 
and contrast effects in respect to recalled positive and negative selves. This was done 
by conducting a multiple regression analysis with valence of the recalled self (dummy 
coded), perceived temporal distance (centred), the cross-product of valence of the 
recalled self and perceived temporal distance, and pre-manipulation self-esteem as 
predictors of post-manipulation self-esteem. As illustrated in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.5, 
the results revealed a significant interaction between valence of the recalled self and 
perceived temporal distance. Furthermore, Table 2.5 shows that all four contrasts in this 
interaction were significant in the expected direction.
To further test the MCM’s hypothesis that perceived temporal distance is an 
important determinant of assimilation and contrast—as also proposed and shown by the 
IEM (Schwarz & Bless, 1992, 2007; see also Broemer et al., 2008; Schwarz & Strack, 
1999)—and to consolidate that perceived temporal distance mediates the effects of 
perceived mood congruence, we first tested for perceived mood congruence’s 
propensity to determine assimilation and contrast and subsequently tested whether these 
effects of perceived mood congruence are mediated by perceived temporal distance.
We did so following the recommendations by Baron and Kenny (1986). In the first 
step, we tested whether perceived mood congruence determines self-esteem change in 
conjunction with the type of recall. Thus, we conducted a multiple regression analysis 
with valence of the recalled self (dummy coded), perceived mood congruence (centred),
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the cross-product of the latter two, and pre-manipulation self-esteem as predictors of 
post-manipulation self-esteem. In line with the MCM, we found that perceived mood 
congruence in fact had the propensity to determine assimilation and contrast effects, as 
evidenced by a significant interaction, /? = .29, p  = .003. This analysis fulfils criterion 1 
of Baron and Kenny’s test for mediation—i.e., an effect of the IV on the DV. Criterion 
2 stipulates an effect of the mediator on the DV. That is, we expected that perceived 
temporal distance would determine the occurrence of assimilation and contrast. As can 
be seen in the previous paragraph (see also Table 2.5) this criterion is also met. Finally, 
Baron and Kenny’s criterion 3 stipulates that the effect of the IV on the DV is 
decreased when the mediator is controlled. In other words, we expected that the effect 
of the interaction between type of recall and perceived mood congruence is decreased 
when controlling for the effect of the interaction between type of recall and perceived 
temporal distance. Thus, we conducted a multiple regression analysis with valence of 
the recalled self (dummy coded), perceived mood congruence (centred), perceived 
temporal distance (centred), the cross-product of valence of the recalled self and 
perceived mood congruence, the cross product of valence of the recalled self and 
perceived temporal distance, and pre-manipulation self-esteem as predictors of post­
manipulation self-esteem. Supporting the MCM, we found that the formerly significant 
interaction effect of valence of the recalled self x perceived mood congruence was in 
fact decreased, /? = .15, ns. In line with this, the Sobel-test (1983) revealed that the path 
from valence of the recalled self x perceived mood congruence to post-manipulation 
self-esteem via valence of the recalled self x perceived temporal distance was 
significant, z = 1.90, p  = .03 (one-tailed).
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An additional regression analysis tested whether self-esteem is (a) more strongly 
affected by recalling a positive past self, (b) by recalling a negative past self, or (c) is 
similarly affected by recalling a positive and a negative past self. (There was no a 
priori foundation for assuming that one effect should be stronger than the other.) The 
multiple regression analysis included chronic mood (centred), valence of the recalled 
self (dummy coded), the cross-product of chronic mood and valence of the recalled self, 
and pre-manipulation self-esteem as predictors of post-manipulation self-esteem. The 
results revealed a significant effect of pre-manipulation self-esteem, = .60, p  = .001, a 
significant effect of chronic mood, fi = .36, p  = .001, no significant effect of valence of 
the recalled self, /? = -.05, p  = .31, and no significant interaction between chronic mood 
and valence of the recalled self, /? = -.07, p  = .35. Thus, the effects of recalling a 
valenced self on self-esteem are not stronger for a specific type of recall. This analysis 
is also essential because the significant relationship between chronic mood and post­
manipulation self-esteem, after controlling for pre-manipulation self-esteem, directly 
shows that the recall of valenced past selves increases the self-esteem of happy people 
relative to sad people.
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Figure 2.4. The effect of valence of the recalled self (positive vs. negative) x perceived 
temporal distance (low vs. high) on post-manipulation self-esteem (while controlling 
for pre-manipulation self-esteem). The significance tests for contrasts A to D are 
presented in Table 2.5.
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—■— Positive 
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Low High
Perceived Temporal Distance
Note. Low and high perceived temporal distance equal 1 SD below and above the mean 
of perceived temporal distance, respectively. The graph illustrates the mean post­
manipulation self-esteem for low vs. high temporal distance perceivers in the positive 
vs. negative recall condition across Studies 3 and 4.
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Table 2.5
Valence o f Recall x Perceived Temporal Distance as a Predictor o f Post-Manipulation 
Self-Esteem (while Controlling for Pre-Manipulation Self-Esteem)
Study Interaction Contrast A Contrast B Contrast C Contrast D
f i P P P f i P f i P P P
3 -.35 .001 .18 .04 -.15 .04 -.25 .002 .28 .001
4 -.15 .003 .08 .10 -.08 .05 -.13 .007 .12 .02
Note. DV: Post-manipulation self-esteem; Contrast A to D correspond to the contrasts 
as indicated in Figure 2.4.
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To summarize, the results of Study 3 replicated Study l ’s evidence that the 
direction of the temporal distance bias is determined by chronic mood. Further, Study 3 
replicated Study 2’s evidence that the moderating effect of chronic mood on the 
temporal distance bias is not spurious due to an effect of trait self-esteem on (a) the 
temporal distance bias or (b) chronic mood. Extending the findings of Studies 1 and 2, 
Study 3 provided evidence that the occurrence of assimilation and contrast effects in 
respect to recalled positive and negative selves is indeed determined by perceived 
temporal distance. Specifically, we found that an assimilation effect (indicated by a 
relative change of self-esteem) toward a recalled self occurs when this recalled self is 
perceived as temporally recent and that a contrast effect away from a recalled self 
(indicated by a relative change of self-esteem) occurs when this recalled self is 
perceived as temporally distant. That is, perceiving a positive past self as recent and 
perceiving a negative past self as distant led to a relative increase in self-esteem. 
However, perceiving a positive past self as distant and perceiving a negative past self as 
recent led to a relative decrease in self-esteem. Thus, thinking about either a positive 
past or a negative past relatively increases self-esteem for chronically happy people, but 
relatively decreases self-esteem for chronically sad people. This pattern of results 
provides the first direct evidence that psychological health, in the form of chronic 
mood, exerts effects on self-esteem, when it comes to recalling valenced selves.
2.6 Study 4
So far, the findings described in this chapter have shown that chronically sad 
people perceive a negative recalled self as temporally recent, and thus assimilate their 
current self toward the recalled self. Conversely, chronically sad people perceived a
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positive recalled self as temporally distant and thus contrasted away from it. These 
findings suggest that it is important to recognize the central role of perceived temporal 
distance when attempting to increase self-esteem by asking chronically sad people to 
recall positive past selves (cf. nostalgia, reminiscence therapy, and experimental mood- 
manipulations). Specifically, it may be desirable to correct chronically sad people’s 
naturally occurring temporal distance bias by manipulating their perception of temporal 
distance. Because temporal distance determines assimilation and contrast, undermining 
the temporal distance bias should prevent sad people from assimilating toward a 
recalled negative self and contrasting themselves away from a recalled positive self. 
Accordingly, such a temporal distance intervention should prevent a decrease in self­
esteem for sad people.
To test this reasoning, Study 4 aimed to show that the naturally occurring 
temporal distance bias can be eliminated by making sad (happy) people believe that a 
recalled positive (negative) self is not as temporally distant as they are naturally 
inclined to think and a recalled negative (positive) self is not as temporally recent as 
they are naturally inclined to think. To manipulate the perception of temporal distance, 
Study 4 combined manipulations used by Broemer et al. (2008) and by Wilson and 
Ross (2001). Broemer and colleagues showed that asking participants to think about the 
time between the recalled self and the current self from a perspective that is far in the 
future makes the time between the recalled and current selves appear relatively short. 
Thus, to decrease perceived temporal distance, we asked participants to take the 
perspective of their future self in 25 years, to look back at their current self from this 
perspective, and to mentally travel back to their past self 5 years ago, where they should 
think about the positive or negative attributes they possessed at that time. To increase 
temporal distance, we asked participants to mentally travel “all the way” back to their
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past self 5 years ago. Wilson and Ross (2001) showed that emphasizing the distance 
between a recalled and a current self increases the perception of temporal distance. A 
control condition did not attempt to influence perceived temporal distance and simply 
repeated the procedure of Study 3.
2.6.2 Method
Participants
270 participants (208 women, 59 men, and 3 did not respond) completed this 
study. Again, this study was advertised on Krantz’s web portal for online-studies. The 
mean age of the participants was 26.23 years (SD = 9.65). The majority of the 
participants were from North America (83%). 11 additional participants failed to 
complete the task and thus were excluded from the analyses. The reaction time of one 
additional participant indicated that she took a long break from the study between the 
completion of the manipulation and the dependent measures and thus was also excluded 
from the analyses.
Materials and Procedure
The control condition of this study was identical to Study 3. The only difference 
between the short and long temporal distance conditions and the control condition was 
that the past self recall task was modified to manipulate temporal distance perceptions. 
Therefore, only the past self recall task for the short and long temporal distance 
conditions are described below. Internal consistencies of the chronic mood measure (a 
= .91), the valence of the recalled self measure (a = .96), the measure of perceived 
mood congruence, r = .56, p  = .001, and perceived temporal distance, r = .48, p -  .001, 
were good.
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Past self recall: Short temporal distance. In the positive (negative) past self 
condition participants read the following instructions:
“We would like you now to think about positive (negative) attributes you had 5 
years ago. We would like you to do this by taking the perspective of vour future self in 
25 years. That is, please visualize yourself 25 years from now and then look back to 
your current self. Keeping the perspective of your future self in 25 years, please close 
your eyes and visualize yourself as you “travel” back from your current self to your 
positive (negative) former self 5 years aeo. When you reach that point, visualize the 
person you were 5 years ago by thinking about solely positive (negatived attributes and 
disregarding any negative (positive) attributes. This imagination task is illustrated by 
the figure below (see Figure 2.5, Panel A).
After visualizing the time travel, starting with your current self and ending at 
your positive (negative) former self 5 years ago, we would like you to write down the 5 
most positive (negative) attributes you had 5 years ago. Please write one attribute (in 
one word) in each of the five textboxes below. Please don *t forget to stick to the 
perspective o f your future self in 25 years during the whole task!”
Past self recall: Long temporal distance. In the positive (negative) past self 
condition participants read the following instructions:
“We would like you now to think about positive (negative) attributes you had 5 
years ago. We would like you to do this by taking the perspective of vour current self. 
That is, please visualize vour current self and then look all the wav back to your 
positive (negative) former self 5 years aso. Keeping the perspective of your current 
self, please close your eyes and visualize yourself as you “travel” all the wav back 
from your current self to your positive (negative) former self 5 years aso. When you 
reach that point, visualize the person you were 5 years ago by thinking about solely
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positive (negatived attributes and disregarding any negative (positive! attributes. This 
imagination task is illustrated by the figure below (see Figure 2.5, Panel B).
After visualizing the time travel, starting with your current self and ending all 
the way back at your positive (negative) former self 5 years ago, we would like you to 
write down the 5 most positive (negative! attributes you had 5 years ago. Please write 
one attribute (in one word) in each of the five textboxes below. Please don't forget to 
stick to the perspective o f your current self during the whole task!”
2.6.3 Results and Summary
The initial analyses tested whether Study 4 replicated the findings from Studies 
1 through 3. All of the key findings were replicated. First, Table 2.1 shows that the 
manipulation was successful. Second, Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2 show that chronic mood 
moderated the effect of recalling a valenced self on perceived temporal distance in the 
control condition of this study. Also, simple comparisons revealed that all contrasts of 
the interaction were significant in the expected direction. Third, Table 2.3 shows that 
the effect of recalling a valenced self on perceived temporal distance was mediated by 
perceived mood congruence. Fourth, the moderating effect on chronic mood on the 
temporal distance bias was not spuriously caused by trait self-esteem. Figure 2.3 and 
Table 2.2 show that trait self-esteem moderated the temporal distance bias, while Table
2.3 shows that the effect of valence of recall x trait self-esteem was mediated by 
perceived mood congruence. Fifth, Table 2.4 shows that the moderating effect of 
chronic mood on the temporal distance bias remained significant even after controlling 
for the moderating effect of trait self-esteem.
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Figure 2.5. In order to illustrate participants the temporal distance manipulation task 
participants in the short temporal distance condition saw the upper part of this figure 
(A) and participants in the long temporal distance condition saw the lower part of this 
figure (B).
A
time travel
Former Self Current Self Future Self
5 years ago in 25 years
time travel
Current SelfFormer Self
5 years ago
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The next set of analyses tested whether Study 4 replicated the unique findings of 
Study 3. First, these analyses tested whether perceived temporal distance determines the 
occurrence of assimilation and contrast effects in respect to recalled positive and 
negative selves. As shown in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.5, this was indeed the case.
Second, as shown in Table 2.5, three of the contrasts of this interaction were 
significant, while the fourth was marginally significant (the latter is appropriate given 
that this is a replication of our prior findings). All of the contrasts were in the expected 
direction. Third, as in Study 3 perceived mood congruence also determined the 
occurrence of assimilation and contrast effects in respect to recalled positive and 
negative selves, /? = .17, p -  .001, and controlling for perceived temporal distance and 
the interaction between perceived temporal distance and type of recall reduced the 
effect of the interaction between perceived mood congruence and type of recall on post- 
manipulation self-esteem (while additionally controlling for pre-manipulation self­
esteem) to P = . 11, p -  .06. The Sobel-test was close to significance, z = 1.52, p -  .06 
(one-tailed). Finally, we tested whether (a) self-esteem was more strongly affected by 
recalling a positive past self, (b) self-esteem was more strongly affected by recalling a 
negative past self, or (c) self-esteem was similarly strongly affected by recalling a 
positive and a negative past self. Following the procedure described in Study 3, the 
results of this analysis mirror the results obtained in Study 3, such that there was no 
significant interaction between chronic mood and valence of the recalled self as 
predictors of post-manipulation self-esteem in the replication condition, ft = -.06, p  = 
.53. Furthermore, this analysis revealed a significant relationship between chronic 
mood and post-manipulation self-esteem, after controlling for pre-manipulation self­
esteem, p  = .35, p  = .001. This evidence directly supports the hypothesis that the recall 
of valenced past selves increases the self-esteem of happy people relative to sad people
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and that self-esteem is similarly strongly affected by recalling a positive and a negative 
past self. As such, Study 4 completely replicated the findings of Studies 1 to 3.
Next, we tested the unique hypotheses of Study 4. To check whether the 
manipulation of perceived temporal distance was effective, we conducted an ANOVA 
with the temporal distance manipulation (short vs. long) as the independent variable 
and perceived temporal distance as the dependent variable. As expected, participants in 
the short temporal distance condition perceived the time between the recalled and the 
current self as significantly shorter than did participants in the long temporal distance 
condition, F (l, 177) = 4.15, p = .04. Next, we formed an intervention condition on the 
basis of chronic mood (above or below the median) and the temporal distance condition 
(short or long temporal distance): Sad (happy) participants, who where either in the 
short (long) temporal distance and positive recall condition or in the long (short) 
temporal distance and negative recall condition were treated as a single intervention 
condition. As shown earlier, the control condition replicated the effect of valence of 
recalled self x chronic mood on perceived temporal distance. We expected that this 
effect would not replicate in the intervention condition. Thus, we expected a significant 
three-way interaction between valence of the recalled self (positive vs. negative), 
chronic mood (happy vs. sad;, and intervention (intervention vs. control) on perceived 
temporal distance.
Consistent with predictions, the results of a multiple regression analysis showed 
a significant three-way interaction among past self, chronic mood, and intervention on 
perceived temporal distance, p  = -.40, p  = .009. This three-way interaction was 
decomposed by examining the results in each experimental condition. As shown above, 
chronic mood moderated the temporal distance bias in the control condition. In 
contrast, there was no significant interaction between chronic mood and valence of the
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recalled self in the intervention condition, p  = -.04, p  = .78. This pattern indicates that 
the cognitive intervention undermined naturally occurring differences in perceptions of 
temporal distance by chronically happy and sad people. In line with this finding, the 
effect of chronic mood on post-manipulation self-esteem was smaller in the 
intervention condition than in the control condition, /? = -.17, p = .055.
Extending the findings of Studies 1 to 3, we successfully manipulated perceived 
temporal distance by differentially framing the five years of recall (cf. Broemer et al., 
2008; Wilson & Ross, 2001). This manipulation undermined the naturally occurring 
temporal distance bias shown by chronically happy and sad people. The possibility of 
undermining the temporal distance bias by means of cognitive interventions, such as the 
divergent framing of the time between the recalled and the current self, provides further 
support for the argument that the temporal distance bias is partly caused by cognitive 
factors.
2.7 Analyses Across Studies
In all four studies, perceived mood congruence between a recalled self and the 
current self was a crucial determinant of perceived temporal distance. However as 
noted in the introduction, it is important to further consider why perceived mood 
congruence possesses this central role in the temporal distance bias. Specifically, it is 
useful to compare two possible processes that have been suggested in the literature.
First, mental representations become more abstract with the passage of time (cf. 
Semin & Smith, 1999; Trope & Liberman, 2003). Thus, one heuristic to judge whether 
an event is perceived as temporally recent or distant is to rely on the vividness of the 
recalled event and the ease with which the event is retrieved from memory. A memory
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is perceived as temporally more recent if it is easy to recall (e.g., Sanna & Schwarz, 
2003, 2004; for a review, see Schwarz, 2004) or vividly retrieved from memory (e.g., 
Brown et al., 1985). Ease of recall and vividness of retrieval can be influenced by 
retrieval factors (e.g., Brown et al., 1985). The retrieval factor that is relevant for our 
assumption is the mood-state-dependent retrieval hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes 
that the vividness of recall and ease of retrieval of positive events should be stronger for 
happy (versus sad) people, whereas vividness of recall and ease of retrieval of negative 
events should be stronger for sad (versus happy) people (e.g., Blaney, 1986; Bower, 
1981; Kenealy, 1997). Therefore, happy people should perceive recalled positive selves 
as more recent than recalled negative selves and sad people should perceive recalled 
negative selves as more recent than recalled positive selves.
Second, affect should be a particularly relevant feature when it comes to 
valenced selves. This assumption is in line with the central role of the hedonic principle 
in people’s lives (Freud, 1920; Kahneman et al., 1999; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). 
Further, this assumption is also in line with Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) work on mood- 
as-information. When recalling valenced selves, affective overlap (i.e., mood 
congruence) may be an especially relevant type of feature overlap (Schwarz & Bless, 
2007; Stapel, 2007). Of importance, overlap between a recalled self and the current self 
has been assumed to foster feelings of personality continuity, which in turn has been 
hypothesized to increase the perception of temporal recency (cf. Beike & Niedenthal, 
1998; Broemer et al., 2008). This may be a second explanation why affective overlap 
determined the perception of temporal distance in each study.
Although both explanations are theoretically sound, there are data suggesting 
that ease of retrieval and vividness of recall do not explain the role of mood congruence 
in the temporal distance bias. Specifically, Ross and Wilson (2002) found that ease of
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retrieval did not account for the interactive effect of valence of the recalled self and 
self-esteem on perceived temporal distance. Nevertheless, either the ease/vividness of 
retrieval explanation or the feature overlap explanation may shed more light on the 
process that underlies the influence of perceived mood congruence on the temporal 
distance bias. Additionally, evidence for the operation of either one of these processes 
would further support our claim that the temporal distance bias is partly a cognitive 
bias, because both ease/vividness of recall as well as feature overlap are cognitive 
rather than motivational factors.
To investigate these issues, Studies 2 to 4 included additional measures of ease 
of retrieval, vividness of recall, and feature overlap between the recalled and the current 
self (see below). Previous studies showed that these constructs can be reliably assessed 
by means of self-report and that there are moderately strong intercorrelations between 
these constructs. Consistent with these previous studies, we found moderately strong 
positive relationships between ease of retrieval and vividness of recall, .38 < all rs <
.60, allps < .001, and weak or no relationships between feature overlap and ease of 
retrieval as well as vividness of recall, .02 < all rs < .26, ns < allps < .001.
2.7.7 Method
Materials and Procedure
The items assessing vividness of recall, ease of retrieval, and feature overlap 
between the recalled and the current self were administered together with the items 
assessing perceived temporal distance and perceived mood congruence in random 
order. Participants completed all items using the same response format as used to assess 
perceived mood congruence.
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Ease o f retrieval. The measure of ease of retrieval was modelled after the 
measure used by Schwarz et al. (1991). Ease of retrieval was assessed with two items: 
“The recall was pretty hard” (reverse scored) and “It was very easy for me to bring the 
recalled self to mind”, rmean = .51, p = .001.
Vividness o f recall. Vividness of recall was also assessed with two items: “My 
memories of the recalled self were vague and fuzzy” (reverse scored) and “My 
memories of the former self were detailed”, rmean = .65, p  = .001.
Feature overlap. The measure of feature overlap was modelled after the 
measure used by Brown et al. (1992). Feature overlap was again assessed with two 
items: “I do not share a lot of “features” with the person I was back then” (reverse 
scored) and “A lot of things are similar between nowadays and back then”, r  = .48, p  = 
.001.
2.7.2 Results and Summary
To test for the unique relation between perceived mood congruence and (a) ease 
of recall, (b) vividness of recall, and (c) feature overlap, perceived mood congruence 
was regressed simultaneously on the latter three variables in Studies 2 to 4, 
individually. These regressions revealed no significant relations between ease of recall 
and perceived mood congruence, -.15 </fa < .16, all nst and only one significant 
relation between vividness of recall and perceived mood congruence, all other -.04 < fis 
< .19, all ns. However, this significant relation was negative and thus at odds with the 
theoretical expectations, indicating that people who recall the past self vividly 
perceived low mood congruence between the recalled and the current self, /? = -.27, p  = 
.005. On the contrary, there were strong relations between perceived feature overlap
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and perceived mood congruence in all three studies. All of these relations were in the 
theoretically expected direction, indicating that people who perceive high mood 
congruence between the recalled and the current self also perceived high feature 
overlap, all .48 <f$s< .62, ps < .001.
In line with the findings by Ross and Wilson (2002), these results suggest that 
the central role of perceived mood congruence for the temporal distance bias is unlikely 
to be due to ease or vividness of retrieval. Indeed, the findings suggest that perceived 
mood congruence is an especially relevant type of perceived feature overlap when it 
comes to recalling past selves. Perceived feature overlap should affect perceived 
temporal distance because feature overlap fosters feelings of personality continuity (cf. 
Beike & Niedenthal, 1998; Broemer et al., 2008). In line with this argument, both 
perceived mood congruence and perceived feature overlap were strongly and 
consistently related to perceived temporal distance in all three studies, all -.66 < fis < - 
.48, ps < .001 and all -.64 <fis< -.42, ps < .001, respectively.
It is still an open question whether perceived feature overlap is a stronger or a 
weaker mediator (in comparison to perceived mood congruence) of the interaction 
effect of valence of the recalled self and chronic mood on perceived temporal distance. 
On the one hand, perceived feature overlap is a broader construct than perceived mood 
congruence, with perceived mood congruence only being one feature of many that may 
determine assimilation and contrast effects. Thus, one might expect that perceived 
feature overlap is a stronger mediator than perceived mood congruence. On the other 
hand, perceived mood congruence might be perceived as the only relevant feature when 
it comes to valenced selves (cf. Stapel & Marx, 2007). Thus, perceived mood 
congruence might be the more precise and therefore the stronger moderator of the 
interaction effect of valence of the recalled self and chronic mood on perceived
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temporal distance. To test these two possibilities, we compared (a) the decrease of the 
interaction effect of valence of the recalled self and chronic mood on perceived feature 
overlap when perceived mood congruence is controlled with (b) the decrease of the 
interaction effect of valence of the recalled self and chronic mood on perceived mood 
congruence when perceived feature overlap is controlled. When controlling for mood 
congruence, the interaction effect of valence of the recalled self and chronic mood on 
perceived feature overlap was decreased from significance, .36 <fis< .49, ps < .02, to 
non-significance, .04 <fis < .19, .07 <ps  < .80, in all three cases. When controlling for 
perceived feature overlap, the interaction effect of valence of the recalled self and 
chronic mood on perceived mood congruence was only very slightly decreased from 
very high levels of significance, .47 <fis < .65, ps < .001, to still high levels of 
significance .29 <fis< .46, ps < .01, in all three cases. In line with this finding, the 
interaction effect of valence of the recalled self and chronic mood on perceived 
temporal distance, -.68 < fis < -.51, ps < .001, was more strongly decreased when 
controlling for perceived mood congruence, -.39 <fis< -.27, .004 <ps < .10, than when 
controlling for perceived feature overlap, -.49 <fis< -.32, ps < .008.
The coherent pattern of results across studies provides strong support for the 
notion that perceived mood congruence is a specific and especially relevant type o f 
feature overlap when it comes to valenced recalled and current selves. Rather than 
domain unspecific feature overlap in general, it is feature overlap in the domain of 
mood (i.e., mood congruence) that determines the temporal distance bias. This finding 
is consistent with recent research by Stapel and Marx (2007), who advocated the view 
that some features play a more important role in determining the occurrence of 
assimilation and contrast effects than other features. At the same time, consistent with 
evidence reported by Ross and Wilson (2002), our data provide no support for the
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assumption that perceived mood congruence is central because it relates to ease and 
vividness of recall. The finding that perceived mood congruence as a specific feature 
overlap is a better moderator of the temporal distance bias than domain unspecific 
perceived feature overlap more generally is consistent with the central role of the 
hedonic principle in the human psyche (Freud, 1920; Kahneman et al., 1999; Sedikides 
& Gregg, 2008) and the relevance of mood in guiding more general judgments 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Sedikides & Green, 2001). Of importance, the current studies 
are the first to provide empirical evidence that feature overlap (in the form of perceived 
mood congruence) is related to perceived temporal distance.
2.8 Discussion
In this chapter, my collaborators and I proposed and supported the provocative 
hypothesis that thinking about a positive past self leads to a relative increase in self­
esteem for chronically happy people, but to a relative decrease in self-esteem for 
chronically sad people. Probably even more counterintuitive, the research described in 
the chapter supported the hypothesis that thinking about a negative past self leads to a 
relative decrease in self-esteem for chronically sad people, but to a relative increase in 
self-esteem for chronically happy people. These results were expected on the basis of 
our Mood Congruence Model (MCM) of Temporal Comparison (see Figure 2.1). As 
predicted by the MCM, chronically happy people felt mood congruence (incongruence) 
between a recalled positive (negative) self and the current self, eliciting feelings of 
temporal recency (distance), and thus chronically happy people showed an assimilation 
(contrast) effect in regard to the recalled positive (negative) self, as evidenced by a 
relative increase in self-esteem. On the other hand, chronically sad people felt mood
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incongruence (congruence) between a recalled positive (negative) self and the current 
self, eliciting feelings of temporal distance (recency), and thus chronically sad people 
showed a contrast (assimilation) effect in regard to the recalled positive (negative) self, 
as evidenced by a relative decrease in self-esteem. Together then, the results provided 
direct evidence that psychological health, in the form of chronic mood, exerts effects on 
self-esteem, when it comes to recalling valenced selves. This is important since 
research investigating effects of psychological health on self-esteem is sparse 
(Baumeister et al., 2003). Furthermore, the research in this chapter differs from past 
research in that it has a particularly strong focus on the process that underlies these 
effects (see Figure 2.1).
Across four studies, the data were consistent with predictions in all but one 
point: In Studies 1 to 3, sad people did not significantly differ in their perception of 
temporal distance when recalling a positive or a negative past self. At first glance, this 
result is at odds with the MCM. The model predicts that sad people should perceive a 
recalled negative self as temporally more recent than a recalled positive self because of 
the mood congruence (incongruence) between the recalled negative (positive) self and 
the current self.
However, two lines of argument support the model’s rationale. First, the 
literature on chronic mood provides an explanation for our findings. In non-clinical 
samples, the mean level of chronic mood is typically positive and not neutral. In fact, 
the mean mood of participants in Studies 1 to 3 was almost one standard deviation more 
positive than neutral mood. Thus, it is not surprising that there was no significant effect 
when testing this contrast at one standard deviation below the mean of chronic mood.
At one standard deviation below the mean of chronic mood, we do not capture really 
sad mood but neutral mood. In fact, when the same contrasts were tested at two
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standard deviations below the mean, the contrasts were significant in all four studies, 
.44 < all fis < .82, all ps < .05. However, contrasts two standard deviations above or 
below means must generally be interpreted cautiously, because such analyses consider 
relatively few participants. This small number of participants may obscure the 
possibility that there could be some curvilinearity underlying this particular contrast. 
Thus, an important addition to the current research would test the MCM using a 
clinically depressed sample. Second, increasing the power of our analysis by taking the 
participants of all four studies together was sufficient to show a significant contrast for 
individuals already at one standard deviation below the mean of chronic mood, >9(425) 
= .18, p  = .005. These data completely supports the MCM.
The MCM carries several theoretical and practical implications. First, our 
evidence that chronic mood can influence whether thinking about one’s valenced past 
relatively increases or decreases self-esteem may be relevant to consider in other lines 
of research that deal with the recall of valenced selves (e.g., nostalgia, experimental 
mood manipulations, and reminiscence therapy). Second, this research showed that 
cognitive factors underlying temporal distance perceptions are not solely contextual in 
nature (e.g., Broemer et al., 2008; Strack et al., 1985; for a review see Schwarz & 
Strack, 1999) but that individual difference variables can also determine temporal 
distance perceptions through cognitive mechanisms. Third, the research showed that 
perceiving a positive past self as temporally closer than a negative past self (i.e., the 
temporal distance bias; Ross & Wilson, 2002) is not solely due to the motivation to 
self-enhance but also due to the cognitive effect that mood congruent selves are 
perceived as temporally closer than mood incongruent selves.
An interesting issue is how people arrive at mood congruence judgments. The 
four studies in this chapter have shown that perceived mood congruence is central for
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the temporal distance bias as well as for the occurrence of assimilation and contrast 
effects in respect to recalled selves. The judgment of congruence (i.e., similarity, 
overlap) of two entities by definition requires knowledge about both of these entities. 
Then, in the next step, these two entities are compared, and this finally results in a 
judgment of congruence. There is little question that people can judge their current 
mood. However, how do people judge their past mood? It is unlikely that people 
possess a complete mental record of their mood at all time-points from their personal 
past. Such knowledge, however, would be necessary in order to make an error free 
judgment of mood congruence between a recalled and the current self. Instead, it is 
more likely to assume that people use self-perception strategies (Bern, 1967, 1972) in 
order to infer their past mood from their behaviour or from their salient traits at the time 
of the recalled self. That is, the information that is rendered salient concerning the 
recalled time should have a strong impact on whether one’s past mood is judged as 
positive or negative. Thus, selectively recalling positive episodes or traits from one’s 
personal past should lead to the conclusion that one’s mood at the recalled time was 
positive, whereas selectively recalling negative episodes or traits from one’s personal 
past should lead to the conclusion that one’s mood at the recalled time was negative. 
Then, the fit between the mood judgment of one’s past self and the mood judgment of 
one’s current self should be evaluated. High fit should result in high mood congruence, 
whereas low fit should result in low mood congruence.
In fact, the results across Studies 2 through 4 show that this process seems to 
underlie the perceived mood congruence judgments made by our participants. 
Specifically, these studies show that happy (sad) people indicate higher mood 
congruence between their current self and their past self five years ago after they have 
recalled a positive (negative) past self than after they have recalled a negative (positive)
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past self. Thus, participants’ perception of their past mood varied as a function of recall 
and thus participants’ perception of their past mood does not reflect reality, but is 
reconstructed based on the valence o f the recalled information. Note that this finding 
does not question the importance of perceived mood congruence as an influential 
psychological variable. The results demonstrate the importance of perceived mood 
congruence not only for the temporal distance bias but also for the occurrence of 
assimilation and contrast effects in respect to recalled positive and negative selves.
There is potential for these findings and the MCM to serve as the foundation for 
a variety of further empirical work. One interesting strand of future research can be 
based on the observation that recalling any valenced self increases self-esteem for 
happy people, but decreases self-esteem for sad people. Thus, nostalgia may increase 
self-esteem of chronically happy people, but may decrease self-esteem for sad people. 
Interestingly, Wildschut et al. (2006; see also Zhou, Sedikides, Wildschut, Lei, & Gao, 
2008) did not only find that nostalgia increases self-esteem, but also that one trigger of 
nostalgia is negative affect and loneliness (albeit state rather than chronic affect and 
loneliness). Thus, these findings suggest that there may be something specific to the 
recall of past selves in a nostalgic fashion that circumvents contrast effects. Future 
research should closely examine the difference between the nature of nostalgic and 
non-nostalgic recalls of past selves. If it is possible to identify features of nostalgia that 
prevent contrast (e.g., a strong sense of self-continuity; cf. Sedikides, Wildschut, 
Gaertner, Routledge, & Arndt, 2008), one would possess a powerful tool to strengthen 
interventions that attempt to increase psychological functioning by recalling positive 
past selves.
Second, past research has demonstrated that thinking about positive attachment 
experiences with our parents in childhood (Mikulincer et al., 2001a) or thinking about
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positive past attachment experiences with close people in general (Mikulincer et al., 
2003) increases attachment security. Given that attachment experiences are strongly 
related to affect (Mikulincer, Hirschberger, Nachmias, & Gillath, 2001b) the MCM 
might be useful for better understanding attachment processes. In particular,
Attachment Theory assumes that asking people to recall secure attachment episodes 
from their past necessarily increases attachment security (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). 
However, following the MCM it is plausible that chronically sad people contrast 
themselves away from recalled secure attachment episodes. As such, thinking about 
positive personal attachment episodes may provide a safe haven (cf. Bowlby, 1969, 
1973, 1980) for chronically happy people, but a rough sea for those people who are 
badly in need of security -  chronically sad people.
Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that the evidence provided here for a direct 
causal effect of chronic mood on self-esteem within the realm of recalling valenced 
selves is solely based on a ‘mini-longitudinal’ design. Specifically, chronic mood was 
not manipulated but assessed. To be able to nevertheless make some causal statement, 
we controlled for self-esteem at the time of the chronic mood assessment when testing 
for the effect of chronic mood on post-manipulation self-esteem—i.e., a longitudinal 
design with a time frame as long as the manipulation (approximately 10 minutes). This 
methodological approach however allows the alternative explanation that some 
covariate of chronic mood may have caused the effects we obtained. Another approach 
to test for the causal effect of chronic mood is to manipulate chronic mood 
experimentally. However, such an approach also comes with several disadvantages. For 
once, to comfortably conclude that the mood-manipulation provides unequivocal 
evidence for the present hypothesis, one needs to be certain that the mood manipulation 
actually manipulates mood and nothing else—a certainty that is unfortunately not
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always given (see Mikulincer et al., 2001b). More critically here, however, is that 
manipulated mood-states may not be functionally identical to chronic mood states. 
Within the realm of self-esteem research this non-equivalence has long been realized 
(e.g., Brown & Dutton, 1995) and the finding that affect has a substantial genetic basis 
(Neiss et al., in press) also renders the functional non-equivalence of manipulated and 
chronic moods likely. Furthermore, in this research we were explicitly interested in 
how chronic personality characteristics impact the effect of recalling valenced selves 
on the present self. Together then, we see our approach as a necessary step in order to 
test the MCM, but we wish to highlight that an important endeavour for future research 
is to examine the possibility that manipulated mood-states are functionally similar to 
chronic mood in their effect on self-esteem within the realm of recalling valenced 
selves. Such research would complement the current approach and would buttress the 
causal assumptions underlying the MCM.
2.9 Concluding Remarks
A lot of research has focused on how the current self shapes perceptions of 
recalled selves (see Ross, 1989). In this chapter, four studies demonstrated that a 
recalled self also shapes perceptions of the current self. Together, these results suggest 
complex and multi-directional effects between a person’s past self and present self. 
These effects may be due to motivational as well as cognitive biases (for a more general 
discussion between these biases see Miller & Ross, 1975). The current research shows 
that the temporal distance bias (Ross & Wilson, 2002) is not solely due to the 
motivation to self-enhance. Instead, cognitive factors play an important role in whether 
a valenced self is perceived as temporally recent or distant. In turn, temporal distance
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perceptions determined the occurrence of assimilation and contrast effects of the 
valence of the recalled self on current self-esteem. The Mood Congruence Model 
(MCM) of Temporal Comparison provides evidence that chronic personality 
characteristics are important to consider when predicting the effects on recalling past 
selves on the current self. In particular, the MCM suggests that chronic mood needs to 
be considered when making predictions on how recalling valenced selves affect the 
current self. In a broader sense, this model—and the research testing it—contributes to 
a better understanding of the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. 
Whereas a lot of past research has focused on the effects of self-esteem on 
psychological health, the MCM-derived research suggests that psychological health can 
also affect self-esteem and it helps to understand the processes that underlie this effect.
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Chapter 3
The Role of Belongingness in the Relationship 
Between Self-Esteem and Psychological Health
In collaboration with: 
Michael Riketta (University of Tubingen) 
Gregory R. Maio (Cardiff University) 
Geoffrey Haddock (Cardiff University)
3.1 Chapter Overview
Belongingness plays a primary role in the relationship between self-esteem and 
psychological health. A plethora of research has shown that people who possess a high 
belongingness status experience higher self-esteem. In turn, higher self-esteem leads to 
higher psychological health. However, past research has exclusively focused on 
individual differences in the perceived amount of belongingness. Drawing on 
humanistic psychology, the research described in this chapter tested whether people not 
only vary in the amount of belongingness they perceive to receive, but also in their 
perceptions of the extent to which their belongingness is (unconditional on their 
general achievements. This research focus parallels recent research emphasizing the 
importance of contingent self-esteem over and above differences in the amount of self­
esteem. Three studies revealed that (1) amount and unconditionality of belongingness 
are largely independent dimensions, (2) the amount and unconditionality of 
belongingness independently relate to psychological health, and (3) the amount of self­
esteem mediates the relationship between amount of belongingness and psychological 
health, whereas contingent self-esteem mediates the relationship between
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unconditionality of belongingness and psychological health. These results suggest a 
belongingness-based explanation for the effect of contingent self-esteem on 
psychological health and further support a belongingness-based explanation for the 
effect of amount of self-esteem on psychological health.
3.2 Introduction
People feel a sense of belonging or social acceptance when they feel valued, 
liked, and loved by other people (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The need to belong has 
been consistently listed to range among the most important psychological needs (Fiske, 
2002; Sheldon et al., 2001). In their review of the belongingness literature, Baumeister 
and Leary (1995) concluded that “belongingness can be almost as compelling a need as 
food” (p. 498). The need to belong also has been postulated to play a role in people’s 
choices of social identities (Brewer, 1991; see also Ellemers et al., 2002). Further, 
Maslow (1968) assigned belongingness a central role in his hierarchy of needs, and 
self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) assumes that relatedness needs are 
among the three most important psychological needs. Impressive support for the central 
role of belongingness in the human condition has recently been garnered by 
neurological research: Social exclusion, the opposite of a high amount of 
belongingness, has been found to activate the same neural pathways as does physical 
pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003).
Although there are considerable differences among different theories of 
belongingness in their definition of the need to belong, they share at least one core 
assumption: People who feel accepted, valued, liked, and loved by other people in 
general are psychologically healthier than people who do not feel accepted, valued,
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liked, and loved. The beneficial effect of felt belongingness has been demonstrated in a 
vast amount of empirical research, using many different methodologies (for a review, 
see Baumeister & Leary, 1995). This is of course not to say that there are no boundary 
conditions to the effect of belongingness on psychological health. Baumeister and 
Leary (1995) include in their definition of the need to belong, that belongingness is 
only beneficial if it includes “affective concern for each other’s welfare” (p.497). 
Implicit in this statement is that belongingness to people who one does not care for 
should not lead to better psychological health, and the same rational also applies to 
belongingness to groups that one holds low regard for (e.g., Ellemers et al., 2002).
Most relevant to the current research, evidence has found a strong link between 
a lack of close social bonds and unhappiness (e.g., Argyle, 1987; Freedman, 1978; 
Leary, Koch, & Hechenbleikner, 2001; Myers, 1992). Deprivation from close others 
and the prospective loss of important relationships are associated with feelings of 
depression and anxiety (Leary, 1990; Leary, Cottrell, & Phillips, 2001; Leary &
Downs, 1995). Social exclusion is even likely to be the most common cause of anxiety 
(Baumeister & Tice, 1990; see also Barden, Garber, Leiman, Ford, & Masters, 1985). 
Further, the availability of social support reduces stress and increases subjective well­
being (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Goodenow, Reisine, & Grady, 1990; Hermann, Lucas, & 
Friedrich, 2008; Manne & Zautra, 1989), and these effects appear to occur because of 
the perception that other people value and care for the individual and value having 
relationships with this individual (Leary, 2001, Stroebe & Stroebe, 1997). Thus, a large 
amount of social psychological theory and research leaves little doubt that feelings of 
belongingness are positively associated with psychological health.
3.2.1 Unconditional versus Conditional Belongingness
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So far, research in personality and social psychology has almost exclusively 
focused on the amount of belongingness experienced (i.e., on how much one feels 
loved, accepted etc.) and is virtually mute to qualitative differences in belongingness. 
By contrast, humanistic psychologists have claimed for a long time that belongingness- 
related constructs vary not only in their amount, but also in their quality (e.g., Fromm, 
1956; Rogers, 1951, 1961). Further, humanistic psychologists have proposed that these 
qualitative differences in belongingness-related constructs affect psychological health 
over and above differences in the amount of belongingness-related constructs.
For example, Erich Fromm (1956) distinguishes between motherly and fatherly 
love. According to Fromm (1956, p. 31), motherly love “is a passive one. There is 
nothing I have to do in order to be loved -  mother’s love is unconditional. All I have to 
do is to be -  to be her child. Mother’s love is a bliss, is peace, it need not be acquired, it 
need not be deserved.” In contrast, fatherly love “is conditional love. Its principle is ‘I 
love you because you fulfil my expectations, because you do your duty, because you 
are like me” (Fromm, 1956, p. 34). According to Fromm (1956, p. 33), fatherly love 
“always [leaves] a fear that love could disappear. Furthermore, “‘deserved’ love easily 
leaves a bitter feeling that one is not loved for oneself, that one is loved only because 
one pleases, that one is, in the last analysis, not loved at all but used.” Similarly,
Rogers (1951, 1956) argues that unconditional positive regard from the therapist 
towards the client is essential for the therapeutic process. According to Rogers (1961), 
unconditional positive regard from the therapist toward the client leads to a better 
therapeutic outcome than does conditional positive regard.
Whereas Fromm (1956) focused on parental love towards the child and Rogers 
(1951, 1961) focused on positive regard of the therapist towards the client, Baumeister
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and Leary (1995) suggested that the unconditionality dimension may also play a vital 
role in the more general concept of belongingness or social acceptance. (Baumeister 
and Leary use the terms belongingness and social acceptance interchangeably.) 
Surprisingly, however, the assertion that unconditionality of belongingness may play an 
important role in the analyses of belongingness has not yet been tested empirically. The 
current research attempts to fill this important gap.
3.2.2 The Current Research
The current research fulfilled three general aims. First, my collaborators and I 
tested whether the distinction between conditional and unconditional love or positive 
regard can be applied to the broader concept of belongingness towards other people in 
general (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), rather than being specific to parental love and 
positive regard from therapists towards their clients (cf. Fromm, 1956; Rogers, 1951, 
1961). Intuition might lead a person to expect that the belongingness felt from 
interactions with some people is experienced as unconditional (e.g., parents, romantic 
partners), whereas the belongingness felt from interactions with other people is 
experienced as conditional (e.g., colleagues, friends). Although such differences may 
occur, they do not contradict the possibility that there can also be individual differences 
in perceptions of belongingness experienced across individuals. Hermann et al. (2008) 
have shown that people’s beliefs about the extent to which they are valued and liked by 
divergent others (e.g., friends, boss, teachers, parents of friends, neighbours, co- 
workers, and general others) are highly intercorrelated and load on a single factor. In 
other words, people who believe that they are valued by their friends also believe that 
they are valued by their bosses, teachers, and other significant others. This finding
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suggests that perceptions of belongingness cohere across other people in general, 
making it feasible to test whether the amount of belongingness received from other 
people in general can be distinguished from the perceived unconditionality of this 
belongingness experienced from them. An advantage of this approach is that it focuses 
on the same level of analysis as the need to belong (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & 
Schreindorfer, 2004) and global self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1979, 1981; Brown, 1998).
The second aim was to test the assumption that unconditionality of 
belongingness relates to psychological health independent of amount of belongingness 
(cf. Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Independent relations of the unconditionality 
dimension on psychological health have been documented in clinical research. 
Specifically, Rogers (1951, 1961) asserted that independent of the treatment method 
employed by therapists, the quality of regard the therapists had for their clients affected 
the therapeutic success. Therapists who possessed unconditional positive regard toward 
their clients achieved a stronger increase in psychological health in the client than did 
therapists who possessed conditional positive regard. Similarly, Fromm (1956) argued 
that motherly (i.e., unconditional) love from the parents should instil higher 
psychological health in their children than fatherly (i.e., conditional) love does. Within 
the endeavour to examine the independent relations of the two belongingness 
dimensions with psychological health, we also aimed to test for the possibility that the 
two belongingness dimensions may interact in predicting psychological health. There is 
complete consensus among researchers concerned with the unconditionality dimension 
(e.g., Fromm, 1956; Rogers, 1951, 1961; see also Baumeister & Leary, 1995) that the 
combination of a high amount and high unconditionality of belongingness should relate 
to psychological health most positively. However, it is theoretically more difficult to 
predict the relative size of the relations between the remaining three cells of the two­
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dimensional space spanned by the amount and unconditionality of belongingness 
dimension. Fromm (1956) suggested that a lack of fatherly love (low amount and low 
unconditionality of belongingness) is less harmful to the individual than a lack of 
motherly love (low amount and high unconditionality of belongingness), because an 
individual who lacks fatherly love can at least maintain the hope to receive love in the 
future—given that she believes to be better able to live up to her parents expectations in 
the future. On the contrary, however, Fromm (1956) suggested that a lack of motherly 
love does not even allow the individual to be hopeful that she may receive love from 
their parents in the future, because the individual can take no action to increase the love 
that she receives. In other words, Fromm’s reasoning suggests an interaction between 
amount and unconditionality of belongingness. However, it is theoretically similarly 
sound to expect two main effects and no interaction. This latter pattern would predict 
that the combination of low amount and low unconditionality of belongingness is more 
harmful to the individual than the combination of low amount and high 
unconditionality of belongingness. The reason why such a prediction can be sensibly 
made is straight forward. Specifically, individuals with a combination of low amount 
and low unconditionality of belongingness may perceive themselves not only as being 
unloved but also as a failure in the endeavour to achieve belongingness. Individuals 
with a combination of low amount and low unconditionality of belongingness, 
however, have no reason to blame themselves for not being loved by others and thus 
may feel less distressed than individuals with a combination of low amount and low 
unconditionality of belongingness. Together then, we had no specific hypothesis 
regarding whether the two belongingness dimensions would interact in predicting 
psychological health or not. Nonetheless, we wished to examine this interesting issue 
empirically.
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For the purpose of this thesis, the first two goals are necessary steps in order to 
pave the way for testing the third and most important goal. Specifically, the third goal 
was to test the role of self-esteem in the relationship between amount and 
unconditionality of belongingness on the one hand and psychological health on the 
other hand. Several theories that link belongingness and psychological health ascribe a 
central role to self-esteem in this relationship. Many influential theories on the origins 
of self-esteem have argued that self-esteem is based on being accepted, valued, liked, 
and loved by other people. This idea is present in the classic writings of Cooley (1902), 
Homey (1937), James (1890), and Mead (1934), as well as in the more recent 
sociological literature (Felson, 1993) and contemporary social, developmental, and 
personality psychology (e.g., Harter, 1993a; Rosenberg, 1979, 1981; Shrauger & 
Schoeneman, 1979).
An important contemporary example of the perspective that self-esteem is 
determined by one’s belongingness status is Sociometer Theory (Leary, 2006; Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Cox, 2007; Leary et al., 1995). According to this theory, 
self-esteem functions as a meter that monitors a person’s belongingness status. High 
self-esteem indicates sufficient belongingness, whereas low self-esteem indicates 
insufficient belongingness. As such, self-esteem has no direct causal effects, but is an 
epiphenomenon caused by one’s belongingness status.
Speaking for all these theories that connect self-esteem to belongingness, there 
is abundant evidence that the amount of belongingness is positively related to self­
esteem (for a review, see Leary & Baumeister, 2000). To give some research examples, 
fluctuations in self-esteem can be traced back to changes in the belongingness status of 
a person (Coopersmith, 1967; Harter, 1993b). Experimental induction of rejection 
decreases self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995; Leary, Haupt, Stausser, & Chokel, 1998;
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Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary, Blevins, & Holgate, 1997), recalling episodes of acceptance 
elevates self-esteem (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007), and people’s emotional reactions to 
ego threats are more extreme when others know of these threats (Leary, Barnes, & 
Gabriel, 1986). In addition, lower self-esteem is experienced by children who receive 
less acceptance from their peers (Harter, 1993a, 1993b; Harter, Whitesell, & Junkin,
1998) and parents (e.g., Garber, Robinson, & Valentiner, 1997; McCranie & Bass, 
1984). Thus, it seems that the primary sources of self-esteem are interpersonal 
(Fleming & Courtney, 1984; Harter, 1993a; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Koch & 
Shepperd, 2008).
Moreover, self-esteem mediates the connection between belongingness and 
psychological health. This pattern has been shown with correlational designs (e.g., 
Garber et al., 1997; Grills & Ollendick, 2002; Symister & Friend, 2003; for a review, 
see DuBois & Tevendale, 1999) and longitudinal designs (DuBois, Burk-Braxton, 
Swenson, Tevendale, Lockerd, & Moran, 2002). This pattern is also consistent with 
Sociometer Theory (Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Cox, 2007; 
Leary et al., 1995) because the amount of self-esteem should be a more precise 
indicator of one’s belongingness status than actual self-reports of belongingness. Thus, 
the empirical relationship between self-esteem and psychological health should be 
stronger than the empirical relationship between belongingness and psychological 
health.
Prior research has not explored the link between self-esteem and the 
unconditionality of belongingness or the role of self-esteem in the relationship between 
the unconditionality of belongingness and psychological health. Rogers (1961) 
suggested that unconditional positive regard from the therapist towards the client exerts 
its positive effect on psychological health via the implementation of “unconditional
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self-worth” in the client. In Rogers’s (1961) words, “I find that the more acceptance 
and liking I feel toward this individual, the more I will be creating a relationship which 
he can use. By acceptance I mean a warm regard for him as a person of unconditional 
self-worth -  of value no matter what his condition, his behaviour, or his feelings” (p. 
34; italics added). This quality of self-esteem resembles the more recent concept of 
(global) contingent self-esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kemis, 2000, 2003; Kemis & 
Goldman, 2003, 2006; Kemis & Paradise, 2002). Recent studies have shown that 
contingent self-esteem exerts effects on psychological health over and above effects of 
the amount of self-esteem (Kemis, 2008; Kemis et al., 2005; as cited in Kemis & 
Goldman, 2006). Extending this research, we tested whether the effect of 
unconditionality of belongingness on psychological health is mediated by contingent 
self-esteem.
Figure 1 summarizes our predictions in one model linking (a) amount of 
belongingness, (b) unconditionality of belongingness, (c) amount of self-esteem, (d) 
global contingent self-esteem, and (e) psychological health. Findings in support of this 
model may be helpful for Sociometer Theory (Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; 
Leary & Cox, 2007; Leary et al., 1995). As it stands, Sociometer Theory provides an 
elegant explanation of how a person’s amount of self-esteem varies, but Sociometer 
Theory has been silent on the function of contingent self-esteem. It is vital to address 
the function of contingent self-esteem, because the latest developments in self-esteem 
research have increasingly highlighted the importance of contingent self-esteem (e.g., 
Kemis et al., 2005; as cited in Kemis & Goldman, 2006; Kemis, Paradise, & Goldman, 
1999; Neighbors, Larimer, Geisner, & Knee, 2004; Patrick, Neighbors, & Knee, 2004). 
By introducing the dimension of unconditionality into the belongingness framework, 
we hope to suggest a way how Sociometer Theory may integrate contingent self­
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esteem. This integration would be crucial to the understanding of the relationship 
between self-esteem and psychological health, because it would not only suggest a 
belongingness-based explanation for the effects of amount of self-esteem on 
psychological health, but it would also suggest a belongingness-based explanation for 
the effects of conditional self-esteem on psychological health.
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Figure 3.1. The Unconditional Belongingness Model of Self-Esteem and Psychological 
Health
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3.3 Study 5
Study 5 provided an imperative first step toward showing that people do not 
only differ in the amount of felt belongingness, but also in the degree to which 
belongingness is perceived as unconditional versus conditional. To this end, this study 
was used to develop and test a pool of items designed to assess either the amount or the 
conditionality of belongingness. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were 
used to confirm that this measure subsumes two largely independent factors, with one 
tapping the amount of belongingness and the other one tapping the unconditionality of 
belongingness.
To gain some indicators of convergent and discriminant validity, this study also 
tested whether two other indicators of amount of belongingness, loneliness and 
perceived social support, relate to our measure of amount of belongingness, but not to 
our measure of unconditionality of belongingness. It was more difficult to choose 
measures that would be expected to provide support for the convergent validity of the 
unconditionality (rather than amount) of belongingness, because there is no validated 
scale of a related construct. However, several researchers have claimed that the 
unconditionality of belongingness should be negatively related to power and 
achievement motivation, because power and achievement motives are important means 
to achieve conditional belongingness (Morgenthau, 1962; see also Leary & Baumeister,
1995). In a similar vein, Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, and Greenberg (2001, p. 50) 
asked: “If people are unconditionally loved in all domains of life, would they still be as 
driven to succeed? Would Thomas Edison, John D. Rockefeller, and Bill Gates have 
achieved as much as they did?” (see Fromm, 1956, for a similar view). Yet, there is 
also some indirect support for the hypothesis that amount of belongingness is positively
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associated with power and achievement motivation. Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, 
Kumashiro, and Rosbult (2004) found positive relations between amount of 
belongingness and narcissism, and narcissists are known to be strongly power and 
achievement motivated (e.g., Carroll, 1987; Raskin & Novacek, 1991). Furthermore, 
Morgenthau (1962; see also Leary & Baumeister, 1995) argued that the expression of 
power and achievement motivation often leads to social acceptance. Thus, we expected 
that the unconditionality of belongingness would predict lower power and achievement 
motivation, while the amount of belongingness would predict higher power and 
achievement motivation.
Finally, this study tested whether both dimensions are unrelated to impression 
management (Paulhus, 1991). Dependence of any measure with impression 
management means that the measure is contaminated by strivings to appear socially 
desirable and, hence, the scores of this measure cannot be trusted (e.g., Famham et al.,
1999). A second and distinct response bias is self-deceptive enhancement. This bias is 
defined as any positively biased response that the participant believes to be true 
(Paulhus, 1991). Paulhus (1991) argues that self-deceptive enhancement can be a valid 
part of a given construct. For example, self-esteem is positively associated with self- 
deceptive enhancement (e.g., Paulhus, 1991; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). Thus, 
relations to self-deceptive enhancement only become problematic if these relations are 
so high that the two constructs become indistinguishable. Testing that neither amount 
nor unconditionality of belongingness are indistinguishable from self-deceptive 
enhancement is important, because one may argue that the coherence among 
belongingness perceptions across different groups and persons (see Hermann et al., 
2008) may actually date back to self-deceptive enhancement, because belonging to
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others is perceived as important in virtually all cultures (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 
2005).
3.3.1 Method 
Participants
591 participants (466 women, 122 men, and 3 unknown) completed this online- 
study (www.online-studies.org). The study was advertised on John Krantz’s web portal 
for online-studies (http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html). The mean age of 
participants was 22.93 years (SD = 8.01). The vast majority of participants were from 
the USA (92%).
Materials and Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, participants completed 20 candidate items for our two-dimensional 
Belongingness Scale. After that, about a third of the participants completed the 
loneliness scale, another third completed the perceived social support, power 
motivation, and achievement motivation scales, and the final third completed the scales 
assessing impression management and self-deceptive enhancement. At the end, 
participants were thanked for their participation and presented a debriefing sheet. All 
measures used in this study are described below.
Belongingness. Based on available definitions of amount and unconditionality 
of belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fromm, 1956; Rogers, 1951, 1961) we 
constructed 10 candidate items for the Amount of Belongingness subscale and 10 
candidate items for the Unconditionality of Belongingness subscale. All candidate 
items of the Belongingness Scale are listed in Table 3.1. Participants first completed the
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10 candidate items for the Amount of Belongingness subscale and then, on a separate 
page, the 10 candidate items for the Unconditionality of Belongingness subscale. 
Participants responded to each item of both subscales using a 7-point rating-scale 
ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies completely).
The candidate items of the Amount of Belongingness subscale were introduced 
with one sentence: “The 10 items below concern your beliefs about what other people 
in general think about you.” The instructions for the candidate items of the 
Unconditionality of Belongingness subscale were introduced with one brief paragraph: 
“People vary tremendously in their understanding of the concepts of love, value, 
acceptance, and liking. That is, people differ in their opinions and beliefs about 
what these concepts actually mean. The 10 items below concern your 
understanding of just these concepts. Please keep in mind that there are no right 
or wrong answers to any of the statements below. Please complete the following 
items by indicating how YOU UNDERSTOOD AND CONCEPTUALIZED 
LOVE, VALUE, ACCEPTANCE, AND LIKING IN THE PREVIOUS 
SCALE.”
Loneliness. The UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, 1996) contains 20 items. 
Example items are “How often do you feel alone?” and “How often do you feel close to 
people?” (reverse-scored). Participants responded to each item using a 4-point scale 
ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (always) (a = .94).
Gebauer 2008 96
Chapter 3 Unconditionality of Belongingness
Table 3.1
Candidate Items for the Belongingness Scale (BS) with Factor Loadings o f an Exploratory Factor Analysis
Factors
Candidate Item Amount Uncond.
In general, people love and value me. .72 .13
I feel accepted and liked. .85* .12
Other people believe that I am a great person. .80* .03
I do not think that other people like and value me. (R) .65* .12
Generally, people think negatively about me. (R) .60 .43
I believe that I am widely accepted and liked by other people. .82* .02
In general, I think that people hold me in high regard. .76* .09
Generally, I have the feeling that I am not loved and valued by other people. (R) .56 .33
People do not like or accept me. (R) .61 .31
I am sure that people generally have negative attitudes about me. (R) .51 .48
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I believe that love and value from other people depends on my achievements and accomplishments. (R) .01 .74*
Acceptance and love from other people is independent of my personal qualities. .15 .01
I am only accepted by others when I perform well. (R) .31 .65
My successes and failures determine whether I am loved or not. (R) .30 .75
Being accepted and liked has nothing to do with my skills and abilities. .00 .65*
I feel liked and valued only if I can live up to other people's expectations. (R) .38 .61
Whether I am loved and accepted depends on the contributions and qualities I can offer. (R) .28 .67
I do not think that my achievements and accomplishments account for whether I am liked and valued. .15 .75*
Love and value from others does not depend on whether I perform well or not. .07 .76*
What I can contribute and achieve does not determine whether other people love and accept me. .11 .63*
Note. * = item selected for respective subscale, (R) = reverse-scored item
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Perceived social support. The Love-Esteem Dimension of the Revised Kaplan 
Scale (Turner, 1992) utilizes a story-identification technique composed of six sets of 
vignettes. Each vignette consists of three statements about a different fictitious person. 
Each statement concerns the social support the fictitious person receives from other 
people in general. Participants have to indicate which of the three fictitious persons 
receives social support similar to the social support received by the participant himself 
or herself. In the original version of the scale, all target persons were male. Because 
many of the participants in our participant pool were women, we changed the names of 
the target persons in half of the vignettes from male to female. An example vignette is: 
“Helen: People rarely let Helen know that she is wanted. She does not really make a 
difference to them and they are rarely concerned about her. She does not matter to 
them.” vs. “Monica: People sometimes let Monica know that she matters. Sometimes 
they think that she makes a difference to them.” vs. “Catherine: People constantly let 
Catherine know that she is wanted. She really makes a difference to them. They are 
concerned about her and she matters” (a = .86).
Power motivation. Riketta’s (2008) adaptation of the Need for Power Scale 
(Schmidt & Frieze, 1997) contains 20 items. Example items are “I find satisfaction in 
having influence over others” and “I would like doing something important where 
people looked up to me.” Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies completely) (a = .84).
Power values. The Power Values subscale of the Schwartz Value Survey 
(Schwartz, 1992) contains five items. Participants indicate the importance of five power 
values (social power, authority, wealth, preserving public image, and social 
recognition) as guiding principles in their lives. Participants responded to each item
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using a 9-point scale ranging from -1 (<opposed to my values) to 7 (<extremely important) 
(a = .74).
Achievement values. The Achievement Values subscale of the Schwartz Value 
Survey (Schwartz, 1992) contains five items. Participants indicate the importance of 
five achievement values (ambitious, influential, successful, capable, and intelligent) as 
guiding principles in their lives. Participants responded to each item using a 9-point 
scale ranging from -1 (opposed to my values) to 7 (extremely important) (a = .80).
Response style. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) 
Version 6 -  Form 40 (Paulhus, 1988) contains a 20-item Impression Management 
subscale and a 20-item Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale. Example items for the 
Impression Management subscale are “I never cover up my mistakes” and “I sometimes 
tell lies if I have to” (reverse-scored) (a = .89). Example items for the Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement subscale are “I have not always been honest with myself’ and “I rarely 
appreciate criticism” (reverse-scored) (a = .88). Participants responded to each item 
using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly).
Following Paulhus’s (1988) recommendations, the frequency that a participant 
responded with extreme values (“6” or “7”, for reverse-scored items “1” or “2”, 
respectively) was used as a measure of response style for each subscale.
3.3.2 Results and Summary
Exploratory Factor Analysis
A third of the participants (N = 146) were randomly selected for the exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA), using varimax rotation. Inspection of the scree-plot revealed two 
factors. As shown in Table 1, all of the candidate items for the Amount of
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Belongingness subscale loaded high on factor 1 (.50 <FL<.  86) and lower on factor 2 
(.02 <FL<  . 50). Also, nine of the ten candidate items for the Unconditionality of 
Belongingness subscale loaded high on factor 2 (.60 <FL<  . 77) and lower on factor 1 
(.07 <FL<  . 39). One candidate item for the Unconditionality of Belongingness 
subscale loaded low on both factors (.00 < FL < .16). We decided to select those items 
for the final Belongingness Scale that loaded > .60 on the respective factor, while 
loading < .20 on the other factor. Further, we took into account that both subscales 
should have the same number of reverse-scored items. Finally, we wanted a short scale 
and thus decided to limit the number of items of the total scale to 10 (2 x 5 items).
The items selected for the final Belongingness Scale are marked in Table 1. In 
line with the results of the exploratory factor analysis, the internal consistencies of the 
two subscales were high (aAmount = -86, aunconditionaiity = -82). Participants’ mean score 
on the Amount of Belongingness subscale (M = 5.45, SD = 1.00) was more than one 
standard deviation above the theoretical midpoint of the scale, /(152) = 17.94, p  = .001. 
Consistent with past research, this result suggests that people perceive a high amount of 
belongingness in general. Participants’ mean score on the Unconditionality of 
Belongingness subscale (M = 4.34, SD = 1.45) was also higher than the theoretical 
midpoint of this scale, /(152) = 2.89, p  = .01. However, the large standard deviation of 
the Unconditionality of Belongingness subscale also indicates that people differ 
considerably in their perception of the unconditionality of their belongingness status. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
To provide further evidence for the existence and stability of the factor structure 
that was obtained in the exploratory factor analysis, we conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis of responses to the 10 selected items among participants who had not been 
included in the exploratory factor analysis (N  = 437). As expected, the confirmatory
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factor analysis revealed that the proposed two-factor model fits the data well, %2(34) = 
63.48; CF1 = .98; RMSEA = .05; CMIN = 83.07, and exhibited a significantly better fit 
than the one factor solution, ^Diff. = 430.06, p < .001. The two factors correlated at r = 
.23, p  < .01. Furthermore, the internal consistencies of the two subscales were high
(&A m ount = *88, #U nconditionality  = *76).
In line with the results obtained in the EFA sub-sample and past research, 
participants’ mean score of the Amount of Belongingness subscale (M = 5.26, SD =
1.06) was more than one standard deviation above the theoretical midpoint of the scale, 
r(436) = 24.83, p  = .001. This indicates that people perceive a high amount of 
belongingness in general. Participants’ mean score of the Unconditionality of 
Belongingness subscale (M = 4.48, SD = 1.26) was also higher than the theoretical 
midpoint of this scale, f(436) = 8.00, p  = .001. As in the EFA sub-sample, the large 
standard deviation of the Unconditionality of Belongingness subscale also indicates that 
people differ considerably in their perception of the unconditionality of their 
belongingness status.
Convergent and Discriminant Validity
To provide evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the dimensions 
of belongingness, we conducted two multiple regression analyses in which the amount 
and unconditionality of belongingness were entered as simultaneous predictors of 
perceived social support and loneliness. As expected, the amount of belongingness 
predicted higher amounts of social support and lower loneliness, /? = .63, p  < .001, and 
P -  -.64, p  < .001, respectively. Further, the unconditionality of belongingness was 
unrelated to perceived social support and loneliness, /? = .09, ns, and /? = -.08, ns, 
respectively.
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In addition, we conducted two multiple regression analyses in which the amount 
and unconditionality of belongingness were entered as simultaneous predictors of 
power motivation, power values, and achievement values. As expected, 
unconditionality of belongingness was negatively related to power motivation, power 
values, and achievement values, = -.23, p < .01, P = -.28, p  < .001, and ft = -.23, p < 
.01, respectively. In contrast, amount of belongingness was positively related to power 
motivation, power values, and achievement values, /? = .36, p  < .001, /? = .31, p  < .001, 
and p  = .23, p  < .01, respectively.
Finally, the relations between the two dimensions of belongingness and 
response style were examined using two multiple regression analyses, in which 
impression management and self-deceptive enhancement were regressed on amount and 
unconditionality of belongingness (entered simultaneously), while controlling for the 
response style that did not function as the criterion variable in the respective analysis 
(see also Paulhus, 1988). As expected, the results indicted that neither the amount nor 
the unconditionality of belongingness was related to impression management, ft = -.03, 
ns, and /? = .00, ns, respectively. Amount of belongingness was weakly but positively 
related to self-deceptive enhancement, whereas unconditionality of belongingness was 
unrelated to self-deceptive enhancement, ft = .08, p  < .01, and /? = .01, ns, respectively. 
These results show that the measures of belongingness were not confounded by 
strivings to fake good (impression management). Additionally, the finding that the 
amount, but not the unconditionality of belongingness, was positively associated with 
self-deceptive enhancement fits evidence that amount of self-esteem is positively 
associated with self-deceptive enhancement (e.g., Paulhus, 1991; Raskin et al., 1991) 
and that amount of self-esteem is an indicator of amount of belongingness (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000; Leary et al., 1995). Importantly, the modest relations between
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amount of belongingness and self-deceptive enhancement and the null-relation between 
unconditionality of belongingness and self-deceptive enhancement show that the 
coherence in people’s perceptions of their belongingness status across different groups 
of people (e.g., friends, colleagues, family) cannot be attributed to self-deceptive 
enhancement or impression management.
Overall, Study 5 provided an imperative first step toward demonstrating the 
distinction between amount of belongingness and unconditionality of belongingness. At 
the same time as showing that these dimensions are distinct and can be measured 
reliably, the results supported the convergent and discriminant validity of both 
dimensions. Nonetheless, the unconditionality dimension has been neglected in 
empirical research on belongingness. The following studies test whether this 
dimension plays a unique role in the maintenance of psychological health and self­
esteem.
3.4 Study 6
Drawing on humanistic psychology (Fromm, 1956; Rogers, 1951, 1961), Study 
6 tested whether the amount of belongingness and the unconditionality of 
belongingness show independent relations to psychological health. As noted in 
Chapters 1 and 2, psychological health was examined in part because of arguments that 
its importance in psychology is unparalleled (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Indeed, some have 
even argued that the justification of our discipline is that it promises to contribute to 
better psychological health (Kwan et al., 1997). More important, as described in the 
introduction to this chapter, connections between self-esteem and psychological health
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indirectly support the possibility that the amount of belongingness and unconditionality 
of belongingness independently contribute to this variable.
It was a simple matter to examine the empirical associations between the two 
dimensions of belongingness and psychological health, because participants merely 
needed to complete self-report measures of all of the constructs. To make the 
conclusions from this method more robust, the measures were administered in two 
independent samples with different cultural backgrounds, using different measures of 
psychological health. Sample 1 was obtained in the United Kingdom, using a measure 
of depression as an indicator of psychological health. Sample 2 was obtained in 
Germany using several diverse indicators of psychological health (e.g., chronic affect, 
resilience).
3.4.1 Method
Participants
Sample 1. 195 Cardiff University undergraduate students (168 women, 19 men, 
and 8 unknown), completed the study as part of their course requirements in two large 
classroom settings on individual computers. The mean age of participants was 18.62 
years {SD -  1.38).
Sample 2. 81 University of Tubingen undergraduate students (71 women, 10 
men), completed the study in small group settings on individual computers for a small 
financial reward. The mean age of participants was 21.54 years {SD = 2.47).
Materials and Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, participants completed the Belongingness Scale. In Sample 1, this
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measure exhibited strong reliability ( ^ A m o u n t = 87; a u n c o n d id o n a iity  = 84) and was 
followed by a measure of depression (BDI-II), described below. In Sample 2, the 
language of the study was German. After completing a German-language version of the 
Belongingness Scale (c tA m ount = -80; a U nconditionaiity = 89), participants completed 
measures of chronic affect, anxiety-depression, and resilience, in the order they are 
described below.
Depression. The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996) consists of 21 items. Each item represents a different marker of depression (e.g., 
“loss of energy”, “crying”, “suicidal thoughts or wishes”). Participants responded to 
each item using an item specific 4-point scale that allowed indicating to what degree 
the specific symptom of depression applies to them (a = .90). For each symptom, 
participants can receive between 0 to 3 points with higher scores indicating more 
depression. Thus, total BDI-II scores could theoretically vary between 0 and 63. The 
mean score of depression in our sample was 10.57 (SD = 8.20).
Chronic affect. The Chronic Affect Scale was closely modelled after Diener, 
Smith, and Fujita (1995) and consisted of five positive emotions (“happy”, “cheerful”, 
“enthusiastic”, “self-assured”, and “energetic”) and five negative emotions (“unhappy”, 
“sad”, “upset”, “depressive”, and “afraid”; all reverse-scored). Participants responded 
to each item using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (almost always) (a = .89).
Anxiety and depression. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond 
& Snaith, 1983) consists of two 7-item subscales to assess anxiety (a = .84) and 
depression (a = .77). Example items of the Anxiety subscale are “I feel tense or ‘wound 
up’”, and “Worrying thoughts go through my mind”. Example items of the Depression 
subscale are “I still enjoy things I used to enjoy”, and “I can laugh and see the funny
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side of things”. Participants responded to each item using a 4-point scale ranging from 
1 (never) to 4 (most o f the time).
Resilience. The Resilience Scale (Wagnild & Young, 1993) consists of 26 items. 
Example items are “I have enough energy to do what I have to do”, and “I am 
resilient”. Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(absolutely wrong) to 7 (absolutely right) (a = .89).
3.4.2 Results and Summary
To provide evidence that amount of belongingness and unconditionality of 
belongingness both relate independently to psychological health and to examine 
whether the two dimensions interact in predicting psychological health, the indicators 
of psychological health were simultaneously regressed on amount of belongingness 
(centred), unconditionality of belongingness (centred), and the interaction between the 
latter two. Analyses of depression in Sample 1 revealed that the amount and 
unconditionality of belongingness were both related to lower amounts of depression, ft 
= -.40, p < .001, and /? = -.20, p < .01, respectively. No significant interaction effect 
occurred, ft = .08, ns.
Similar results were obtained in Sample 2. As expected, higher amounts o f  
belongingness and unconditionality o f belongingness both predicted more positive 
chronic affect (fi = .62, p < .001, /? = .23, p  < .01, respectively), lower anxiety (fi = -.46, 
p < .001, P = -.24, p  < .05, respectively), lower depression (/? = -.41, p  < .001, /? = -.21, 
p < .05, respectively), and higher resilience (fi = .49, p < .001, y? = .19, p < .05, 
respectively). No significant interaction effect occurred on chronic affect, /? = -.15, ns,
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depression, ft = .17, ns, and resilience, /? = -.01, ns. However, there was a just 
significant interaction effect on anxiety, /? = .18, p  < .05.
The regression analyses across Samples 1 and 2 provided consistent evidence 
that amount and unconditionality of belongingness are independent predictors of 
psychological health. Sample 2 replicated Sample 1 using different and broader 
measures of psychological health in a different cultural setting, attesting to the 
generalizability of our results. These findings are the first direct evidence for the 
hypothesis derived from humanistic psychology (Fromm, 1956; Rogers, 1951, 1961) 
that amount and unconditionality of belongingness are independent predictors of 
psychological health. The results form a simple but powerful argument for the 
importance of unconditionality of belongingness within research on social functioning 
and well-being.
The exploration of an interaction between amount and unconditionality of 
belongingness in predicting psychological health revealed that the two main-effects 
hypothesis and no interaction hypothesis is more consistent with the data. In Sample 2, 
one of the four candidate interactions to predict psychological health was significant. 
The respective indicator of psychological health was anxiety. However, this effect was 
weak, exactly on the boarder of significance, and did not replicate in Study 7 (see 
below). Thus, although we wish to note that although future research may examine the 
issue of interactions between the two belongingness dimensions more closely, the 
current data is largely consistent with the two main-effects hypothesis. One fruitful 
approach in subsequent research may be to examine the interaction between amount 
and unconditionality of belongingness in samples with lower mean levels of amount of 
belongingness. In our healthy-student samples, the amount of belongingness was 
consistently about one standard deviation above the midpoint of the Amount of
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Belongingness subscale. This is consistent with past research on other indicators of 
belongingness and self-esteem (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1996). Such high levels of 
amount of belongingness are likely to limit the chances to find an interaction, because 
such an interaction should be driven by people who perceive very low amounts of 
belongingness in combination with varying degrees of unconditionality (see above).
3.5 Study 7
The amount of self-esteem plays a central role in the relationship between the 
amount of belongingness and psychological health. For example, Sociometer Theory 
(Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Cox, 2007; Leary et al., 1995) 
suggests that the amount of self-esteem is a subjective indicator of the amount of 
belongingness of a person. This reasoning suggests that the relationship between the 
amount of belongingness and psychological health is mediated by the amount of self­
esteem. Sociometer Theory’s predictions concerning the empirical relationship between 
belongingness, amount of self-esteem, and psychological health are in line with a 
plethora of empirical research showing that the effect of the amount of belongingness 
on psychological health is mediated by a person’s amount of self-esteem (DuBois et al., 
2002; Garber et al., 1997; Grills & Ollendick, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004; Symister & 
Friend, 2003; for a review, see DuBois & Tevendale, 1999). The first aim of Study 7 
was to replicate this pattern of results using the Amount of Belongingness subscale of 
our Belongingness Scale.
More importantly, the second aim of this study was to extend past theorizing 
and research by examining the role of self-esteem in the relationship between 
unconditionality of belongingness and psychological health. Based on Rogers’ (1961)
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speculation that the positive effect of unconditional positive regard on psychological 
health unfolds itself via increased unconditional self-worth in the client, we 
hypothesized that the effect of unconditionality of belongingness on psychological 
health is mediated by global contingent self-esteem. In fact, global contingent self­
esteem -  the degree to which self-esteem is contingent on one’s general achievements 
and accomplishments in life (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kemis, 2003; Kemis & Paradise, 
1999; Kemis & Goldman, 2006) -  has recently been identified as an important facet of 
self-esteem over and above the amount of self-esteem (e.g., Kemis et al., 2005; as cited 
in Kemis & Goldman, 2006; Neighbors et al., 2004; Patrick et al., 2004). Thus, the 
following studies are the first to consider contingent self-esteem in the context of 
belongingness.
3.5.1 Method
Participants
203 participants (164 women, 39 men) completed this online-study 
(www.online-studies.org), which was advertised on John Krantz’s web portal for 
online-studies. The mean age of participants was 27.58 years (SD = 12.14). The vast 
majority of participants were from the US (87%).
Materials and Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, participants completed the Belongingness Scale, followed by scales 
assessing amount of self-esteem, contingent self-esteem, and psychological health. 
These measures were administered in the order they are listed below. Finally, 
participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed. The Belongingness
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Scale (fitAmount = -80; aunconditionaiity = 89) was the same as described in Study 5. 
Psychological health was operationalized via anxiety {a = .82) and depression (a = .81) 
using Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (see Study 6). The self-esteem measures 
are described below.
Amount o f Self-Esteem. The Self-Liking Self-Competence Scale—Revised 
Version (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001) consists of 16 items. Example items are “I am very 
comfortable with myself’ and “I sometimes deal poorly with challenges” (reverse- 
scored). Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 {does 
not apply at all) to 7 {applies completely) {a = .93).
Contingent Self-Esteem. The Contingent Self-Esteem Scale (Kemis & Goldman, 
2006) consists of 17 items. Example items are “An important measure of my worth is 
how competently I perform” and “When I am successful at something, my feelings of 
self-worth remain unaffected” (reverse-scored). Participants responded to the items 
using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 {does not apply at all) to 7 {applies completely) {a 
= .89).
3.5.2 Results and Summary
To replicate the results of Study 6, the indicator of psychological health 
(anxiety-depression scores) was simultaneously regressed on amount of belongingness 
(centred), unconditionality of belongingness (centred). Replicating the results of Study 
6, amount and unconditionality of belongingness were independently related to lower 
anxiety (/? = -.35, p  < .001, and 0  = -.20, p  < .01, respectively) and lower depression {0 
= -.33, p  < .001, and 0  = -.22, p  < .001, respectively). No significant interaction effect 
occurred, .01 <0  < .05, ns.
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Using AMOS 6.0, we employed structural equation modelling with 
simultaneous estimation of parameters to test our Unconditional Belongingness Model 
of Self-Esteem and Psychological Health (see Figure 3.1). All variables were 
represented as latent variables and we randomly divided the scale-items of the variables 
in the model in three parcels for each variable. Further, we added disturbances to all 
endogenous variables (i.e., amount of self-esteem, contingent self-esteem, and 
psychological health). Given that past research consistently found relations between 
amount of self-esteem and contingent self-esteem (e.g., Kemis, 2008), we led the 
disturbances of these variables covary. We tested our model (see Figure 3.1) for anxiety 
and for depression separately. We found that the data fit the model well for anxiety 
(X2/ d f =  1.54, CFI = .98, IFI = .98, RMSEA = .05) as well as for depression (x2/ d f=
1.58, CFI = .98, IFI = .98, RMSEA = .06) as the measure of psychological health. 
Further, all paths of our model were highly significant for anxiety as the indicator of 
psychological health, all /?s > 1.251, all ps < .01. However, when treating depression as 
the indicator of psychological health, the path from contingent self-esteem to 
depression was not significant, /? = .04, ns, albeit all other paths were highly significant. 
Thus, the role of contingent self-esteem in our model appears to differ as a function of 
how psychological health is operationalized. Specifically, although unconditionality of 
belongingness repeatedly predicted depression independent of amount of belongingness 
(see Study 6 and 7) the current study suggests that this effect is not mitigated by 
contingent self-esteem. Instead, we additionally tested for direct paths from 
belongingness to psychological health and found a significant direct path from 
unconditionality of belongingness to depression in our model, /? = -.19,/? < .05. On the 
contrary, neither the direct path from amount of belongingness to depression, nor any
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direct path from amount or unconditionality of belongingness to anxiety was significant 
in our model, all /?s < 1.191, all ns.
Together, the current set of analyses provides support for our model when 
psychological health is operationalized as anxiety. When psychological health is 
operationalized as depression, however, we found that contingent self-esteem does not 
play the role proposed in the model. This finding is consistent with past research 
showing that depression behaves differently to other indicators of psychological health 
in its relation to self-esteem. Specifically, depression is typically more strongly related 
to self-esteem than other indicators of psychological health (e.g., Watson et al., 2002). 
In fact, some research even indicates that self-esteem and certain facets of 
psychological health may be identical or at least underlying the same core concept 
(Judge et al., 2002; Neiss et al., in press; Watson et al., 2002). Other researchers, 
however, find evidence showing that the relationship between these indicators of 
psychological health and self-esteem is not solely due to a common core and that these 
indicators of psychological health and self-esteem are certainly not identical (e.g., see 
Orth et al., 2008 for the relationship between self-esteem and depression). Given this 
controversy, it is informative to test whether self-esteem mediates the effect of 
belongingness on well-being or is a joint outcome. To address this issue, we tested two 
alternative models against our model for both facets of psychological health. 
Specifically, we reversed the order of the psychological health facet and self-esteem in 
the first competing model. In comparison to our model, this model provided a poorer fit 
for anxiety (x2/d f=  2.30, CFI = .95, IFI = .95, RMSEA = .08) as well as for depression 
(X2/ d f=  2.27, CFI = .95, IFI = .95, RMSEA -  .08) as indicators of psychological health. 
A likelihood ratio test to compare the models could not be applied, because both 
models had the same degrees of freedom. However, A/2 was in both cases exceeding
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60—a very large difference. For the second competing model we deleted the paths from 
the two facets of self-esteem to psychological health from our original model and 
additionally specified paths from the two facets of belongingness directly to 
psychological health. In other words, we tested whether self-esteem and psychological 
health are joint outcomes of belongingness. Again, we compared this model against our 
original model separately for anxiety and depression as indicators of psychological 
health. In comparison to our model, this second competing model also provided a 
poorer fit for anxiety (x2/df=  1.77, CFI = .97,1F1 = .97, RMSEA = .06) as well as for 
depression (x2/df=  1.88, CFI = .97, IFI = .97, RMSEA = .07) as indicators of 
psychological health. Again, a likelihood ratio test could not be applied, because both 
models had the same degrees of freedom. However, A/2 was in both cases exceeding 
25—a very large difference.
In a final step we tested for the possibility of two additional paths in our model. 
Specifically, we tested whether amount of belongingness may predict contingent self­
esteem independent of amount of self-esteem and unconditionality of belongingness 
may predict amount of self-esteem independent of contingent self-esteem. The resultant 
model is depicted in Figure 3.2. Path analyses revealed that the additional paths were in 
fact significant for amount of belongingness to contingent self-esteem (reverse-scored), 
P -  .23, p < .01, as well as for unconditionality of belongingness to amount of self­
esteem, P = .13, p < .05 (these results were the same for anxiety and depression as the 
indicators of psychological health). The strength of all other paths in the model were 
virtually unaffected by the inclusion of these two additional paths—no changes in the 
significance levels of any path occurred. Furthermore, the model fit of the modified 
model was good when treating anxiety as the indicator of psychological health (%2/df=  
1.36, CFI = .99, IFI = .99, RMSEA = .04) as well as when treating depression as the
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indicator of psychological health (;f/d f=  1.40, CFI = .99, IFI = .99, RMSEA = .05). In 
fact, the modified model (see Figure 3.2) fitted the data significantly better than our 
original model (see Figure 3.1) when treating anxiety as the indicator of psychological 
health (A/2 = 17.5, Adf= 2,p<  .001) as well as when treating depression as the 
indicator of psychological health (A/2 = 17.6, Adf= 2, p < .001). The a priori 
hypothesis underlying the modification shown in Figure 3.2 is not straight forward. A 
first reason for why the model depicted in Figure 3.2 fits the data better than the model 
depicted in Figure 3.1 may be shared method variance between the self-report scales. In 
fact, the strength of the additional correlations is within the typical range of correlations 
due to common method variance and less than half the size of the hypothesized paths 
involving these variables. A second reason for why the model depicted in Figure 3.2 
fits the data better than the model depicted in Figure 3.1 may be caused by some 
shortcomings of the Unconditionality of Belongingness subscale as well as the 
Contingent Self-Esteem Scale. After the submission of this thesis, Leary (2008) pointed 
out that the Unconditionality of Belongingness subscale may measure unconditionality 
of belongingness solely in the achievement domain rather than globally. The items of 
the Unconditionality of Belongingness subscale do suggest this. Similarly, inspection of 
the items of the Contingent Self-Esteem scale reveals that this scale also does not assess 
global perceptions of contingency but contingency in three domains: (a) achievements, 
(b) physical appearance, and (c) opinions of others. Although one may argue that these 
three domains are among the most important domains of contingency, there is 
substantial evidence that domain-specific self-esteem and global self-esteem is different 
and even the consideration of many self-esteem domains at the same time does not 
explain all the variance in global self-esteem judgments (Brown, 1998; Brown & 
Dutton, 1995). Finally, our proposed model needs replication to verify the model and
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the additional paths in particular. Of relevance here, we have constructed a global 
unconditionality of belongingness subscale as a reaction to Leary’s (2008) observation. 
Using this improved measure we found in four independent studies coherent support for 
our originally formulated model and in all studies we failed to replicate the additional 
paths as shown in Figure 3.2.
Together, the structural equation modelling employed above supports the model 
shown in Figure 3.2 for anxiety as an indicator of psychological health and provides 
evidence that our model fits the data better than two competing models. However, for 
depression as an indicator of psychological health our model is only partially supported. 
Although the results obtained by the structural equation modelling approach provides 
evidence for the relevance of unconditionality of belongingness for depression over and 
above amount of belongingness, the relation between unconditionality of belongingness 
on depression was not mediated by contingent self-esteem. This result is in line with 
research showing a particularly strong link between amount of self-esteem and low 
levels of depression. An important step for future research is to test the validity of our 
model using additional indicators of psychological health.
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Figure 3.2. Modified Unconditional Belongingness Model of Self-Esteem and 
Psychological Health
.66***/
.65***
.13*/
.13*
.00’
Amount of 
Belongingness
Self-Esteem
Amount of
Unconditionality of 
Belongingness
Unconditionality of 
Self-Esteem
Psychological
Health
Note, a/b with a = standardized regression weights for the model with anxiety (reverse- 
scored) as the indicator of psychological health and b = standardized regression weights 
for the model with depression (reverse-scored) as the indicator of psychological health. 
*** <=> p < .001, ** <=> p < .01, * O  p < .05, and ns <=> p > .05 (all two-tailed)
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3.6 Discussion
Based on humanistic psychologists’ theoretical analyses of unconditional 
acceptance in parent-child relationships (Fromm, 1956) and client-therapist 
relationships (Rogers, 1951, 1961), Baumeister and Leary (1995) speculated that the 
unconditionality of belongingness is a predictor of psychological health. Nonetheless, 
previous research on belongingness has focused solely on amount of belongingness.
The present studies are the first to empirically evaluate the unconditionality dimension 
of belongingness.
The results indicated that people differ in their perceptions of the 
unconditionality of their belongingness to other people in general and that these 
perceptions are distinct from the amount of belongingness that people perceive. Further, 
the unconditionality of belongingness predicts psychological health over and above the 
amount of belongingness (cf. Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fromm, 1956; Rogers, 1951, 
1961). Most relevant for this thesis, the data showed for the first time that the link 
between unconditionality of belongingness and psychological health is mediated by 
contingent self-esteem, while replicating past evidence that the link between amount of 
belongingness and psychological health is mediated by amount of self-esteem (for a 
review, see DuBois & Tevendale, 1999). In this respect, it needs to be noted that the 
mediational role of contingent self-esteem in the relation between unconditionality of 
belongingness and psychological health was not obtained when psychological health 
was operationalized as the absence of depression. Although this pattern of results is in 
line with past research showing that depression is the one facet of psychological health 
that shows the highest relation to amount of self-esteem (e.g., Watson et al., 2002), 
more research is clearly needed to test our model with other facets of psychological
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health. In fact, we have just completed a series of studies that support our model for 
self-actualization, self-forgiveness, guilt, shame, and chronic affect.4
On the whole, the evidence supports a model that parsimoniously integrates 
amount of belongingness, unconditionality of belongingness, amount of self-esteem, 
contingent self-esteem, and anxiety—as an indicator of psychological health (see 
Figure 1). Even the results involving depression as an indicator of psychological health 
are interesting and informative, although they do not entirely fit our model. All the 
constructs of the model shown in Figure 3.1 have been listed to range among the most 
influential psychological variables (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Fiske, 2002; Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2003). Thus, the analyses above should be useful for the understanding of the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. Despite the plethora of 
studies that have been conducted on the relationships between belongingness, self­
esteem, and psychological health, the processes underlying these effects have not been 
fully understood (Baumeister et al., 2003). By establishing unconditionality of 
belongingness as a major variable for research on belongingness, self-esteem, and 
psychological health, these data may draw us one step closer to understanding the 
processes underlying the relations between belongingness, self-esteem, and 
psychological health. An important next step is to test the causal assumptions of our 
model. So far, we only possess correlational evidence for the hypothesized causal 
effects. Research that tests the model longitudinally as well as research that manipulates 
unconditionality and amount of belongingness is necessary (see also Chapter 5). This 
issue is particularly pressing for the assumed causal path from unconditionality of 
belongingness to psychological health via contingent self-esteem. For the other
4 This sentence was added as a part of the revisions of this thesis after the viva. 
Therefore, this additional data is not reported here.
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assumed path—i.e., amount of belongingness to psychological health via amount of 
self-esteem—there already exist some longitudinal results supporting this part of the 
model (for a review see DuBois et al., 2002).
The model shown in Figure 3.1 provides three immediate benefits. First, by 
introducing the unconditionality of belongingness dimension into personality and social 
psychological research, it suggests an important origin of contingent self-esteem (Deci 
& Ryan, 1995; Kemis, 2003; Kemis & Goldman, 2003). Contingent self-esteem has 
been found to predict variables as diverse as instable self-esteem (Kemis et al., 2005), 
anger-proneness (Kemis et al., 1999), heightened alcohol consumption as a means to 
regulate affect (Neighbors et al., 2004), and increases in sad mood when comparing 
oneself with physically more attractive others (Patrick et al., 2004). However, the 
antecedents of global contingent self-esteem remain widely unexplored. Our analysis 
suggests that unconditionality of belongingness is an important origin of contingent 
self-esteem.
Second, Kwan et al. (1997, p. 1038) have argued that it is an “ultimate dream 
for everyone in the field of psychology ... [to] contribute to people's well-being44. An 
important prerequisite for this is to understand the origins of well-being or 
psychological health. Many psychologists have granted belongingness a primary role in 
contributing to better psychological health (for a review see Baumeister & Leary,
1995). With the introduction of the unconditionality of belongingness dimension into 
the belongingness framework, this chapter provides evidence that the importance of 
belongingness for psychological health is even bigger than previously assumed.
Third, and most important for this thesis, adding unconditionality of 
belongingness to the belongingness framework suggests a possible integration of 
contingent self-esteem into Sociometer Theory (Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister,
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2000; Leary & Cox, 2007; Leary et al., 1995). Sociometer Theory provides an 
explanation of the function of amount of self-esteem. Specifically, the theory assumes 
that amount of self-esteem functions as a meter or gauge of a person’s level of 
belongingness. However, why does self-esteem then not only vary in its amount, but 
also in its degree of contingency? Leary and Baumeister (2000) have compared the 
amount of belongingness with the amount of fuel in a car and correspondingly the 
amount of self-esteem with the car’s fuel control. However, fuel is not enough to keep 
an engine going. An engine also needs air and an air control (i.e., the “choke” in older 
engines). In keeping with Leary and Baumeister’s (2000) metaphor, the 
unconditionality of belongingness can be compared with the air intake and contingent 
self-esteem is like the engine’s air-intake control. The fuel and air controls work side- 
by-side to assure the functioning of the engine. Similarly, the evidence described in this 
chapter shows that amount and unconditionality of belongingness both predict 
psychological functioning. In line with the finding that amount of (contingent) self­
esteem mediates the relationship between amount (unconditionality) of belongingness 
and psychological functioning (but see the divergent role of depression), we posit that 
amount of self-esteem monitors a person’s amount of belongingness, whereas 
contingent self-esteem monitors a person’s unconditionality of belongingness. This 
reasoning provides a belongingness-based and parsimonious explanation for the 
independent effects of amount of self-esteem and contingent self-esteem that have been 
observed in this as well as previous research.
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Chapter 4
Implicitly Measured Self-Esteem and Psychological Health
In collaboration with: 
Michael Riketta (University of Tubingen) 
Philip Broemer (University of Vienna) 
Gregory R. Maio (Cardiff University)
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter argues that existent implicit measures of self-esteem assess 
domain-specific rather than global self-esteem and that this may explain why existent 
implicit measures of self-esteem fail to predict self-reported psychological health. To 
address this and other issues, a new single-item implicit measure of global self-esteem 
is introduced. The measure is based on the mere-ownership effect and asks participants 
to indicate how much they like their name. Six studies attest to the validity of this 
measure. In addition to showing high test-retest reliability (r=.85), the studies found 
that Name Liking was (a) unrelated to impression management, (b) positively related to 
the Name-Letter-Task, the Self-Esteem IAT, and explicit self-esteem measures, (c) 
more strongly related to explicit measures of global than domain-specific self-esteem, 
(d) more strongly related to self-esteem judgments made spontaneously as well as 
under cognitive load, and (e) predicted observer-reported anxiety during an anxiety- 
inducing interview, whereas an explicit measure of self-esteem did not. Crucially,
Name Liking was positively associated with self-reports of psychological health, and 
this relation even held when controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem. These 
results indicate that the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health holds
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not only for explicitly measured of self-esteem, but also for implicitly measured self­
esteem.
4.2 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, implicit measures of self-esteem have recently 
garnered much theoretical and empirical attention. Although self-esteem researchers 
heavily debate whether implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem assess the same 
theoretical construct (i.e., single-attitude theories; e.g., Olson et al., 2007) or whether 
these measures assess two different theoretical constructs (i.e., dual-attitude theories; 
e.g., Koole et al., 2001; Wilson et al., 2000), there is agreement that valid and reliable 
implicit measures of self-esteem are vital for self-esteem research.
One reason for the development of implicit measures of self-esteem is to 
elucidate the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. As shown in 
Chapter 1 (see also Baumeister et al., 2003), explicit measures of self-esteem are 
strongly related to psychological health. However, explicit measures of self-esteem 
may not assess “genuine self-esteem” (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008), but may instead assess 
the motive to outwardly present a positive attitude toward the self (Baumeister et al., 
1989; Tice, 1991; for similar claims see also Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Famham et al., 
1999; Homey, 1937; Olson et al., 2007).
To address this and other issues, several implicit measures of self-esteem have 
been developed in recent years. These measures include evaluative priming techniques 
(Spalding & Hardin, 1999), word-stem completion tasks (Pelham & Hetts, 1999), the 
evaluation of self-related objects (i.e., name letters, birth date numbers; Koole et al., 
2001), and the self-esteem version of the Implicit Association Test (Self-Esteem IAT;
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Greenwald & Famham, 2000). Yet, a persistent barrier to acceptance of these measures 
is that they are generally unrelated to each other (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; 
Bosson et al., 2000; Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2003; Riketta, 2005). At the same time, 
existent implicit measures of self-esteem do not consistently relate to psychological 
health (e.g., Bosson et al., 2000; Schimmack & Diener, 2003; Shimizu & Pelham, 
2004). Furthermore, in the infrequent cases where a relationship between implicitly 
measured self-esteem and psychological health did occur, this relationship was 
rendered non-existent when controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem (e.g., 
Bosson et al., 2000).
The low relations between implicit measures of self-esteem have led some 
researchers to suggest that different implicit measures assess different facets of self­
esteem (Bosson et al., 2000). More recently, this claim has been supported for the only 
two implicit measures that have acceptable psychometric properties (Bosson et al., 
2000): the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT. In particular, Wentura et al. 
(2005) suggested that the Name-Letter-Task assesses self-evaluations that pertain 
predominantly to the social domain. Also, Sakellaropoulo and Baldwin (2007) found 
that the Name-Letter-Task assesses either an agentic or a communal facet of self­
esteem depending on the wording of the instructions. Finally, Campbell et al. (2007) 
showed that the Self-Esteem IAT assesses different facets of self-esteem depending on 
the specific items used.
Together then, it is timely and useful to attempt the development of an implicit 
measure that assesses global rather than domain-specific self-esteem, because the 
failure to find consistent relations between implicitly measured self-esteem and self- 
reported psychological health may be due to the assessment of domain-specific, rather 
than global self-esteem, with the existing implicit measures. Therefore, the research
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described in this chapter was conducted in an attempt to construct a new implicit 
measure of global self-esteem and to provide initial support for its validity. At the same 
time, this measure was used to re-examine the relationship between implicitly measured 
self-esteem and psychological health. The next section presents the rationale for the 
new implicit measure of self-esteem.
4.2.1 The Mere-Ownership Effect
Similar to the Name-Letter-Task (Koole et al., 2001), the new implicit measure 
of global self-esteem is based on the mere-ownership effect. This effect is the tendency 
to evaluate self-related objects more positively than self-unrelated objects. For 
example, people generally favour personal belongings over the belongings of others, 
people prefer the numbers appearing in their birth date over non-birth date numbers, 
and they like the letters included in their name more than other letters (Koole &
Pelham, 2003). The mere-ownership effect allows the implicit assessment of self­
esteem because people with high self-esteem extend their positive self-evaluation to the 
evaluation of objects representing the self, without conscious awareness that self­
esteem is contributing to these evaluations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Thus, people 
with genuinely high self-esteem should show a stronger mere-ownership effect than 
people with low self-esteem.
Koole and Pelham (2003) argued that the strength of the mere-ownership effect 
is more indicative of global self-esteem when the owned object is more representative 
of the self. Koole and Pelham reviewed a large number of studies attesting to the 
centrality of one’s name for one’s global self and concluded that the letters included in 
one’s name are particularly suitable objects for assessing self-esteem implicitly,
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because “it is difficult to think of a social symbol that is more closely associated with a 
person’s identity than his or her name” (p. 99). In support of this notion, people report 
that they would not be the same person if they had another name, couples report that the 
perpetuation of their family name is one of the most important reasons for having a 
child, students feel flattered if their professors know their name, and namelessness is in 
many cultures equivalent to possessing no honour or identity.
Koole and Pelham (2003) used these arguments to explain why assessing 
people’s liking for the letters in their name constitutes an implicit measure of self­
esteem. However, an implication of their arguments is that assessing people’s liking for 
their name as a whole would be an even better implicit measure of self-esteem. 
According to a well-known proposition of Gestalt psychology, the whole is often more 
than the sum of its parts. This view suggests that the evaluation of one’s name might be 
a better way of assessing the individual’s global self-esteem than summing up the 
evaluation of name letters. Moreover, most word recognition models (McClelland & 
Elman, 1986; Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2000) assume that words are encoded 
holistically and are represented phonetically in memory (that is by phonemes and not 
by letters). Above and beyond this, the Name-Letter-Task does not take the order of 
one’s name-letters into account. However, the order of letters is crucial to determine the 
meaning and valence of a target object. For example, a person called Blake may 
possess a positive attitude toward himself—Blake—but a negative attitude towards 
‘bleak’.
Together then, we expect that Name Liking is a more global measure of self­
esteem than the Name-Letter-Task, because Name Liking captures all properties of the 
arguably most self-related object—i.e., the name—(see Koole & Pelham, 2003), 
whereas the Name-Letter-Task fails to consider the frequency and order of the letters in
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one’s name as well as the phonemes of one’s name. Based on this reasoning, we 
expected that Name Liking may assess self-esteem more globally than the Name- 
Letter-Task. To provide a full test of this reasoning, three measures of name-liking 
were developed and tested, including evaluations of one’s first name, surname, and first 
and surname together (i.e., full name). We tested our hypotheses for all three measures, 
although the full name measure should be most powerful and valid (cf. Gestalt 
psychology).
An additional advantage of the full name version of the name-liking measure 
over other implicit measures is its brevity. The measure consists of a single item. As 
such, it complements a recently developed single-item explicit measure of self-esteem 
(“I have high self-esteem”; Robins, Hendin, & Tresniewski, 2001). According to 
Robins et al., multi-item measures, such as the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965), are relatively complicated and time-consuming to administer; cause 
fatigue, frustration, and boredom; and may result in participants skipping questions. 
These concerns also apply to the self-esteem IAT, which typically consists of about 200 
trials, and to the name-letter-task, which asks participants to rate all 26 letters of the 
alphabet.
4.3 Study 8
The aim of Study 8 was to provide a preliminary test of the viability of name- 
liking as an implicit measure of global self-esteem. Therefore, this study examined the 
correlations between name-liking and the only two implicit self-esteem measures that 
have been shown to have acceptable psychometric properties: the name-letter-task and 
the self-esteem IAT (Bosson et al., 2000). We expected to replicate evidence that the
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Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT are unrelated (Baccus et al., 2004; Bosson 
et al., 2000; Jordan et al., 2003; Riketta, 2005), while finding that Name Liking is 
moderately positively related to both measures. This pattern would constitute further 
support for the hypothesis that the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT assess 
different facets of self-esteem (Campbell et al., 2007; Sakellaropoulo & Baldwin, 2007; 
Wentura et al., 2006; see discussion above). More important, this finding would be 
consistent with the argument that Name Liking is a measure of global (rather than 
domain-specific) self-esteem.
Additionally, we also expected a moderately positive correlation between Name 
Liking and explicitly measured global self-esteem. According to Greenwald and 
Famham (2000), implicitly and explicitly measured self-esteem should be positively 
related, because both explicit and implicit measures are determined in part by affective 
associations with the self. Further, Greenwald and Famham (2000) argued that the 
conscious expression of valenced self-views should strengthen the connection between 
the self and these evaluations. Finally, Bosson et al. (2000) argued that, even if the 
constructs tapped on by implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem are acquired 
through different learning processes, the learned content should be similar and produce 
some overlap between the two constructs.
We did not have a specific hypothesis about whether Name Liking is more 
strongly related to other implicit measures of (domain-specific) self-esteem or to 
explicit measures of (global) self-esteem. On the one hand, one might expect a stronger 
relation between Name Liking and other implicit measures, because these measures 
should not be biased by impression management and they should not depend on one’s 
conscious awareness of one’s level of self-esteem. On the other hand, existing implicit 
measures seem to assess domain-specific aspects of self-esteem more than global self­
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esteem. Hence, Name Liking, as a measure of global self-esteem, may relate to explicit 
measures of (global) self-esteem at least as strongly as to the existing implicit measures 
of (domain-specific) self-esteem.
In order to buttress our hypothesis that Name Liking is not simply a proxy for 
explicit self-esteem, we wished to test whether explicit measures of self-esteem, the 
Self-Esteem IAT, and the Name-Letter-Task are all independently related to Name 
Liking. Such evidence would lend credence to the validity of Name Liking as an 
implicit measure of global self-esteem by revealing theoretically expected relations to 
other implicit measures of self-esteem even when explicit measures of self-esteem are 
controlled for.
4.3.1 Method
Participants
126 participants (89 women, 37 men) completed this online-study (www.online- 
studies.org). The study was advertised on John Krantz’s web portal for online-studies 
(http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html). The language of the study was 
English. The mean age of the participants was 25.98 years (SD = 11.10). The majority 
of the participants were from North America (88%). One additional participant was 
identified as an outlier and was excluded from the analyses.
Materials and Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, participants completed the Name Liking measures, the Name-Letter-Task, 
the Self-Esteem IAT, and two explicit measures of global self-esteem. The order of all 
measures was randomized across participants, except that Name Liking always
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appeared after the Name-Letter-Task to prevent suspicion that the evaluation of one’s 
name may play a role in letter preferences. At the end of the study, participants read a 
feedback page and were thanked for their participation.
Name Liking Scales. In order to assess participants’ evaluation of their first 
name, surname, and full name, participants completed the following three single-item 
measures on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much): “How much 
do you like your first name?”, “How much do you like your surname?”, “How much do 
you like your name, in totalV
Name-Letter-Task. Closely modelled after the task used by Koole et al. (2001), 
participants indicated how much they liked each of the 26 letters of the alphabet in 
random order. Participants responded to each item using a 9-point scale ranging from 1 
{not at all beautiful) to 9 {extremely beautiful). A name-letter score was calculated for 
each participant using his or her full name (first and last name together). To do so, we 
followed the recommendations by Kitayama and Karasawa (1997): this calculation 
assessed the “objective” (i.e., unbiased by the mere-ownership effect) beauty of each 
letter, by calculating the mean evaluation of each letter over all participants who did not 
have the letter in their name. The overall name-letter score was simply the mean of the 
differences between each participant’s name letter evaluations and the corresponding 
objective beauties. Thus, higher name-letter scores indicated higher self-esteem.
Self-Esteem IAT. The Self-Esteem IAT was modelled after Greenwald and 
Famham’s (2000) personalized Self-Esteem IAT. Participants first reported their first 
name, last name, and initials. These became items for the “me” category in the IAT. To 
obtain neutral “not-me” items, participants selected two same sex first names and one 
last name from three lists. Participants were instructed to select names that they (a) do 
not associate in any way with themselves, a close friend, or a relative, (b) have no
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reason to either like or dislike, and (c) are the most familiar one’s from the remaining. 
For the “pleasant” category, the words were “loved”, “positive”, “liked”, “good”, 
“worthy”, and “nice”. For the “unpleasant” category, the words were “hated”, 
“negative”, “disliked”, “bad”, “failure”, and “awful”. The number of items for each 
category is lower than in the original Self-Esteem IAT by Greenwald and Famham 
(2000) because Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2005) showed that an increasing item 
number does not improve the IAT results, as long as there is more than one item for 
each category used.
The Self-Esteem IAT consisted of the same configuration of blocks as used by 
Greenwald and Famham (2000). Blocks 1, 2, and 3 consisted of 20 trials. Blocks 4 and 
5 consisted of 40 trials. Blocks 6 and 7 are identical in length to blocks 3 and 4, 
respectively. The order of the items was randomized for each participant for all blocks 
of the Self-Esteem IAT. For more detailed information about the single blocks, see 
Greenwald and Famham (2000). As recommended by Greenwald et al. (2003) we used 
the improved scoring algorithm for the IAT (D-score) to calculate participants’ IAT 
scores. Following the calculation method recommended by Cunningham, Preacher, and 
Banaji (2001), the internal consistency of the measure was good (a = .89).
Explicit Measures o f Self-Esteem. Two explicit measures of self-esteem were 
utilised. The Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale (Robins et al., 2001) asks participants to 
respond to the item: “I have high self-esteem”. Participants responded to the item using 
a 7-point scale ranging from 1 {does not apply at all) to 7 {applies completely). The 
Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale - Revised Version (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001) 
contains 16 items. Example items are “I am very comfortable with myself’ and “I am 
highly effective at the things I do” (a = .91). Participants responded to each item using 
a 7-point scale ranging from 1 {does not apply at all) to 7 {applies completely).
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4.3.2 Results and Summary
When describing this and the following studies, the text reports only the results 
involving the full name version of the Name Liking measure, but not the first name and 
surname versions. We focus on the full name version because the results across the 
present studies supported our aforementioned hypothesis that the full name version is 
the most valid implicit measure of global self-esteem. Nonetheless, in order to allow 
direct comparison of the performance of the three candidate Name Liking measures, the 
zero-order correlations between all variables are presented in separate tables (for this 
study, see Table 4.1), including all three candidate Name Liking measures (i.e., first 
name, surname, and full name). Further, for all studies, the results of any analyses for 
the first name and surname versions of the Name Liking measure that does not take the 
form of a zero-order correlation is presented in the Appendix. Parallel results for the 
full name version of the Name Liking measure are presented in the text.
As in previous research, the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT were 
unrelated, r = .12, ns. In contrast, higher self-esteem on Name Liking predicted 
significantly higher self-esteem on the Name-Letter-Task, r = .30, p < .001, and the 
Self-Esteem IAT, r = .24, p  < .01. These correlations with both implicit measures speak 
to the validity of Name Liking as a global measure of self-esteem.
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Table 4.1
Zero-Order Correlations Between all Measures used in Study 8.
N = 126 ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
( 1) First Name Name Liking --
(2 ) Surname Name Liking 3 9 *** —
(3) Full Name Name Liking 72*** 69*** —
(4) Name-Letter-T ask 32*** 2 9 *** 30*** —
(5) Self-Esteem IAT .18* .14 .24** .1 2 —
(6 ) Single-Item Explicit Measure 
of Self-Esteem
3^*** 3 5 *** 3g*** 3 4 *** .18* —
(7) Multi-Item Explicit Measure 
of Self-Esteem
3 j*** 2 5 ** .30** 3 1*** .18* 7 9 ***
Note. *** = (p < .001), ** = (p < .01), * = (p < .05).
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Also, Name Liking was positively related to explicitly measured self-esteem, as 
assessed by the single-item measure, r  = .38, p < .001, and the multi-item measure, r  = 
.30, p  < .001. Note that this finding is consistent with the single-attitude view if one 
assumes that Name Liking and the explicit measures assess the same construct but are 
affected by different types of measurement error (Greenwald & Famham, 2000). The 
finding is also consistent with the dual-attitudes view if one assumes that Name Liking 
and the explicit measures refer to distinct constructs that share common sources 
(Bosson et al., 2000).
Finally, we simultaneously regressed Name Liking on (a) the multi-item 
measure of explicit self-esteem, (b) the Self-Esteem IAT, and (c) the Name-Letter- 
Task. Results revealed that all three predictors were independently related to Name 
Liking, = .20, p  < .05 (explicit measure), p  = . 18, p < .05 (Self-Esteem IAT), and ft = 
.20, p  < .05 (Name-Letter-Task). This pattern of results is first support that Name 
Liking is more than a noisy measure of explicit self-esteem or a proxy measure of 
explicit self-esteem. This pattern of results also suggests that Name Liking is a more 
global measure of self-esteem than the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT.
4.4 Study 9
Study 9 garnered additional support for the idea that Name Liking is a measure 
of global rather than domain-specific self-esteem. Specifically, this study tested 
whether Name Liking is more strongly related to explicit measures of global self­
esteem or to explicit measures of domain-specific self-esteem.
Further, Study 9 garnered additional evidence that Name Liking is an implicit 
rather than explicit measure. Bosson et al. (2000) assert that “explicit self-report
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measures are essentially tapping broad beliefs or schemas about who we think we are. 
They are essentially self-theories: ‘I think I am this way’; ‘I feel certain I'm not this 
other way.’” (p. 641) Implicit measures differ from explicit measures in this respect, 
because implicit measures “provide estimates of individuals’ attitudes without our 
having to directly ask them for such information” (Fazio & Olson, 2003; p. 303). Thus, 
if participants respond to the Name Liking measure without directly indicating their 
self-theories of their self-esteem, Name Liking formally classifies as an implicit 
measure of self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2000; Fazio & Olson, 2003). However, it is 
possible that participants in Study 8 assumed that Name Liking is meant to assess self­
esteem and thus reported their self-theories concerning their self-esteem. To check this 
possibility, at the end of Study 9 participants were asked what guided their responses to 
the Name Liking measure. This enabled us to find out whether they had completed the 
Name Liking measure by indicating how much they like their name and not according 
to how much they like themselves (self-theory of self-esteem).
4.4.1 Method
Participants
145 participants (105 women, 37 men, and 3 did not respond) completed this 
online-study (www.online-studies.org). The study was advertised on John Krantz’s web 
portal for online-studies. The language of the study was English. The mean age of the 
participants was 22.38 years (SD = 8.72). The majority of the participants were from 
North America (86%).
Materials and Procedure
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After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, participants completed the Name Liking measures, the explicit measure of 
global self-esteem, and the explicit measure of domain-specific self-esteem. The order 
of all these measures was randomized across participants. Finally, participants were 
asked about the strategy that guided their responses to the Name Liking measure. At the 
end of the study, participants read a feedback page and were thanked for their 
participation. The Name Liking measures were identical to the measures used in Study 
8 . The remaining measures are described below.
Explicit Measure of Global Self-Esteem. The Amount of Self-Esteem Scale 
(Gebauer, Riketta, Maio, & Haddock, 2008) contains 5 items. Example items are “In 
general, I hold myself in high regard” and “I do not like and value myself’ (reverse- 
scored) (a = .88). Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies completely).
Explicit Measure o f Domain-Specific Self-Esteem. The Domain-Specific Self- 
Esteem Inventory (Hoyle, 1991) contains 4 subscales with 5 items each. Example items 
of the Social subscale are “I feel secure in social situations” and “I feel confident of my 
social behaviour” (a = .87). Example items of the Ability subscale are “I am able to do 
things as well as most other people” and “I almost always accomplish the goals I set for 
myself’ (a = .77). Example items of the Appearance subscale are “I feel that others 
would consider me to be attractive” and “I am satisfied with the way I look” (a = .90). 
Example items of the Public subscale are “I enjoy being in front of large audiences” 
and “When I speak in a large group discussion, I usually feel sure of myself’ (a = .91). 
Participants responded to each item using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all like 
me) to 5 (very much like me).
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Response Strategy on Name Liking. Participants responded to the following 
measure by either ticking a checkbox in order to indicate that answer alternative ‘(a)’ 
applied to them or by filling out a text box in order to indicate that answer alternative 
‘(b)’ applied to them: “I answered the question ‘How much do you like your first 
name/sumame/name, in total?’ by indicating (a) how much I like my name or (b) 
[textbox]”.
4.4.2 Results and Summary
Table 4.2 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this 
study. To test whether Name Liking is a measure of global rather than domain-specific 
self-esteem, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis with global self-esteem 
and the five facets of self-esteem (all explicitly measured) as predictors of Name 
Liking. As expected, the first step of the regression was the only one yielding a 
significant relation. Only global self-esteem predicted Name Liking, /? = .36, p < .001, 
whereas none of the five facets of self-esteem predicted Name Liking over and above 
global self-esteem, -.08 </?s < .15, ns. This evidence supports the hypothesis that Name 
Liking assesses global rather than domain-specific self-esteem. It is noteworthy that the 
four domains of domain-specific self-esteem that we tested in this study include an 
agentic self-esteem domain—ability domain—and a communal domain—social 
domain. Given that both of these domains did not explain any additional amount of 
variance in Name Liking over and above the explicit measure of global self-esteem, 
there is indirect support that Name Liking is a more global measure of self-esteem than 
the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT is. However, it needs to be noted that 
one could draw these conclusions more comfortably if the Self-Esteem IAT and the
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Name-Letter-Task had been administered in this study as well and had been found to 
relate to the explicit measure of domain-specific self-esteem.
The next analysis examined participants’ reported strategy for completing the 
Name Liking measure. Six participants (4.1%) did not complete this item, 129 (92.8%) 
indicated that they completed the item according to how much they like their name, and 
10 participants (7.2%) indicated that they completed the item according to something 
else. Six of these ten participants obviously misunderstood the task and indicated a 
number or a phrase that reflected their Name Liking (e.g., “I like my name very 
much”). One participant indicated that her answer was “quite random”. The remaining 
three participants made irrelevant statements (e.g., “I love my initials”). Thus, although 
Name Liking was embedded in explicit measures of self-esteem in this study, not a 
single participant indicated reporting the self-theory concerning self-esteem. Therefore, 
any effects of this measure are indirect and not attributable to conscious theories about 
self-esteem. Hence, Name Liking meets the criteria for an implicit measure as defined 
by Fazio and Olson (2003). A drawback of the procedure employed in this task, 
however, is that it is unknown whether participants felt demand to report that they 
indicated their actual Name Liking rather than their self-liking. After all, the Name 
Liking measure explicitly asks participants to report their liking for their name and thus 
participants may have felt obliged to later report that they have done just this, despite 
actually having reported their self-esteem. A funnel debriefing task (cf. Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003) would have been more suitable, but the 
fact that this study was an online-study made a funnel debriefing impossible. Also, we 
wish to remind the reader that this task is not the only task suggesting that Name Liking 
is more than an explicit measure of self-esteem and shares properties with other implicit 
measures of self-esteem (see Studies 8 , 11, and 12) and also possesses predictive power
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over and above well validated explicit measures of self-esteem (see Studies 8 , 10, 11, 
and 12).
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Table 4.2
Zero-O rder Correlations Between all M easures used in Study 9.
N  = 145 ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7)
( 1) First Name Name Liking —
(2 ) Surname Name Liking 4 3 *** —
(3) Full Name Name Liking 7 5 *** 72*** —
(4) Explicit Measure o f Self- 
Esteem
36*** .2 1 * .36*** —
(5) Domain-Specific Self-Esteem  
-  Ability Domain
.18* .15 .19* 50*** —
(6 ) Domain-Specific Self-Esteem  
-  Social Domain
32*** .2 0 * 30*** 5 3 *** 4 7 *** —
(7) Domain-Specific Self-Esteem  
-  Physical Appearance
29*** .15 28*** 6 5 *** 3 5 *** 52***
(8 ) Domain-Specific Self-Esteem  
-  Public Domain
.17* .11 .08 4  j *** 4 0 *** 64*** 4 5 ***
Note. *** = (p<  .001), ** = (p<  .01), * = (p < .05).
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4.5 Study 10
As mentioned above, Bosson et al. (2000) found that only the Self-Esteem IAT 
and the evaluation of self-related objects (i.e., name letters and birth date numbers) 
exhibited satisfactory test-retest reliability. The first goal of Study 10 was to test if the 
Name Liking measure also exhibits satisfactory test-retest reliability.
As a second goal, Study 10 tested whether Name Liking predicts psychological 
health. Explicit measures of self-esteem are among the strongest predictors of 
psychological health (Baumeister et al., 2003; Diener & Diener, 1995; Sedikides et al., 
2004). However, previous studies found weak and inconsistent relations between 
implicitly measured self-esteem and explicitly measured psychological health 
(Schimmack & Diener, 2003; Shimizu & Pelham, 2004), and these relations were non­
significant after controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2000). If 
Name Liking is an indicator of global self-esteem, it should be a better predictor of 
psychological health than are the (arguably) domain-specific implicit measures used in 
those studies. Furthermore, because Name Liking circumvents conscious reporting 
biases and does not rely on conscious theories about the self, it should predict 
psychological health over and above explicitly measured self-esteem.
Finally, Bosson et al. (2000) reported that implicit measures of self-esteem 
worked best when self-esteem was primed by the completion of explicit measures of 
self-esteem. Bosson et al. (2000) concluded that “order effects may raise concerns 
about the ‘implicitness’ of some of the implicit self-esteem measures” (p. 641). This 
concern is relevant to the use of the Name Liking measure in the previous studies, 
because Name Liking was mainly administered after explicit measures of self-esteem 
(see randomized order of measures across participants in Studies 8 and 9). It is thus
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important to show that meaningful effects emerge when Name Liking is administered 
prior to other measures of self-esteem. Such evidence would indicate that the validity of 
the Name Liking measure does not rely on the completion of explicit measures 
beforehand.
4.5.1 Method
Participants
190 Cardiff University undergraduate students (170 women, 14 men, and 6  did 
not respond) completed this laboratory study for exchange of course credit in two large 
class-room settings on individual computers. The language of the study was English. 
The mean age of the participants was 18.62 years (SD = 1.34).
Materials and Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, participants completed the Name Liking measures, an explicit measure of 
global self-esteem, and a measure of psychological health in the listed order. At the end 
of the study, participants read a feedback page and were thanked for their participation. 
Four to six weeks later, 118 of the initial participants (62%) completed the Name 
Liking measures again over the internet. The Name Liking measures and the explicit 
measure of global self-esteem (a = .92) were identical to the measures used in Study 9. 
The measure of psychological health is described below.
Psychological Health. Psychological health was operationalized via the 21-item 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II is the most 
widely used and best validated measure of depression, with depression being a core 
component of psychological health (Sedikides et al., 2004). Each item of the BDI-II
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represents a different marker of depression (e.g., “loss of energy”, “crying”, “suicidal 
thoughts or wishes”). Participants responded to each item using an item specific 4-point 
scale that indicated to what degree the specific symptom of depression applied to the 
participant (a = .90).
4.5.2 Results and Summary
Table 4.3 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this 
study. The first analysis examined the test-retest reliability of Name Liking. The 
correlation between scores at times 1 and 2 was high, r = .85, p  < .001, whereas most 
other implicit self-esteem measures suffer from too low or barely acceptable test-retest 
reliability (Bosson et al., 2000).
Further, explicitly measured self-esteem and Name Liking were both 
significantly related to psychological health, r = -.59, p  < .001, and, r = -.29, p  < .001, 
respectively. To test whether Name Liking was related to psychological health over and 
above explicitly measured self-esteem, psychological health was regressed on Name 
Liking, while controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem. Name Liking predicted 
psychological health independently of explicitly measured self-esteem, p  = -.15, p <
.01. This finding supports the assertion that implicitly measured self-esteem relates to 
psychological health over and above explicitly measured self-esteem (e.g., Bosson et 
al., 2000; Shimizu & Pelham, 2004). Notably, previous studies were unable to support 
this assertion using other implicit measures (e.g., Bosson et al., 2000; Schimmack & 
Diener, 2003; Shimizu & Pelham, 2004).
Finally, Name Liking exhibited the same strength of relationship to explicitly 
measured self-esteem as in the previous studies, where Name Liking was mainly
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assessed following other self-esteem measures, r = .26, p  < .001. Further, as shown 
above, theoretically sound relations were obtained between Name Liking and 
psychological health. Thus, these results demonstrate that the validity of Name Liking 
does not depend on the prior completion of an explicit measure of self-esteem.
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Table 4.3
Zero-O rder Correlations Between all M easures used in Study 10.
N  = 190 (1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7)
(1) First Name Name Liking @ 
Time 1
—
(2 ) Surname Name Liking @ 
Time 1
4  j *** —
(3) Full Name Name Liking @ 
Time 1
76*** 7 7 *** —
(4) First Name Name Liking @ 
Time 2
8 5 *** 35*** 67*** —
(5) Surname Name Liking @ 
Time 2
.26** gg*** 70*** 27** —
(6 ) Full Name Name Liking @ 
Time 2
3 7 * * * .76*** 8 5 *** 61*** 78*** —
(7) Beck Depression Inventory-II _ 3 2 *** -.17* _ 2 9 *** - .1 0 -.03 -.06 —
(8 ) Explicit Measure o f Self- 
Esteem
3 3 *** .1 0 26*** 30*** .0 0 .18 - 5 9 ***
Note. *** = (p < .001), ** = (p < .01), * = (p <  .05).
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4.6 Study 11
In Koole et al.’s (2001) third study, participants with a dispositionally fast (as 
opposed to slow) response style on explicit measures of self-esteem manifested a 
stronger relation between these measures and implicit measures of self-esteem. This 
finding fits dual-attitude theories of self-esteem, because implicit self-esteem is 
assumed to be based on faster, automatic processes, rather than slower, controlled 
processes (Epstein & Morling, 1995). However, this finding also fits single-attitude 
theories, because people might be more honest when they respond quickly to self-report 
measures (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Olson et al., 2007). Regardless of which theory 
applies, it should be possible to replicate Koole et al.’s (2001) finding with the Name 
Liking measure. This replication would further attest to the validity of the measure as 
an implicit measure of self-esteem.
Study 11 also tried to replicate Study 10’s finding that Name Liking predicts 
psychological health over and above explicitly measured self-esteem. This time, 
psychological health was operationalized broadly, by using a composite score of 
anxiety, depression, and life satisfaction.
4.6.1 M ethod
Participants
357 participants (283 women, 73 men, and 1 did not respond) completed this 
online-study (www.online-studies.org). The study was advertised on John Krantz’s web 
portal for online-studies. The language of the study was English. The mean age of the
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participants was 25.41 years (SD = 3.57). The majority of the participants were from 
North America (92%).
Materials and Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, participants completed an explicit measure of global self-esteem, a 
measure of affect-based psychological health, a measure of cognition-based 
psychological health5, and the Name Liking measures in the listed order. At the end of 
the study, participants read a feedback page and were thanked for their participation. 
The Name Liking measures and the multi-item explicit measure of global self-esteem 
(a = .93) were identical to the measures used in Study 8 . The measures of psychological 
health are described below.
Psychological health. To tap psychological health broadly, we used an affective 
and a cognitive measure of this construct. The affective measure was the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), which contains 14 items. 
Example items are “I feel tense or ‘wound up”’, and “I feel as if I am slowed down” (a 
= .87). Participants responded to each item using a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (never) 
to 4 (most o f the time). As in previous research (e.g., Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), scores 
on the anxiety and depression scales were highly correlated, so they were combined to 
form one scale.
The cognitive component of psychological health was assessed via the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), which 
contains five items. Example items are “In most ways my life is close to my ideal”, and 
“If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing” (a = .90). Participants
5 The psychological health measures were included in the study after the first 154 
participants. Thus, only 203 of the 357 participants completed these measures.
Gebauer 2008 147
Chapter 4 Implicitly Measured Self-Esteem
responded to each item using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 
(iapplies completely).
Similar to previous studies (e.g., Schimmack & Diener, 2003), the affective and 
the cognitive measures of psychological health were highly correlated, r = .55, p  =
.001. Thus, these scales were combined to form one scale, such that high scores 
reflected a general sense of high psychological health.
4.6.2 Results and Summary
Table 4.4 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this 
study. We tested whether the relation between implicitly and explicitly measured self­
esteem was especially strong when the response latencies of the explicit measure were 
short. This test was conducted using a multiple regression analysis that entered 
explicitly measured self-esteem (centred), the response time of explicitly measured self­
esteem (centred)6, and the cross-product of these two variables as predictors of Name 
Liking. As predicted, there was a significant interaction between explicitly measured 
self-esteem and response time, /? = -.11, p  < .05. Figure 4.1 shows that explicitly 
measured self-esteem was a better predictor of Name Liking for participants who
6 Response times greater than 20 seconds per item were excluded because such long 
responses can be considered as an indication of exceptionally low attention to the item. 
After excluding these trials, the internal consistency of the response times to the multi­
item explicit measure of self-esteem was very high (a = .90), suggesting that the mean 
across these response times is a reliable indicator of an individual’s response style (i.e., 
spontaneous vs. deliberate).
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responded more quickly to the explicit measure. Thus, Koole et al.’s (2001, Study 3) 
finding was replicated with the Name Liking measure.
Psychological Health was related to explicitly measured self-esteem, r = .67, p < 
.001, and Name Liking, r = .36, p < .001. Further, a simultaneous regression revealed 
that Name Liking predicted psychological health even when explicitly measured self­
esteem was controlled, /? = .12, p  < .05. Thus, we replicated Study 10 using a broader 
operationalization of psychological health.
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Table 4.4
Zero-Order Correlations Between all Measures used in Study 11.
N  = 357 (1) (2 ) (3) (4)
(1) First Name Name Liking —
(2 ) Surname Name Liking —
(3) Full Name Name Liking 7 7 *** 7 7 *** —
(4) Explicit Measure of Self- 
Esteem
.26*** 31*** 40*** —
(5) Subjective Well-Being 
( # = 202 )
3 1*** 3 4 *** 36*** 5 7 ***
Note. *** = (p < .001), ** = (p < .01), * = (p< .05).
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Figure 4.1. The Moderating Effect of Response Time on the Relation between 
Implicitly and Explicitly Measured Self-Esteem (Low = M -  2SD, High = M + 
2SD).
8.5
7.5
6.5
5.5
4.5
3.5 4--------------------------------------------------------------'----------------------------------------------------
Low High
Explicitly M easured Self-Esteem
Note. Dashed line = relatively slow response on explicit measure; solid line = relatively 
fast response on explicit measure.
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4.7 Study 12
The above interpretation of Study 11 rests on the assumption that response times 
mainly depend on the amount of cognitive deliberation. This follows from both single­
attitude and dual-attitude theories because faking on explicit self-esteem measures (cf. 
single-attitude theories) and the activation of explicit self-esteem (cf. dual-attitude 
theories) should both require cognitive capacity (e.g., Koole et al., 2001; Paulhus, 1993; 
Wilson et al., 2000). Nonetheless, a more direct test of this assumption is to manipulate 
cognitive capacity. Thus, following Koole et al.’s (2001) validation of the Name-Letter- 
Task, Study 12 extended Study 11 by manipulating cognitive load while participants 
completed the explicit measure of self-esteem. Koole et al.’s Study 4 showed that the 
relation between implicitly measured and explicitly measured self-esteem became 
stronger when participants were under cognitive load while completing the explicit 
measure. We expected to replicate this finding using the Name Liking measure.
Moreover, we wanted to demonstrate that Name Liking predicts psychological 
health even in a context where explicitly measured self-esteem fails to predict 
psychological health. Spalding and Hardin (1999) found that implicitly measured self­
esteem is a better predictor of observer-reported anxiety during a demanding interview 
than is explicitly measured self-esteem. Replication of this pattern using the Name 
Liking measure would further bolster the argument that Name Liking is a valid measure 
of self-esteem and in this regard is at least as useful as other implicit measures of self­
esteem.
4.7.1 M ethod
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Participants
35 undergraduate students from the University of Tubingen (18 women and 17 
men) completed this laboratory study in individual sessions. The language of the study 
was German. All participants were German.
Materials and Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, participants completed an explicit measure of self-esteem without 
cognitive load, a parallel version of the same explicit measure under cognitive load, the 
Name Liking measures, and were subjected to an anxiety-inducing interview in the 
listed order. At the end of the study, participants were carefully debriefed (funnel 
debriefing, cf. Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003), thanked, and paid 
(6 Euro) for their participation. The Name Liking measures were identical to the 
measures used in Studies 8 to 11. The remaining measures are described below.
Explicit Self-Esteem Without Cognitive Load. In the no load trait endorsement 
task (closely modelled after Paulhus, 1993, and Koole et al., 2001) participants were 
asked to respond as fast as possible to 15 moderately positive and to 15 moderately 
negative words (word set 1), which were taken from a large German norm list of trait 
words (Hager & Hasselhom, 1994, Table 4-3).7 Participants were instructed to press 
keys of the keyboard with either the right or the left index finger to either indicate that 
the word applies or does not apply to them. Each participant completed three practice 
trails before the actual task.
Explicit Self-Esteem Under Cognitive Load. The load trait endorsement task was 
identical to the no load task except that participants responded to different words (word
7 Moderately, rather than extremely, evaluative words were selected in order to avoid 
ceiling and bottom effects in the trait endorsement task.
Gebauer 2008 153
Chapter 4 Implicitly Measured Self-Esteem
set 2) from the same norm list8 and participants were instructed to rehearse a given 8- 
digit number throughout the whole task. Participants were informed that they would 
have to report the number after the trait endorsement task is finished. At the end of the 
task, participants entered the 8-digit number.
A nxiety Inducing Interview. Closely modelled after Spalding and Hardin’s 
(1999) anxiety inducing interview, participants were seated in front of a camera and 
told that they would be videotaped during the following interview, which ostensibly 
had the purpose of assessing participants’ emotional health. To begin, the experimenter 
asked the participants to describe their positive and their negative aspects of 
themselves. During this phase, the experimenter, who was blind to participants’ self­
esteem scores, ostensibly made a lot of notes and responded to participants’ 
descriptions of themselves with phrases like “ah, that is interesting” and “mh, I see”. 
After that, participants were asked to describe a picture that was taken from a projective 
test and finally, participants had to indicate their feelings and emotions toward a couple 
of verbal stimuli (e.g., turtle). In total, the interview took about 5 minutes.
O bserver-Reported Anxiety. Using 7-point scales ranging from 1 (does not apply  
a t all) to 7 (applies com pletely), the experimenter rated participants’ anxiety directly 
after the interview on three items: “The participant showed anxiety during the 
interview”, “The participant’s hands have been jittery”, and “The participant showed a 
closed and defensive seating position”. Using the Spearman-Brown correction, the 
internal consistency of the three items (a  = .60) was adequate.
8 Half of the participants received word set 1 as stimuli for the no load condition and 
word set 2 as stimuli for the load condition whereas the other half received word set 2 
as stimuli for the no load condition and word set 1 as stimuli for the load condition.
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4.7.2 Results and Summary
Table 4.5 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this 
study. The first principal analysis tested whether Name Liking was more strongly 
related to explicitly measured self-esteem under cognitive load than without load. 
Because each participant completed the explicit measure of self-esteem both under load 
and without load, the analysis regressed Name Liking on load self-esteem and no-load 
self-esteem (both entered simultaneously). Name Liking was related to explicitly 
measured load self-esteem, /? = .55, p  < .05, but unrelated to explicitly measured no- 
load self-esteem, /? = .05, ns. This finding complements the result of Study 11 in 
showing that spontaneous and non-deliberate responding on explicit self-esteem 
measures can boost the relation between these measures and Name Liking. However, 
an alternative explanation should be noted. Participants completed the Name Liking 
measure always closer in time to the load version of the explicit self-esteem measure 
than to the no-load version. Thus, order effects may have played a role in the obtained 
results. Although this alternative explanation is possible, three arguments render this 
alternative explanation less likely than one may initially think. First, the results are 
consistent with and compliment the results obtained in Study 11. More importantly, a 
filler-questionnaire has been administered between the explicit self-esteem measures 
and the Name Liking measure. Moreover, the self-esteem measures involved in the 
current analyses are trait measures and show high test-retest reliability. Nonetheless, 
future research should further examine the conditions that moderate the relation 
between explicit measures of self-esteem and Name Liking. One may for example 
experimentally vary self-presentation motivation before explicitly assessing self-esteem 
and test whether the relation between explicitly measured self-esteem and Name Liking
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is highest under conditions where self-presentation motivation is close to zero. 
Similarly, one may put people under time-pressure while completing the explicit 
measure of self-esteem and show that time pressure increases the relation between 
explicitly measured self-esteem and Name Liking.
The next analysis tested whether Name Liking is a better predictor of observer­
rated anxiety during an anxiety-inducing interview than is explicitly measured self­
esteem. Therefore, we simultaneously regressed observer-rated anxiety on Name Liking 
and explicitly measured self-esteem (i.e., no-load self-esteem). As expected, Name 
Liking was negatively related to anxiety, /? = -.41 ,P<  .05, whereas explicitly measured 
self-esteem was unrelated to anxiety, p  = -.13, ns. Together with Studies 10 and 11, this 
study suggests that Name Liking is at least as valid as other implicit measures and 
predicts important outcomes (psychological health and state anxiety) over and above 
explicit measures of self-esteem. Again, this result buttresses the argument that Name 
Liking is not merely a noisy measure of explicit self-esteem.
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Table 4.5
Zero-Order Correlations Between all Measures used in Study 12.
N = 35 (1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
(1) First Name Name Liking —
(2 ) Surname Name Liking .21 —
(3) Full Name Name Liking .55*** 70*** —
(4) Explicit Measure of Self- 
Esteem -  Cognitive Load
.29 .27 .48** —
(5) Explicit Measure of Self- 
Esteem -  No Cognitive Load
.33* .31 5 9 *** 7g*** —
(6 ) Observer-Rated Anxiety -.18 _ 4 9 ** _ 4 7 ** -.32 _ 44**
Note. *** = (p < .001), ** = {p < .01), * = (p<  .05).
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4.8 Study 13
Explicit measures of self-esteem have been empirically linked to the impression 
management component of socially desirable responding (e.g., Greenwald & Famham, 
2000; Riketta, 2004). This finding has been labelled the “Achilles’ heel” of explicit 
measures of self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2000). One crucial advantage of implicit 
measures, then, is that they are less likely to be influenced by impression management 
than explicit measures (Bosson et al., 2000). Study 13 tested whether Name Liking 
does have this virtue; that is, whether it is unrelated to impression management.
A second, distinct self-presentational strategy, and another component of 
socially desirable responding, is self-deceptive enhancement. This strategy is defined as 
any positively biased response that the participant believes to be true. Paulhus (1991) 
argues that self-deceptive enhancement is a valid component of self-esteem. In line 
with this claim, prior research has revealed a positive relation between explicitly 
measured self-esteem and self-deceptive enhancement (e.g., Raskin et al., 1991; 
Paulhus, 1991; Riketta, 2005). It is not entirely clear whether a positive relation 
between implicitly measured self-esteem and self-deceptive enhancement should be 
expected (Riketta, 2005). Although some researchers have argued that implicitly 
measured self-esteem should be independent of self-deceptive enhancement (Epstein & 
Morling, 1995), Paulhus (1991) assumes that self-deceptive enhancement is an 
automatic process. In the latter case, it may be positively related to implicitly measured 
self-esteem. Thus, the answer to this question appears to depend on whether self- 
deceptive enhancement is truly automatic. Given our evidence for the validity of the 
Name Liking measure, we expected that the correlation between self-deceptive 
enhancement and Name Liking would be conclusive in this regard.
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4.8.1 M ethod  
Participants
241 participants (187 women, 52 men, and 2 did not respond) completed this 
online-study (www.online-studies.org). The study was advertised on John Krantz’s web 
portal for online-studies. The language of the study was English. The mean age of the 
participants was 23.38 years (SD  = 9.61). The majority of the participants were from 
North America (95%).
M aterials and Procedure
After consenting to participate, participants completed a series of demographic 
items. Next, participants completed measures of self-deceptive enhancement, 
impression management, and Name Liking in the listed order. At the end of the study, 
participants read a feedback page and were thanked for their participation. The Name 
Liking measures were identical to the measures used in Studies 1 to 5. The remaining 
measures are described below.
Self-deceptive enhancem ent and impression management. Participants 
completed the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) Version 6  -  Form 
40 (Paulhus, 1988). The inventory is divided into a 20-item Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement Scale and a 20-item Impression Management Scale. Example items for 
the Self-Deceptive Enhancement Scale are “I have not always been honest with myself’ 
and “I rarely appreciate criticism” (reverse-scored) (a  = .69). Example items for the 
Impression Management Scale are “I never cover up my mistakes” and “I sometimes 
tell lies if I have to” (reverse-scored) (a  = .79). Participants responded to each item 
using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 {agree strongly).
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4.8.2 Results and Summary
Table 4.6 shows all zero-order correlations between the measures used in this 
study. To disentangle the empirical overlap between self-deceptive enhancement and 
impression management, Paulhus (1991) suggests controlling for one when testing for 
the effects of the other. Therefore, we regressed Name Liking simultaneously on 
impression management and self-deceptive enhancement. Impression management was 
unrelated to Name Liking, /? = .03, ns, whereas self-deceptive enhancement was 
associated with higher Name Liking, /? = .23, p < .001.
These results indicate that Name Liking overcomes a crucial limitation of 
explicit self-esteem measures in that it is unrelated to impression management. 
Moreover, the positive relation between Name Liking and self-deceptive enhancement 
is consistent with Paulhus’s (1991) argument that self-deceptive enhancement operates 
automatically. This argument suggests that self-deceptive enhancement should colour 
responses to implicit (and not only explicit) measures of self-esteem, and the obtained 
data support this reasoning.
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Table 4.6
Zero-Order Correlations Between all Measures used in Study 13.
N = 241 (1) (2 ) (3) (4)
(1) First Name Name Liking —
(2 ) Surname Name Liking —
(3) Full Name Name Liking .76*** ^9*** —
(4) Impression Management .02 .10 .11 —
(5) Self-Deceptive Enhancement .14* 2 3 *** 2 4 *** .35***
Note. *** = (p< .001), ** = (/?< .01), * = (/?< .05).
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4.9 Discussion
Past research found that implicit measures of self-esteem are not consistently 
related to self-reported psychological health (Bosson et al., 2000; Schimmack &
Diener, 2003; Shimizu & Pelham, 2004). In the rare cases where implicit measures of 
self-esteem did relate to self-reported psychological health, these relations were 
rendered non-significant as soon as explicit measures of self-esteem were controlled. 
This pattern of results concerning the relationship between implicitly measured self­
esteem and self-reported psychological health questions the validity of the idea that 
self-esteem and psychological health are strongly related (Baumeister et al., 2003; 
Diener & Diener, 1995; Sedikides et al., 2004). The weak relationship between 
implicitly measured self-esteem and psychological health is especially troublesome for 
advocates of a single-attitude view of self-esteem (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Famham et 
al., 1999; Olson et al., 2007), because these researchers often dismiss the validity of 
explicit measures of self-esteem (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Famham et al., 1999). If 
explicit measures of self-esteem are dismissed, implicit measures of self-esteem build 
the only ground to evaluate the question whether self-esteem is related to psychological 
health. As shown before, previous implicit measures of self-esteem are generally 
unrelated to self-reported psychological health. Together then, single-attitude theorists 
of self-esteem, who dismiss the validity of explicit measures (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; 
Famham et al., 1999) would have to conclude that self-esteem is unrelated to 
psychological health.
An alternative to this conclusion may be that existent implicit measures of self­
esteem do not assess global self-esteem, eliciting a need for the development of an 
implicit measure of global self-esteem, which may reveal consistent relations between
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implicitly measured self-esteem and self-reported psychological health. In support of 
this assumption, past research and theory suggests that existing implicit measures of 
self-esteem assess different facets of self-esteem, rather than global self-esteem 
(Bosson et al., 2000; Campbell et al., 2007; Sakellaropoulo & Baldwin, 2007; Wentura 
et al., 2006). Thus, the studies described in this chapter aimed to develop an implicit 
measure that assesses global, rather than domain specific, self-esteem.
Building on the mere-ownership effect (Koole et al., 2001), these studies 
examined an implicit measure that simply asks participants to evaluate their name with 
a single item. We expected that Name Liking should capture global self-esteem more 
adequately than the Name-Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT, because the evaluation 
of one’s name is particularly representative of the self as a whole (Koole & Pelham, 
2003). In line with this argument, the evaluation of one’s full name was the most 
suitable implicit measure of self-esteem, although the first name and surname versions 
of Name Liking produced similar results. In fact, the first name and surname versions 
correlated positively with each other across all six studies, r(1090) = .42, p  < .001 (see 
also Tables 3 to 8). This supports the assumptions that responses to these items, too, are 
driven by the mere-ownership effect.
Support for Name Liking as an implicit measure of global self-esteem was 
obtained in several ways. For one, Name Liking was positively related to the Name- 
Letter-Task and the Self-Esteem IAT, even though the latter two tasks were unrelated. 
These relations remained virtually identical even after controlling for explicitly 
measured self-esteem. This latter finding provides first support that Name Liking is not 
merely a poor proxy for explicitly measured self-esteem. In addition, a validation 
criterion developed by Koole et al. (2001) was used to test the “implicitness” of Name 
Liking. Koole et al. (2001) expected that the implicit-explicit relation is especially
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strong for people who (a) are dispositionally prone to responding quickly to the explicit 
measure and (b) are under cognitive load. Both findings were replicated with the Name 
Liking measure. Furthermore, Study 12 replicated Spalding and Hardin’s (1999) 
finding that implicit measures of self-esteem predict observer-reported anxiety, whereas 
explicit measures do not. Moreover, a post-experimental probe that asked participants 
what they had indicated when completing the Name Liking measure revealed that not a 
single participant reported responding on the basis of his or her self-esteem. On the 
whole, these findings suggest that the Name Liking measure is not just a proxy for an 
explicit measure of self-esteem. Moreover, the findings show that Name Liking is at 
least as valid as other implicit measures of self-esteem and has predictive power over 
and above explicit measures of self-esteem.
Capitalizing on the validity of our Name Liking measure, two large samples 
from different cultures (USA and United Kingdom) were used to test whether implicitly 
measured global self-esteem predicts psychological health. Analyses of these data 
revealed a consistent positive relationship between implicitly measured global self­
esteem and psychological health. Moreover, this relationship remained significant even 
after controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem. These findings provide the first 
consistent support for the claim that implicitly measured self-esteem is positively 
related to psychological health (e.g., Bosson et al., 2000). Additionally, these findings 
buttress our argument that Name Liking is more than an imprecise measure of explicit 
self-esteem, given that Name Liking showed predictive validity over and above explicit 
measures of self-esteem.
Despite the manifold and consistent empirical evidence that Name Liking 
differs from explicit measures of self-esteem in theoretically meaningful ways, 
especially the rather high correlation between Name Liking and explicit measures of
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self-esteem may lead to questions regarding the implicitness of the Name Liking 
measure. Study 8 allows a direct comparison of the effect sizes of the relation between 
Name Liking and explicitly measured self-esteem on the one hand and Name Liking 
and other implicit measures of self-esteem on the other hand. Study 8 shows that these 
effect sizes are virtually identical. Is it justifiable to label our Name Liking measure an 
implicit measure of self-esteem given that it relates as highly to explicit measures than 
to implicit measures? We believe that it is. Specifically, past theory and research has 
suggested that existent implicit measures of self-esteem fail to assess global self-esteem 
but rather assess domain-specific self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2000; Campbell et al., 
2007; Sakellaropoulo & Baldwin, 2007; Wentura et al., 2006). If this is indeed the 
case—and the null-relation between existent implicit measures has been cited as 
suggestive for this (Bosson et al., 2000; see also Study 8)—both, single-attitude 
theories as well as dual-attitude theories of self-esteem readily explain the pattern of 
relations obtained between Name Liking and explicit measures of global self-esteem as 
well as implicit measures of domain-specific self-esteem. Adopting a single-attitude 
perspective—that endorses the view that explicit measures of self-esteem are 
hopelessly confounded by social desirability and lack of introspection—an overlap 
between a valid implicit measure of global self-esteem (i.e., Name Liking) and a largely 
invalid explicit measures of self-esteem of about 15% (see Studies 8 to 12) seems about 
right. At the same time the overlap between explicit measures of global self-esteem and 
domain-specific self-esteem is typically about 20% (see Brown, 1998; see also Study 
9). Given that at least existent implicit measures of self-esteem suffer from somewhat 
lower internal consistency than explicit measures (e.g., Bosson et al., 2000) an overlap 
between implicitly measured global self-esteem and implicitly measured domain- 
specific self-esteem of about 8% (see Study 8) is within the realm of expectations.
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Adopting a dual-attitude perspective, it is not surprising that two global but distinct 
constructs (i.e., global explicit self-esteem and global implicit self-esteem) are similarly 
strongly related than a global construct and one of its facets (global implicit self-esteem 
and domain-specific implicit self-esteem). Finally, we wish to note in respect to this 
issue that the categorization of measures in either an explicit category or an implicit 
category may be oversimplified. For example, there is room within dual-attitude 
theories that the Self-Esteem IAT may in fact assess people’s implicit self-esteem (or 
facets of it), but the name-letter task may assess people’s explicit self-esteem (or facets 
of it) without being confounded by social desirability. Such a perspective may also 
explain why the two measures are not related to each other. For our Name Liking 
measure such a position may mean that this measure assesses partly aspects of the 
implicit and partly aspects of the explicit self-concept. Clearly, it is too early to make 
any definite statement about the processes that underlie all implicit and explicit 
measures of self-esteem. Nonetheless, the Name Liking measure is an interesting 
measure that promises to be a useful tool in future endeavours to understand the 
function and nature of self-esteem and it has already contributed to a better 
understanding of the relation between self-esteem and psychological health.
Another interesting question for future research is whether Name Liking is a 
valid measure of self-esteem in Eastern, collectivistic cultures, and not only in Western, 
individualistic cultures, as examined here (US, UK, and Germany). The tendency to 
link objects to the self may be less strong in relatively non-materialistic, (i.e., Eastern) 
cultures than in materialistic (i.e., Western) cultures, which may make Name Liking 
less suitable for assessing self-esteem in Eastern cultures. Alternatively, a person’s 
name is clearly of less material value than other self-related objects, such as personal 
belongings. Furthermore, admitting to thinking very positively about oneself (i.e.,
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indicating high self-esteem on explicit measures) violates the cultural norms of many 
Eastern societies. Therefore, the Name Liking measure may be even more suitable in 
Eastern cultures. This latter position is consistent with studies showing the predictive 
validity of other mere-ownership based implicit measures of self-esteem (evaluation of 
name letters and birthday numbers) in Eastern cultures (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). 
Thus, an important topic for future research is to test whether Name Liking relates more 
or less strongly to psychological health in collectivistic than in the individualistic 
cultures. Diener and Diener (1995) have shown that self-esteem has a stronger effect on 
life satisfaction in individualistic than in collectivistic cultures. As argued above, the 
validity of explicit measures of self-esteem is questionable in collectivistic cultures (see 
also Yamaguchi, Greenwald, Banaji, et al., 2007). Thus, Diener and Diener’s finding 
may be due to the invalidity of explicit measures of self-esteem in collectivistic cultures 
rather than due to actual differences in the effect of self-esteem on psychological 
health. The Name Liking measure as an implicit measure of global self-esteem should 
not be subject to reporting biases exerted by cultural norms and thus may be an 
especially suitable measure to test whether the effect of self-esteem on psychological 
health varies cross-culturally.
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion
5.1 Chapter Overview
In the next section, I summarize the main research findings across the three 
empirical chapters (Chapters 2 to 4). Most of the specific implications of each line of 
research have been elucidated in the discussion sections of the individual chapters. 
Therefore, this summary focuses on the broader, inter-related implications of the 
research for understanding the relationship between self-esteem and psychological 
health.
Furthermore, this summary is accompanied by descriptions of potential future 
research, including additional relevant research that my collaborators and I have 
conducted subsequent to the publication of the research reported in the empirical 
chapters. Much of this research is still in progress and therefore not definite. Still, 
drawing on this research may give the reader a better idea where the research that 
started with my postgraduate studies may lead in the future.
In the Introduction to this thesis, I highlighted the potential complexity of the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. In the remainder of this 
chapter, it will become clear that the research conducted by my collaborators and me 
underscores this complexity. Nonetheless, I wish to close this thesis by suggesting a 
model that may help to integrate past research, the research presented in this thesis, and 
the research that my collaborators and I are currently conducting. Although it seems 
impossible that any model of the relationship between self-esteem and psychological 
health can do justice to all the findings that have been reported in the literature
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(including this thesis), the model proposed here will make a significant step by focusing 
on elements that have been shown to explain the largest amount of variance in the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health, while acknowledging the 
role of several other processes and influences.
5.2 Review of the Main Findings
In the Introduction to this thesis, I have highlighted the fact that the relationship 
between self-esteem and psychological health is far from being fully understood. 
Specifically, despite a total of over 10,000 studies on the relationship between self­
esteem and psychological health, the directions, dynamics, and processes that underlie 
this relationship are still not entirely clear. The literature review presented in the 
Introduction pointed towards a need to conduct research on several urgent topics—three 
of which are conducted in this thesis. First, my literature review pointed toward the 
need to investigate the effects of psychological health on self-esteem, while focussing 
on the processes that underlie such effects. Second, the literature review suggested that 
there is a need for research investigating the role of belongingness in the relationship 
between self-esteem and psychological health, while extending belongingness research 
from a pure analysis of amount of belongingness to the simultaneous analysis of 
amount and unconditionality of belongingness. Finally, the review identified a need to 
re-examine the relationship between implicitly measured self-esteem and psychological 
health, while using implicit measures of global self-esteem, rather than the implicit 
measures of domain-specific self-esteem that have been used in past research.
Before describing a model that helps to integrate these three topics, it is useful 
to first provide brief summaries of the three sets of studies examining the topics. After
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reviewing these sets of studies and outlining future research aims relevant to each one, 
Fll turn to considering some more general aspects that cut across all three topics.
5.2.1 Review o f the First Empirical Chapter
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) presented research in which my 
collaborators and I (see also Gebauer et al, 2008a) found evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that psychological health, operationalized as chronic mood, has effects on 
self-esteem when it comes to recalling positively and negatively valenced selves (i.e., 
past episodes and past traits). This research has a specifically strong focus on the 
processes that underlie these effects. The research presented in Chapter 2 is relevant 
because there is virtually no research examining the effect of psychological health on 
self-esteem. The few studies that examine such effects mainly use longitudinal designs 
(Ormel et al., 2004; Orth et al., 2008; Shahar & Davidson, 2003). However, these 
studies remained inconclusive because they revealed mixed results concerning the 
effect of psychological health on self-esteem. More importantly, these studies did not 
provide empirical tests of the processes that underlie a possible effect of psychological 
health on self-esteem. The research presented in Chapter 2 is unique in that it 
repeatedly provides empirical evidence in line with the hypothesis that chronic mood 
has an effect on self-esteem in the realm of recalling valenced selves, while examining 
the process that underlies this effect.
In a nutshell, Chapter 2 shows that chronically happy people perceive mood 
congruence between a recalled positive self and the current self. Mood congruence 
elicits feelings of temporal recency. Temporal recency elicits assimilation effects of the 
recalled positive self on one’s current self-esteem (Schwartz & Bless, 1992, 2007).
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Hence, our data suggest that recalling positive past selves increases self-esteem for 
chronically happy people. Further, my collaborators and I showed that chronically sad 
people perceive mood incongruence between a recalled positive self and the current 
self. Mood incongruence elicits feelings of temporal distance, and temporal distance 
elicits contrast effects of the recalled positive self on one’s current self-esteem 
(Schwartz & Bless, 1992, 2007). Hence, our data suggested that recalling positive past 
selves decreases self-esteem for chronically sad people.
The reverse is true for recalling negative past selves. The results obtained in 
Chapter 2 show that chronically happy people perceive mood incongruence between a 
recalled negative self and the current self. Mood incongruence elicits feelings of 
temporal distance, and temporal distance elicits contrast effects of the recalled negative 
self on one’s current self-esteem (Schwartz & Bless, 1992, 2007). Hence, our data 
suggests that recalling negative past selves decreases self-esteem for chronically happy 
people. Further, Chapter 2 shows that chronically sad people perceive mood 
congruence between a recalled negative self and the current self. Mood congruence 
elicits feelings of temporal recency. Temporal recency elicits assimilation effects of the 
recalled negative self on one’s current self-esteem (Schwartz & Bless, 1992, 2007). 
Hence, our data suggests that recalling negative past selves decreases self-esteem for 
chronically sad people.
Together then, this research is in line with the hypothesis that recalling either 
positive or negative past selves increases self-esteem for chronically happy people, but 
decreases self-esteem for chronically sad people. My collaborators and I have termed 
this model the Mood Congruence Model (MCM) of Temporal Comparison.
Future Research
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The MCM attributes important roles to chronic mood and perceptions of mood 
congruence. It is sensible to ascribe the concept of mood a primary role, because of the 
central role of the hedonic principle in people’s lives (Freud, 1920; Kahneman et al., 
1999; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). However, it can be argued that the processes 
described in the MCM are more generally applicable to perceptions of congruence 
between a recalled and the current self in the most salient feature o f the recalled self 
This assumption is in line with Chapter 2’s findings that mood is the most salient 
feature when it comes to recalling valenced selves. But what if people recall past selves 
where other features are more salient? For example, when recalling attachment 
experiences with one’s parents in childhood, parents’ behaviour should be more salient 
than mood. If so, temporal distance perceptions between a recalled attachment episode 
with parents and the current self may not be moderated by chronic mood, but instead by 
chronic attachment patterns. People who generally see other people as loving and 
caring (positive attachment model of others/low attachment avoidance; Brennan, Clark, 
& Shaver, 1998) may perceive a recalled positive attachment episode from one’s 
childhood as temporally recent and a recalled negative attachment episode as 
temporally distant. Conversely, people with a negative attachment model of others may 
perceive a recalled positive attachment episode from one’s childhood as temporally 
distant and a recalled negative attachment episode as temporally recent. According to 
the Inclusion-Exclusion Model of Social Judgment (IEM; Schwartz & Bless, 1992, 
2007), these divergent perceptions of temporal distance should increase attachment 
security for people with a positive attachment model of others, but decrease attachment 
security for people with a negative attachment model of others. Consistent with the 
MCM, these divergent effects should occur independent of whether people recall 
positive or negative attachment episodes with one’s parents in childhood.
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Gebauer, Broemer, Haddock, and von Hecker (under review) repeatedly found 
support for exactly these hypotheses. Specifically, the chronic attachment model of 
others and neither chronic mood nor the chronic attachment model of self moderated 
the effect of recalling valenced attachment episodes with one’s parents in childhood on 
perceived temporal distance. In turn, perceived temporal distance moderated the effect 
of recalled valenced attachment episodes on current attachment security.
These findings have at least two implications. First, Bowlby’s attachment theory 
(Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980) assumes that the mental representation of positive past 
attachment episodes leads to effects that are similar to those evoked by the physical 
presence of an attachment figure. As a consequence of this assumption, attachment 
researchers often prime secure attachment by asking people to think about their 
attachment figures (Mikulincer & Arad, 1999; Mikulincer, Bimbaum, Woddis, 
Nachmias, 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001) or to recall positive past attachment 
experiences (Mikulincer et al., 2003; Mikulincer et al., 2001a). Our research showed 
that activating positive past attachment episodes only increases attachment security for 
people with a positive attachment model of others, but decreases attachment security 
for people with a negative attachment model of others.
The second and theoretically more important implication is that the Mood 
Congruence Model (MCM) of Temporal Comparison turns out to be a special 
application of a broader congruence model of temporal comparison, which my 
collaborators and I termed the General Congruence Model (GCM) of Temporal 
Comparison. The key difference between the MCM and the GCM is the MCM’s 
narrower focus on mood congruence. The GCM subsumes the MCM by showing that it 
is not mood congruence per se that determines temporal distance perceptions between a 
recalled and the current self, but that it is congruence concerning the most salient
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feature o f the recalled self that determines assimilation and contrast effects. Future 
research should test further applications of the GCM and should test boundary 
conditions to it. For example, Gebauer, Broemer, Maio, and Haddock (in preparation) 
are currently investigating whether religious people increase their religiosity by either 
recalling personal religious or non-religious behaviours, whereas non-religious people 
should decrease their religiosity by either recalling personal religious or non-religious 
behaviours.
5.2.2 Review o f the Second Empirical Chapter
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) presented research in which 
belongingness played a crucial role in understanding of the relationship between self­
esteem and psychological health. Whereas past research has exclusively focussed on 
the amount of belongingness, my collaborators and I constructed and validated a self- 
report scale of belongingness that consists of two independent dimensions: amount of 
belongingness and unconditionality of belongingness. Both dimensions were 
independently related to better psychological health in three studies. In line with past 
research, amount of self-esteem completely mediated the relationship between amount 
of belongingness and psychological health. This finding is consistent with Sociometer 
Theory’s (Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Cox, 2007; Leary et al., 
1995) hypothesis that amount of self-esteem is a meter of a person’s amount of 
belongingness.
Further extending past research, the research presented in Chapter 3 revealed 
that contingent self-esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kemis, 2000, 2003; Kemis & 
Goldman, 2003, 2006; Kemis & Paradise, 2002) completely the relationship between
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unconditionality of belongingness and anxiety—but not depression (Figure 3.1). This 
finding is important in three ways. First, it suggests that unconditionality of 
belongingness is a possible source of non-contingent self-esteem. Second, it suggests a 
way to integrate contingent self-esteem into the belongingness framework in general 
and into Sociometer Theory in particular. Finally, and most importantly for this thesis, 
these findings provide a more complete picture of the interrelations between 
belongingness, self-esteem, and psychological health.
Future Research
I regard the research presented in Chapter 3 as a first step towards establishing 
the role of unconditionality of belongingness for belongingness research in general and 
for understanding the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health in 
particular. In this first step, my collaborators and I constructed and validated a self- 
report scale of amount and unconditionality of belongingness. Then, across several 
studies, we provided the first empirical evidence that belongingness varies not only in 
its amount, but also in its unconditionality. Nonetheless, the data presented in this 
thesis are entirely correlational in nature. Thus, on the basis of this research we cannot 
yet conclude that unconditionality of belongingness has a causal effect on 
psychological health and that this effect is mediated by contingent self-esteem.
Future research should use experimental designs to provide unequivocal support 
for this claim. In fact, my collaborators and I (Gebauer, Sedikides, & Leary, in 
preparation) are currently putting together a larger research program that will prime 
unconditional versus conditional belongingness and investigate the effects of these 
primes on self-esteem, psychological health, and motivation. This issue is important 
partly because of fascinating evidence about differences in the basis of self-esteem. For 
example, Deci and Ryan (2000) have proposed an intriguing explanation why people
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strive for self-esteem. In their view, the striving for self-esteem is a compensatory 
motive that arises from the failure to fulfil self-determination theory’s universal 
psychological needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
Similar compensatory motives in different domains of psychology have been 
hypothesized by Brennan and Morris (1997), Swann (1996), and Kuhut (1971). In 
particular, Brennan and Morris (1997) suggested that securely attached individuals 
“should derive self-esteem from warm associations with others, whereas dismissing 
individuals, lacking such associations, may learn to compensate by deriving self-esteem 
from alternative sources” (p. 23). Further, these researchers argue that “dismissing 
individuals, lacking a base of positive regard from others, should compensate by 
investing more in abilities or accomplishments” (p. 25). Similarly, Swann (1996) 
reports that some children derive their self-esteem from interpersonal relationships to 
the exclusion of achievement concerns, whereas other children neglect relationships in 
favour of personal accomplishments. Moreover, Kohut (1971) suggests that the striving 
to appear grandiose (cf. narcissism) is due to a lack of the feeling of being accepted and 
being inherently “good” in childhood.
These views are reflected in my master thesis at the University of Tubingen, 
which developed Unconditional Love Theory (ULT; Gebauer, 2005). ULT proposes 
that the hierarchically highest psychological need is a need for security, which can be 
achieved by the satisfaction of various hierarchically lower-order needs (for a similar 
argument, see Hart, Shaver, & Goldenberg, 2005). One primary subordinate need is the 
need to belong unconditionally (or unconditional love). ULT proposes that the 
unconditional quality of belongingness is vital because only belongingness that is 
unconditional cannot be lost, whereas conditional belongingness is always 
accompanied by the fear of losing belongingness (see Fromm, 1956, and Rogers, 1951,
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1961, for similar arguments regarding parental love and positive regard from the 
therapist towards the client). Hence, unconditional belongingness should satisfy the 
overarching need for security, but conditional belongingness should not. Thus, 
according to ULT, people have a fundamental psychological need for unconditional 
belongingness and develop a compensatory motive for conditional belongingness if 
they are not able to satisfy their need for unconditional belongingness.
ULT’s compensatory hypothesis may be useful for understanding the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. On the one hand, ULT 
adopts the idea of Sociometer Theory that self-esteem is a meter of one’s belongingness 
status. On the other hand, researchers have argued that the fulfilment of psychological 
needs are more strongly related to psychological health than the fulfilment of 
compensatory motives (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Reis, Sheldon, 
Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon et al., 2001; Sheldon, 
Ryan, & Reis, 1996).
Together then, our future research will further elevate the understanding of the 
relationship between belongingness (amount and unconditionality), self-esteem 
(amount and contingency), and psychological health via adopting a priming method in 
order to draw causal explanations.
5.2.2 Review o f the Third Empirical Chapter
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) presented research in which my 
collaborators and I (see also Gebauer et al., 2008b) re-examined the relationship 
between implicitly measured self-esteem and self-reported psychological health. Past 
research has generally found no relationship between implicit measures of self-esteem
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and self-reported psychological health (Schimmack & Diener, 2003; Shimizu &
Pelham, 2004), and, in the few cases where a reliable relationship emerged, this 
relationship was rendered non-significant when controlling for explicitly measured self­
esteem (e.g., Bosson et al., 2000). It is widely acknowledged that explicit measures of 
self-esteem are influenced by response biases (Baumeister et al., 1989; Famham et al., 
1999; Tice, 1991) and many researchers suggest that the only viable way of assessing 
genuine self-esteem is via implicit measures (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Famham et al. 
1999; Greenwald & Famham, 2000). Thus, the null-relation between implicitly 
measured self-esteem and self-reported psychological health seriously questions 
whether there is a relationship between self-esteem and psychological health at all.
Chapter 4 described how the absence of a reliable relationship between 
implicitly measured self-esteem and self-reported psychological health may be due to 
problems with existing implicit measures of self-esteem. Several researchers have 
speculated that existing implicit measures of self-esteem assess domain-specific rather 
than global self-esteem (Banaji, 1999; Bosson et al., 2000), and more recent research 
has supported this claim empirically (Campbell et al., 2007; Sakellaropoulo & Baldwin, 
2007; Wentura et al., 2005). My collaborators and I reasoned that one reason that led to 
null-results between implicitly measured self-esteem and self-reported psychological 
health in the past may be because available implicit measures fail to assess global self­
esteem. Thus, we developed and validated an implicit measure of global self-esteem -  
the Name Liking Measure.
Name Liking related consistently to psychological health in two studies.
Further, this relationship even remained significant after controlling for explicitly 
measured self-esteem. Together then, the relationship between self-esteem and 
psychological health is pervasive even if it is argued that explicit measures of self­
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esteem are unsuitable for assessing self-esteem (Baumeister et al., 1989; Famham et al., 
1999; Tice, 1991) and that only implicit measures of self-esteem can assess genuine 
self-esteem (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Famham et al., 1999; Greenwald & Famham, 
2000).
Future Research
With a series of subsequent studies, Constantine Sedikides and I (Gebauer & 
Sedikides, in preparation) have tried to understand the suitability of assessing self­
esteem with explicit measures of global self-esteem versus Name Liking. The first aim 
of this subsequent project is to evaluate critically the claim of some researchers that 
explicit measures of self-esteem are unsuitable to assessing self-esteem. The second 
aim is to utilize the lessons learned from research elucidating the first aim, in order to 
better understand the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. In a 
first study, participants completed an explicit measure of global self-esteem and our 
Name Liking measure. Further, participants provided the addresses of two friends who 
functioned as peer-reporters of participants’ self-esteem. Also, the peer-reporters 
indicated to what degree they feel suitable to function as an objective observer of the 
participant’s personality. The results of this study revealed Name Liking was positively 
related to peer-reported self-esteem, whereas the explicit measure of global self-esteem 
was unrelated to peer-reported self-esteem. Interestingly, this effect occurred only when 
peer-reporters indicated that they are suitable to function as objective observers. For 
peer-reporters who indicated that they are unsuitable as objective observers, the 
opposite was the case: the explicit measure of self-esteem related positively to peer- 
reported self-esteem, and the implicit measure of global self-esteem was unrelated to 
peer-reported self-esteem. This pattern of findings suggests that Name Liking is a more 
suitable measure of real or genuine self-esteem than are explicit measures of self-
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esteem. Furthermore, these findings are first empirical support of Baumeister et al.’s 
(1989; see also Tice, 1990) assertion that explicit measures of self-esteem assess the 
motivation to possess high self-esteem, rather than actual level of self-esteem.
In the next step, we wished to consolidate the finding that explicit measures of 
self-esteem are less suitable measures of self-esteem than the Name Liking measure. 
Thus, we conducted a study testing which measure of self-esteem is more strongly 
related to IAT-Anxiety (Egloff & Schmukle, 2002). IAT-Anxiety assesses trait levels of 
anxiety via an IAT procedure (see Chapter 4, Study 8 for a description of the IAT).
IAT-Anxiety has been shown to be a suitable measure of anxiety, with scores free of 
social desirability. Because of the resilience to being biased by social desirability, IAT- 
Anxiety has been found to predict a number of behavioural manifestations of anxiety, 
which are not predicted by self-report measures of anxiety (e.g., experimenter-rated 
anxiety, performance decrements after failure, and behavioural indicators of anxiety 
during a stressful speech; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002). The results of our study including 
IAT-Anxiety among measures of self-esteem were in line with our prior evidence that 
explicit measures of self-esteem are unsuitable for assessing genuine self-esteem. 
Specifically, the explicit measures of self-esteem were unrelated to IAT-Anxiety 
scores, but Name Liking did relate to IAT-Anxiety.
5.3 Tying Everything Together
If I had to summarize what I have learned from three years of research on the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health, I would say that I have 
learned that this relationship is far more complex and multifaceted than I originally 
anticipated. First, under certain circumstances, self-esteem exerts effects on
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psychological health, but, under other circumstances, psychological health exerts 
effects on self-esteem (see Chapter 2). Second, self-esteem is closely bound to 
belongingness and both constructs do not only vary in their amount, but also in their 
unconditionality. Both amount and unconditionality of belongingness and self-esteem 
are independently related to psychological health (see Chapter 3). Finally, implicit and 
explicit measures of self-esteem sometimes converge and sometimes diverge in their 
relationship with psychological health (see Chapter 4). Nonetheless, past research, the 
research presented in this thesis, and the research that followed the research in this 
thesis all paint a picture that helps to identify major and minor contributors to the 
relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. Although a single model 
will never be able to completely explain this relationship, a new fruitful, integrative 
model may be beneficial.
In my opinion, this new model is Unconditional Love Theory (ULT, Gebauer, 
2005). It attempts to explain as much variance in the relationship between self-esteem 
and psychological health as possible, while drawing attention to additional processes 
that are not a part of the model but nonetheless contribute to the relationship between 
self-esteem and psychological health. The model can be understood by considering that 
a suitable starting point for thinking about the relation between any two variables is to 
understand the nature and function of each individual variable involved in this 
relationship. With regard to the relationship between self-esteem and psychological 
health, there exists a lot of research on each variable, but relatively little research 
concerns the function of these variables. In other words, why do people possess self­
esteem and psychological health?
Only two theories to date explain comprehensively why people need self­
esteem: Terror Management Theory (TMT; e.g., Greenberg et al., 1986; Pyszczynski et
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al., 2004; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) and Sociometer Theory (Leary, 
2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Cox, 2007; Leary et al., 1995). TMT 
conceptualizes self-esteem as a buffer against the existential terror that is accompanied 
by the awareness of one’s own death. Sociometer Theory conceptualizes self-esteem as 
a meter of the level of belongingness. There is heated debate between the two camps of 
researchers, with each camp attacking and dismissing the reasoning of the other (e.g., 
Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Pyszczynski et al., 2004). A closer look at both theories, 
however, suggests that the TMT’s and the Sociometer Theory’s explanations of why 
people need self-esteem are not all that different.
Both theories seem to suggest that self-esteem is an epiphenomenon, although 
Sociometer Theory is more explicit in this claim than TMT. Sociometer Theory 
suggests that self-esteem is a gauge or meter of one’s amount of belongingness, which 
developed evolutionarily, because a sufficient level of belongingness has always been 
vital for the survival of our species. Consequently, there is high evolutionary value in 
possessing a sophisticated monitoring system that tracks one’s belongingness status 
(e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Similarly, in order to explain why self-esteem buffers 
people from the paralyzing terror of death awareness, TMT posits that high self-esteem 
results from feelings of literal or symbolic immortality, with feelings of literal or 
symbolic immortality being achieved by living up to cultural standards of value (e.g., 
Pyszczynski et al., 2004). This hypothesis assumes that the real buffer against death 
anxiety is the feeling of overcoming death, either literally or symbolically. Put simply, 
TMT assumes that self-esteem is a meter or gauge of people’s “immortality status” and 
hence, is similar to the meter or gauge hypothesis of people’s belongingness status 
(Sociometer Theory; Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Cox, 2007; 
Leary et al., 1995). In both cases, self-esteem is an epiphenomenon.
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Thus, the real debate between TMT and Sociometer Theory is whether self­
esteem gauges immortality status or belongingness status. Unconditional Love Theory 
(ULT, Gebauer, 2005) suggests that both may play a role. According to ULT, 
psychological needs can be ordered hierarchically (e.g., see Maslow, 1968) with the 
overarching or most fundamental psychological need being a need for security (for 
initial empirical support, see Hart et al., 2005). Felt immortality and a high 
belongingness status can both contribute to this security need: self-esteem is assumed to 
indirectly -  via the satisfaction of one’s security need -  gauge both immortality status 
and belongingness status. This interpretation is in line with the many findings 
supporting TMT (for reviews, see Greenberg et al., 1986; Pyszczynski et al., 2004; 
Solomon et al., 1991) and Sociometer Theory (for reviews, see Leary, 2006; Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Cox, 2007; Leary et al., 1995) and, therefore promises to 
reconcile the dispute between the two theories.
With the assertion that self-esteem is an epiphenomenon that monitors or gauges 
people’s security status, the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health 
becomes equivalent to the relationship between felt security and psychological health. 
Although many different factors contribute to psychological security (e.g., felt 
immortality, certainty, etc.), ULT concurs with Sociometer Theory in ascribing 
belongingness a central role in achieving psychological security. Again, this is not to 
say that other variables do not exert important effects on psychological security and 
thus self-esteem. However, the evolutionary importance of belongingness (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995) and the high correlations between belongingness and self-esteem 
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000) provide a compelling argument for the centrality of 
belongingness as a contributor to psychological security and thus self-esteem.
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Of importance, ULT extends Sociometer Theory by proposing a need to belong 
unconditionally, rather than a need to belong per se. The rational for this emphasis on 
the need to belong unconditionally is that there are reasons to believe that a high level 
of belongingness does not always foster psychological security. These reasons were 
outlined in my description of theory and research by humanistic psychologists in 
Chapters 1 and 3 (e.g., Fromm, 1965; Rogers, 1951, 1961), and in my description of 
Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) argument for a role of conditionality of belongingness. 
Moreover, Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence for the importance of the 
unconditionality dimension in research on belongingness. This chapter shows that 
people with a high amount and high unconditionality of belongingness are 
psychologically most healthy, whereas people with a high amount and high 
conditionality of belongingness are psychologically less healthy. A strong relationship 
between the fulfilment of a candidate psychological need and psychological health is an 
important criterion for regarding the candidate need as being a real psychological need 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Reis et al., 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 
1999; Sheldon et al., 2001; Sheldon et al., 1996). Thus, these data provide initial 
support for a need to belong unconditionally, which stands in the service of the 
hierarchically higher need for psychological security. The hierarchical structure is 
further elucidated by the finding that the relation between level of belongingness and 
psychological health was mediated by level of self-esteem and that the relation between 
unconditionality of belongingness and psychological health (at least anxiety) was 
mediated by contingent self-esteem (see Chapter 3, Study 7). This evidence supports 
the idea that both level of self-esteem and contingent self-esteem function as gauges of 
belongingness.
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Together then, these analyses suggest that the main reason why self-esteem is 
related to psychological health is that self-esteem mirrors one’s psychological security 
status and psychological security is related to psychological health. Of importance, 
unconditional belongingness plays a major role in the aforementioned model, because 
psychological security is to a large degree determined by fulfilling the hierarchically 
lower need for unconditional belongingness. This model fits abundant research and 
theoretical assumptions that self-esteem plays a causal role in the relationship between 
self-esteem and psychological health (for a review, see Baumeister et al., 2003).
The above reasoning not withstanding, the empirical foundation of ULT is still 
sparse. More research is needed to test the key assumptions of the theory: First, it is 
important to find a way to assess the need for and level of psychological security. 
Second, research that facilitates strong causal conclusions is needed (e.g., priming 
studies, longitudinal studies). Finally, research should elucidate the dynamics 
underlying the aforementioned motive to compensate the lack of a high amount of 
unconditional belongingness via the pursuit of conditional belongingness.
Nonetheless, two of the three empirical chapters of this study helped to lay the 
groundwork for this research. Specifically, as described in Chapter 3, my collaborators 
and I have developed and validated a self-report measure of the amount and 
unconditionality of belongingness. This measure will be central for future analyses of 
the effects of the unconditionality of belongingness. Furthermore, as described in 
Chapter 4, my collaborators and I have developed and validated a novel implicit 
measure of self-esteem, which promises to be a useful research tool for assessing self­
esteem within the belongingness and security framework. The use of the Name Liking 
measure in this respect is particularly pressing, given the accumulating evidence for the 
unsuitability of explicit measures of self-esteem (Baumeister et al., 1989; Dijksterhuis
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et al., 2008; Famham et al., 1999; Gebauer & Sedikides, in preparation; Homey, 1937; 
Tice, 1991).
Together then, future research that builds on the research presented in this thesis 
promises to further increase our understanding of the relationship between self-esteem 
and psychological health. It is likely that studying a need for unconditional 
belongingness and the issues related to this need may help to understand much of what 
is currently puzzling in the relationship between self-esteem and psychological health. 
Over and above this, Chapter 2 is an important reminder that the relation between self­
esteem and psychological health is not solely due to a causal effect of self-esteem. The 
MCM lines out a sound reasoning for a causal effect of chronic mood on self-esteem in 
the domain of recalling valenced selves. There may be numerous other domains in 
which psychological health may affect self-esteem and future research is needed to 
identify these domains.
On page 1 of this thesis, I summarized friends and colleagues’ sceptical 
questions about my dissertation research. 170 pages later -  on the last page of this 
thesis -  it is worth revisiting these questions. People have wondered whether the study 
of a single relation between two psychological variables is negligible, given the large 
number of variables in our discipline. I hope that I was able to infect the reader with the 
fascination that I possess for the relationship between self-esteem and psychological 
health. At the minimum, I hope that this thesis makes the point for more thorough 
research on this relationship well. Similarly, people have wondered how it can take all 
of three whole years to “figure out” the relationship between self-esteem and 
psychological health. As is true for most research, the extended “future direction” 
sections in this chapter show that “figuring out” this relationship will take many more 
years. I would like to believe that this thesis has made some progress in the right
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direction towards the final aim to fully understand the relationship between self-esteem 
and psychological health.
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Regression analyses employed in Studies 9 to 13.
Study 9 first name surname full name
Explicit Measure of Global Self-esteem .36 *** .21 ** .36 ***(hierarchical regression)
Domain-Specific Self-Esteem Measure -  Ability .17 .13 .15(hierarchical regression)
Domain-Specific Self-Esteem Measure -  Social 
(hierarchical regression) .00 .06 .02
Domain-Specific Self-Esteem Measure -  Appearance .09 .01 .09(hierarchical regression)
Domain-Specific Self-Esteem Measure -  Public 
(hierarchical regression) .03 .02 -.08
Study 10 first name surname full-name
Depression -.14 * -.12 * -.15 **(controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem)
Study 11 first name surname full-name
Explicit Measure of Self-Esteem x Response Time -.05 - 13 ** -.11 *(multiple regression)
Subjective Well-Being .10 .17 ** .12 *(controlling for explicitly measured self-esteem)
Study 12 first name surname full-name
No-Load Explicit Measure of Self-Esteem .08 .06 .05(controlling for load self-esteem)
Load Explicit Measure of Self-Esteem 
(controlling for no-load self-esteem) .28 .27 .55 *
Observer-Rated Anxiety -.10 -.43 ** -.41 *(controlling for no-load self-esteem)
Study 13 first name surname full-name
Impression Management -.03 .03 .03(controlling for Self-Deceptive Enhancement)
Self-Deceptive Enhancement .15 * 22 *** 23 ***(controlling for Impression Management)
Note. *** = (/?< .001), ** = (p < .01), * = (p< .05).
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